Legal provisions of COM(2021)579 - Regulation Towards the future Generalised Scheme of Preferences legal framework granting trade advantages to developing countries

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dossier COM(2021)579 - Regulation Towards the future Generalised Scheme of Preferences legal framework granting trade advantages to developing ...
document COM(2021)579 EN
date September 22, 2021


CHAPTER I

General provisions

Contents

Article 1

1. The scheme of generalised tariff preferences by which the Union provides preferential access to its market (the ‘scheme’ or ‘GSP’) shall apply in accordance with this Regulation.

2. The scheme provides for the following tariff preference arrangements:

(a)a standard arrangement (‘Standard GSP’);

(b)a special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (‘GSP+’);

(c)a special arrangement for the least-developed countries (Everything But Arms (‘EBA’)).

Article 2

For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

(1) ‘countries’ means countries and territories possessing a customs administration;

(2) ‘eligible countries’ means developing countries listed in Annex I;

(3) ‘Standard GSP beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the standard arrangement as listed in Annex I;

(4) ‘GSP+ beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance as listed in Annex I;

(5) ‘EBA beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries as listed in Annex I;

(6) ‘Common Customs Tariff duties’ means the duties specified in Part Two of Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 23 , except those duties established as part of tariff quotas;

(7) ‘section’ means any of the sections of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;

(8) ‘chapter’ means any of the chapters of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87;

(9) ‘GSP section’ means a section listed in Annex III and established on the basis of sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff;

(10) ‘preferential market access arrangement’ means preferential access to the Union market through a trade agreement, either provisionally applied or in force, or through autonomous preferences granted by the Union;

(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, thus ensuring fulfilment of the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country’s entire territory;

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point.

(13) ‘regional cumulation between beneficiary countries of different regional groups’ means the cumulation of origin referred to in Article 55(5) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446;

(14) ‘extended cumulation’ means the cumulation of origin referred to in Article 56(1) Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446.

Article 3

1. A list of eligible countries is established in Annex I, columns A and B.

2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend columns A and B of the table in Annex I to take account of changes in the international status or classification of countries, their economic development, or their trade, financing and development needs.

3. The Commission shall notify an eligible country concerned of any relevant changes in its status under the scheme.

CHAPTER II

Standard arrangement

Article 4

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the standard arrangement referred to in Article 1(2), point (a) unless:

(a)it has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income or an upper-middle income country during three consecutive years immediately preceding the update of the list of beneficiary countries; or

(b)it benefits from a preferential market access arrangement with the Union which provides the same tariff preferences as the scheme, or better, for substantially all trade.

2. Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to least-developed countries, as identified by the United Nations.

Article 5

1. Standard GSP beneficiary countries meeting the criteria laid down in Article 4 are listed in Annex I, column C.

2. By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex I. To provide a standard GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change of the country's status under the scheme:

(a)the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of standard GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of Article 4(1), point (a), shall apply as of 1 January of the year following one year after the date of entry into force of that decision;

(b)the decision to remove a beneficiary country from the list of standard GSP beneficiary countries, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and on the basis of Article 4(1), point (b), shall apply as of 1 January of the year following two years after the date of application of a preferential market access arrangement.

3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I, column C, on the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 4.

4. The Commission shall notify the standard GSP beneficiary country concerned of any changes of its status under the scheme.

Article 6

1. The products included under the standard arrangement referred to in Article 1(2), point (a), are listed in Annex III.

2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to incorporate changes made necessary by amendments to the Combined Nomenclature.

Article 7

1. Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex III as non-sensitive products shall be suspended entirely, except for agricultural components.

2. Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on products listed in Annex III as sensitive products shall be reduced by 3,5 percentage points. For products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b of Annex III, that reduction shall be 20 %.

3. Where preferential duty rates calculated, in accordance with Article 7(3) of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, on the Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties applicable on the date of entry into force of this Regulation provide for a tariff reduction of more than 3,5 percentage points for the products referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, those preferential duty rates shall apply.

4. Common Customs Tariff specific duties, other than minimum or maximum duties, on products listed in Annex III as sensitive products shall be reduced by 30 %.

5. Where Common Customs Tariff duties on products listed in Annex III as sensitive products include ad valorem duties and specific duties, the specific duties shall not be reduced.

6. Where duties reduced in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 specify a maximum duty, that maximum duty shall not be reduced. Where such duties specify a minimum duty, that minimum duty shall not apply.

Article 8

1. The tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 shall be suspended, in respect of products of a GSP section originating in a standard GSP beneficiary country, when the average value of Union imports of such products over three consecutive years from that standard GSP beneficiary country exceeds the thresholds listed in Annex IV. The thresholds shall be calculated as a percentage of the total value of Union imports of the same products from all GSP beneficiary countries.

