Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2011)747 - Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2011)747 - Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2011)747  |
| date | 15-11-2011 |
Credit rating agencies are important financial market participants and need to be subject to an appropriate legal framework. Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies i (CRA Regulation) entered into full application on 7 December 2010. It requires credit rating agencies (CRAs) to comply with rigorous rules of conduct in order to mitigate possible conflicts of interest, ensure high quality and sufficient transparency of ratings and the rating process. Existing CRAs had to apply for registration and to comply with the requirements of the Regulation by 7 September 2010.
An amendment to the CRA Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 513/2011) entered into force on 1 June 2011, entrusting the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) with exclusive supervisory powers over CRAs registered in the EU in order to centralise and simplify their registration and supervision at European level i.
Whilst providing a good basis, a number of issues related to credit rating activities and the use of ratings have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing CRA Regulation. These relate notably to the risk of overreliance on credit ratings by financial market participants, the high degree of concentration in the rating market, civil liability of credit rating agencies vis-à-vis investors, conflicts of interests with regard to the issuer-pays model and CRAs' shareholder structure. The specifics of sovereign ratings which became evident during the current sovereign debt crisis are also not specifically addressed in the current CRA Regulation.
The European Commission pointed to these open issues in its Communication of 2 June 2010 ("Regulating financial services for sustainable growth") i and in a consultation paper of the Commission services of 5 November 2010 i announcing the need for a targeted review of the CRA Regulation which is delivered with this proposal.
On 8 June 2011, the European Parliament issued a non-legislative resolution on CRAs i. The report supports the need to enhance the regulatory framework for credit rating agencies and to take measures to reduce the risk of overreliance on ratings. More specifically, the European Parliament supports, amongst others, enhanced disclosure requirements for sovereign ratings, the establishment of a European Rating Index, increased disclosure of information on structured finance instruments and civil liability of credit rating agencies. The European Parliament also regarded stimulation of competition as an important task and considered that the establishment of an independent European Credit Rating Agency should also be explored and assessed by the Commission.
At an informal ECOFIN meeting of 30 September and 1 October 2010 the Council of the European Union acknowledged that further efforts should be made to address a number of issues related to credit rating activities, including the risk of overreliance on credit ratings and the risk of conflict of interests stemming from the remuneration model of rating agencies. The European Council of 23 October 2011 concluded that progress is needed on reducing overreliance on credit ratings.
In addition, the European Securities Committee and the European Banking Committee composed of representatives of Member States' ministries of finance discussed the need to further strengthen the regulatory framework for credit rating agencies at their meetings of 9 November 2010 and 19 September 2011.
At the international level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued in October 2010 principles to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on CRA ratings i. The principles call for removing or replacing references to such ratings in legislation where suitable alternative standards of creditworthiness are available and for requiring investors to make their own credit assessments. Those principles were endorsed by the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010.
The Commission has recently addressed the question of overreliance on ratings by financial institutions in the context of the reform of the banking legislation i. The Commission proposed the introduction of a rule requiring banks and investment firms to assess themselves the credit risk of entities and financial instruments in which they invest and not to simply rely on external ratings in this respect. A similar provision is proposed by the Commission in the draft amendment to the Directives on UCITS and on managers of alternative investment funds i, which are proposed in parallel to this proposal for a Regulation.
Contents
- RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
- BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
- On 6 July, the Commission services held a roundtable in order to obtain further feedback from relevant stakeholders on these issues. A summary of the roundtable can be found at
- An impact assessment has been produced for this proposal. It can be found at
- 3.1. Legal basis
- 3.2. Subsidiarity and proportionality
- 3.3. Compliance with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU
- 3.4. Explanation of the proposal
- 3.4.1. Extension of the scope of application of the Regulation to cover rating outlooks
- 3.4.2. Amendments in relation to the use of credit ratings
- 3.4.3. Amendments in relation to the independence of CRAs
- 3.4.4. Amendments in relation to the disclosure of information on methodologies of CRAs, credit ratings and rating outlooks
- 3.4.5. Amendments in relation to sovereign ratings
- 3.4.6. Amendments in relation to the comparability of credit ratings and fees for credit ratings
- 3.4.7. Amendments in relation to the civil liability of credit rating agencies vis-à-vis investors
- 3.4.8. Other amendments
- 3.4.9 The question of the European Rating Agency
The European Commission conducted a public consultation from 5 November 2010 to 7 January 2011 presenting various options to address the issues identified. The Commission received approximately 100 contributions from stakeholders which have been taken into account in drafting this proposal. A summary of the responses to the consultation paper can be found at
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs
On 6 July, the Commission services held a roundtable in order to obtain further feedback from relevant stakeholders on these issues. A summary of the roundtable can be found at
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/agencies
The impact assessment identified the following problems:
– the requirements to use external credit ratings in legislation, the excessive use of external ratings for internal risk management by investors, the investment strategies directly linked to ratings as well as the insufficient information on structured finance instruments results in overreliance on external credit ratings leading to procyclicality and 'cliff' effects i in capital markets;
– insufficient objectivity, completeness and transparency on the sovereign rating process, together with the overreliance, leads to 'cliff' and contagion effects of sovereign rating changes;
– high concentration in the credit rating market, high barriers to entry into the market of credit ratings and lack of comparability of ratings result in limited choice and competition in the credit rating market;
– insufficient right of redress for users of ratings suffering losses due to an inaccurate rating issued by a