2. Prior to the application of the tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act establishing, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), a list of GSP sections for which the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 are suspended in respect of a standard GSP beneficiary country. That implementing act shall apply as from 1 January 2024.

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year in which the review is conducted and of the two years preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

5. The Commission shall notify the country concerned of the implementing act adopted in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.

6. Where Annex I is amended in accordance with the criteria laid down in Article 4, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex IV in order to adjust the modalities listed in that Annex so as to maintain proportionally the same weight of the GSP sections in respect of which the tariff preferences have been suspended pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.

CHAPTER III

Special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance

Article 9

A GSP beneficiary country may benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b), if the following conditions are met:

(a)it is considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification as defined in Annex V;

(b)it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the relevant conventions) and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

(c)it has not formulated a reservation in relation to any of the relevant conventions, which is prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention. 

For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention in one of the following cases:

(i)a process explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined;

(ii)in the absence of such a process, the Union where it is a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States parties to the convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in Vienna on 23 May 1969;

(d)it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

(e)it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by any of the relevant conventions and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions;

(f)it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the Union’s reporting and monitoring procedure provided for in Article 13.

Article 10

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be granted if the following conditions are met:

(a)a GSP beneficiary country has made a request to that effect;

(b)the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that therequesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, pointes (d), (e), and (f).

3. After receiving a request, the Commission shall notify the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

4. After examining the request, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

5. Where a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in Article 9, points (a) or (c) or withdraws any of its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f), the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove that country from the GSP+ arrangement.

6. The Commission shall notify the requesting country of a decision taken in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article after the delegated act amending Annex I is published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Where the requesting country is granted the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, it shall be informed of the date on which the respective delegated act will start to apply.

7. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to supplement this Regulation by establishing rules related to the procedure for granting the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines and the submission and processing of requests.

8. Countries that on 31 January 2023 are GSP+ beneficiary countries under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 can apply to be granted the GSP+ arrangement under this Regulation until 31 December 2025. The GSP+ arrangement under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 for those requesting countries will be maintained until that deadline expires and during the period of assessment of their application by the Commission and, where applicable, during the period in which the European Parliament and the Council will review the delegated act amending Annex I that has been adopted, in accordance with the procedure under Article 36(5).

Article 11

1. The products included in the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance are listed in Annex III and VII.

2. Without prejudice to Article 6(2), the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex VII to take into account amendments to the Combined Nomenclature affecting the products listed in that Annex.

Article 12

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended.

2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended entirely, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.

Article 13

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

2. A GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e), and (f) and its situation as regards Article 9, points (b) and (c).

Article 14

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

2. That report shall include:

(a)the conclusions or recommendations of relevant monitoring bodies in respect of each GSP+ beneficiary country; and

(b)the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;

The report may include any information from any source the Commission considers appropriate.

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

Article 15

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

2. The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), and its situation as referred to in Article 9, point (c), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country.

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:

(a)state the grounds for the reasonable doubt referred to in paragraph 3 which may call into question the right of the GSP+ beneficiary country to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance;

(b)specify the period, which may not exceed three months from the date of publication of the notice, within which the GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations.

5. The Commission shall provide the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b).

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide:

(a)to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure;

(b)to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the specialincentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.

8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable six months after its adoption.

11. Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article becomes applicable, the Commission is empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.

12. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to supplement this Regulation by establishing rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality and conditions for review.

Article 16

Where the Commission finds that the reasons justifying a temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences, as referred to in Article 15(1), no longer apply, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to reinstate the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.

Where some of the reasons referred to in Article 15(1) for which a temporary withdrawal has been decided continue to apply while others do not or where additional reasons to those having justified a temporary withdrawal become applicable, the measures adopted in accordance with Article 15(9) shall be adjusted accordingly.

CHAPTER IV

Special arrangement for the least-developed countries

Article 17

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country.

2. The Commission shall continuously review the list of EBA beneficiary countries contained in Annex I, column C, on the basis of the most recent available data.

Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Pending the identification by the United Nations of a newly independent country as a least-developed country, the Commission shall adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I as an interim measure so as to include such a country in the list of EBA beneficiary countries.

If such a newly independent country is not identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country during the first available review of the category of least-developed countries, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts forthwith, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove such a country from that Annex, without granting the transitional period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. The Commission shall notify the EBA beneficiary country concerned of any changes in its status under the scheme.

Article 18

The Common Customs Tariff duties on all products that are listed in Chapters 1 to 97 of the Combined Nomenclature, except those in Chapter 93, originating in an EBA beneficiary country, shall be suspended entirely.

CHAPTER V

Temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements

Article 19

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

(a)serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;

(b)export of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour and forced labour, including slavery and prison labour;

(c)serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

(d)serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body;

(e)serious and systematic infringement of the objectives adopted by Regional Fishery Organisations or any international arrangements to which the Union is a party concerning the conservation and management of fishery resources

2. Paragraph 1, point (d), does not apply with respect to products of a beneficiary country that are subject to anti-dumping or countervailing measures under Regulation (EU) No 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council n 24  or Regulation (EU) No 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council 25 .

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union announcing the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, and shall notify the beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:

(a)provide sufficient grounds in relation to the implementing act to initiate a temporary withdrawal procedure, referred to in paragraph 3;

(b)state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary, inter alia, the available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, and relevant information from other sources, including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

8. Within six months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b), the Commission shall decide:

(a)to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure;

(b)to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

11. For either of the cases referred to in paragraphs 9 and 10, the adopted act shall be based inter alia on evidence collected and received.

12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable six months after its adoption.

13. Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article becomes applicable, the Commission shall be empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.

14. Where the Commission considers that in exceptional circumstances, such as a global health or sanitary emergency, natural disaster or other unforeseen events, it is appropriate to review the scope of the temporary withdrawal, postpone or suspend the application of the temporary withdrawal, the Commission is empowered to amend the delegated act in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.

15. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to supplement this Regulation by establishing rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of all arrangements in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality, and review of any measures adopted.

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.

17. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal pursuant to paragraph 16 of this Article, such delegated act is adopted in accordance with Article 37 and shall apply one month from its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 20

Where the Commission finds that the reasons justifying a temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences, as referred to in Article 19(1), no longer apply, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to reinstate the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Where some of the reasons referred to in Article 19(1) for which a temporary withdrawal has been decided continue to apply while others do not or where additional reasons to those having justified a temporary withdrawal become applicable, the measures adopted in accordance with Article 19(10) shall be adjusted accordingly.

Article 21

1. The preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, in cases of fraud, irregularities or systematic failure to comply with or to ensure compliance with the rules concerning the origin of the products and with the procedures related thereto, or failure to provide administrative cooperation as required for the implementation and policing of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

2. The administrative cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 requires, inter alia, that a beneficiary country:

(a)communicate to the Commission and update the information necessary for the implementation of the rules of origin and the policing thereof;

(b)assist the Union by carrying out, at the request of the customs authorities of the Member States, subsequent verification of the origin of the goods, and communicate its results in time to the Commission;

(c)assist the Union by allowing the Commission, in coordination and close cooperation with the competent authorities of the Member States, to conduct the Union administrative and investigative cooperation missions in that country, in order to verify the authenticity of documents or the accuracy of information relevant for granting the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2);

(d)carry out or arrange for appropriate inquiries to identify and prevent contravention of the rules of origin;

(e)comply with or ensure compliance with the rules of origin in respect of regional cumulation, if the country benefits therefrom;

(f)assist the Union in the verification of conduct where there is a presumption of origin-related fraud, whereby the existence of fraud may be presumed where imports of products under the preferential arrangements provided for in this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of the beneficiary country's exports.

3. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, it shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2), in respect of all or certain products originating in a beneficiary country.

4. Before adopting such acts, the Commission shall first publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, stating that there are grounds for reasonable doubt about compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2, which may call into question the right of the beneficiary country to continue to enjoy the benefits granted by this Regulation.

5. The Commission shall inform the beneficiary country concerned of any act adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, before it becomes applicable.

6. The period of temporary withdrawal shall not exceed six months. At the latest on the conclusion of that period, the Commission shall adopt an immediately applicable implementing act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) either to terminate the temporary withdrawal or to extend the period of temporary withdrawal.

7. Member States shall communicate to the Commission all relevant information that may justify temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences, its extension or termination.

CHAPTER VI

Safeguard and surveillance provisions

Section I - General safeguards


Article 22

1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) is imported in volumes or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to Union producers of like or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be wholly or partially reintroduced.

2. For the purposes of this Chapter, ‘like product’ means a product which is identical, that is, alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

3. For the purposes of this Chapter, ‘interested parties’ means those parties involved in the production, distribution or sale of the imported products referred to in paragraph 1 and of like or directly competing products.

4. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36, to supplement this Regulation by establishing rules related to the procedure for adopting general safeguard measures in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality, disclosure, verification, visits and review of measures.

Article 23

Serious difficulties referred to in Article 22(1) shall be considered to exist where Union producers suffer deterioration in their economic or financial situation. In examining whether such deterioration exists, the Commission shall take account, inter alia, of the following factors concerning Union producers, where information is available:

(a)market share;

(b)production;

(c)stocks;

(d)production capacity;

(e)bankruptcies;

(f)profitability;

(g)capacity utilisation;

(h)employment;

(i)imports;

(j)prices.

Article 24

1. If it considers that there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the conditions of Article 22(1) are met, the Commission shall investigate whether the normal Common Customs Tariff duties should be wholly, or partially, reintroduced.

2. An investigation shall be initiated upon request by a Member State, by any legal person or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of Union producers, or on the Commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the Commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence, as determined on the basis of factors referred to in Article 23, to justify such initiation. The request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in Article 22(1) are met. The request shall be submitted to the Commission. The Commission shall, as far as possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request, to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.

3. Where it is apparent that there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation the Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union. Should an investigation be initiated, the notice shall provide all necessary details about the procedure and deadlines, including the possibility of recourse to the Hearing Officer of the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission. Initiation shall take place within one month of the request received pursuant to paragraph 2.

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within 12 months from its initiation.

Article 25

On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic or financial situation of Union producers, and where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.

Article 26

Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act to reintroduce the Common Customs Tariff duties in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall enter into force within one month from the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 27

Where the facts as finally established show that the conditions set out in Article 22(1) are not met, the Commission shall adopt an implementing act terminating the investigation in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3). That implementing act shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. If no implementing act is published within the period referred to in Article 24(4), the investigation shall be deemed terminated and any implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 25 shall automatically expire. Any Common Customs Tariff duties collected as a result of those implementing acts shall be refunded.

Article 28

Common Customs Tariff duties shall be wholly or partially reintroduced for as long as necessary to counteract the deterioration in the economic or financial situation of Union producers, or for as long as the threat of such deterioration persists. The period of reintroduction shall not exceed three years, unless it is extended in duly justified circumstances.

Section II - Safeguards in the Textile, Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors


Article 29

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S‑11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

(a)for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, and 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year

(b)for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to EBA beneficiary countries, nor shall it apply to countries with a share for the relevant products referred to in paragraph 1 not exceeding 6 % of total Union imports of the same products.

3. The removal of the tariff preferences shall become applicable two months after the date of publication of the Commission's act to that effect in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 30

Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, where imports of products listed in Annex I to the TFEU cause, or threaten to cause, serious disturbance to Union markets, in particular to one or more of the outermost regions, or those markets' regulatory mechanisms, the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act in order to suspend the preferential arrangements in respect of the products concerned in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3).

Article 31

The Commission shall inform the beneficiary country concerned as soon as possible of any decision taken in accordance with Articles 29 or 30 before it becomes applicable.

Section III - Surveillance in the Agricultural and Fisheries Sectors


Article 32

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, may be subject to a special surveillance mechanism, in order to avoid disturbances to Union markets. The Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, after consulting the committee for the relevant agriculture or fisheries common market organisation, shall adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 39(3), on whether to apply that special surveillance mechanism, and shall determine the products to which that surveillance mechanism is to be applied.

2. Where Section I of this Chapter is applied to products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, originating in beneficiary countries, the period referred to in Article 24(4) of this Regulation shall be reduced to two months in the following cases:

(a)when the beneficiary country concerned does not ensure compliance with the rules of origin or does not provide the administrative cooperation referred to in Article 21;

(b)when Imports of products from Chapters 1 to 24 of the Common Customs Tariff as laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87, under the preferential arrangements granted under this Regulation massively exceed the usual levels of exports from the beneficiary country concerned.

CHAPTER VII

Common provisions

Article 33

1. To benefit from the tariff preferences, the products for which the tariff preferences are claimed shall originate in a beneficiary country.

2. For the purposes of the tariff preference arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) of this Regulation, the rules on preferential origin shall be those laid down in accordance with Article 64(1) and (3) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 26 .

3. Without prejudice to the rules referred to in paragraph 2 and upon request from a beneficiary country, the Commission shall grant regional cumulation between beneficiary countries of different regional groups or extended cumulation where and as long as the following conditions are met:

(a)the request from the beneficiary country provides sufficient evidence that such cumulation is necessary in view of specific trade, development and financing needs of that country;

(b)the cumulation does not create undue trade difficulties for other eligible countries, in particular beneficiaries under the EBA arrangement, in view of possible diversion of trade flows;

(c)The beneficiary country provides evidence that it cannot comply with the rules of origin applicable to the goods in question, without such cumulation being granted.

4. When assessing if the request is justified in view of specific trade, development and financing needs of the beneficiary country, in particular on the basis of information provided by that country, the Commission shall take into account the level of dependency of the beneficiary country on integrated production with the third countries concerned by the request, the impact of such dependency for the beneficiary country, the relevance of sectors with such integrated production for the economy of the beneficiary country and future development perspectives with regard to the products in question.

5. Before the Commission reaches its decision on a request, it shall give the beneficiary country the opportunity to present its views.

Article 34

1. Where the rate of an ad valorem duty for an individual import declaration is reduced in accordance with this Regulation to 1 % or less, that duty shall be suspended entirely.

2. Where the rate of a specific duty for an individual import declaration is reduced in accordance with this Regulation to EUR 2 or less per individual euro amount, that duty shall be suspended entirely.

3. Subject to paragraphs 1 and 2, the final rate of the preferential duty calculated in accordance with this Regulation shall be rounded down to the first decimal place.

Article 35

1. The statistical source to be used for the purpose of this Regulation shall be the external trade statistics of the Commission (Eurostat).

2. Member States shall send the Commission (Eurostat) their statistical data on products placed under the customs procedure for release for free circulation under the tariff preferences pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2019/2152 of the European Parliament and of the Council 27 . In order to facilitate information and increase transparency, the Commission shall also ensure that the relevant statistical data for the GSP sections are regularly available in a public database.

3. In accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, Member States shall forward to the Commission, at its request, details of the quantities and values of products released for free circulation under the tariff preferences, during the previous months. Those data shall include the products referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article.

4. The Commission shall, in close cooperation with Member States, monitor the imports of products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 0603, 0803 90 10, 1006, 1604 14, 1604 19 31, 1604 19 39, 1604 20 70, 1701, 1704, 1806 10 30, 1806 10 90, 2002 90, 2103 20, 2106 90 59, 2106 90 98, 6403, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 3824 99 56, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996, in order to determine whether the conditions referred to in Articles 22, 29 and 30 are fulfilled.

Article 36

1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article.

2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 22 shall be conferred to the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from 1 January 2024.

3. The delegation of powers referred to in Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 or 22 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.

4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making.

5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council.

6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 or 22 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by either the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.

Article 37

1. Delegated acts adopted under this Article shall enter into force without delay and shall apply as long as no objection is expressed in accordance with paragraph 2. The notification of such a delegated act to the European Parliament and to the Council shall state the reasons for the use of the urgency procedure.

2. Either the European Parliament or the Council may object to a delegated act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 36(5). In such a case, the Commission shall repeal the act immediately following the notification of the decision to object by the European Parliament or by the Council.

Article 38

1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested.

2. Neither information of a confidential nature nor any information provided on a confidential basis received pursuant to this Regulation shall be disclosed without specific permission from the supplier of such information.

3. Each request for confidentiality shall state the reasons why the information is confidential. However, if the supplier of the information wishes neither to make it public nor to authorise its disclosure in general terms or in the form of a summary and if it appears that the request for confidentiality is unjustified, the information concerned may be disregarded.

4. Information shall in any case be considered to be confidential if its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the source of such information or on bilateral international relations of the Union.

5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not preclude reference by the Union authorities to general information and in particular to reasons on which decisions taken pursuant to this Regulation are based. Those authorities shall, however, take into account the legitimate interests of natural and legal persons concerned so that their business secrets shall not be divulged.

Article 39

1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Generalised Preferences Committee established by Regulation (EC) No 732/2008. That Committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

4. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, in conjunction with Article 5 thereof, shall apply.

Article 40

By 1 January 2027 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent three-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

By 1 January 2030, the Commission shall submit, to the European Parliament and to the Council, a report on the application of this Regulation. Such a report may, where appropriate, be accompanied by a legislative proposal.

Article 41

Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 is repealed with effect from 1 January 2024. 

References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation in accordance with the correlation table in Annex VIII.

CHAPTER VIII

Final provisions

Article 42

1. Any investigation or temporary withdrawal procedure initiated and not terminated under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 shall be re-initiated automatically under this Regulation, except in respect of a beneficiary country of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance under that Regulation if the investigation or procedure concerns only the benefits granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. However, such investigation or procedure shall be re‑initiated automatically if the same beneficiary country applies for the special incentive arrangement under this Regulation before 1 January 2025.

2. The information received in the course of an investigation initiated and not terminated under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 shall be taken into account in any re‑initiated investigation.

Article 43

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

It shall apply from 1 January 2024.

This Regulation shall apply until 31 December 2033. However, the expiry date shall neither apply to the special arrangement for the least-developed countries as established in Chapter IV, nor, to the extent that they are applied in conjunction with that Chapter, to any other provisions of this Regulation.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.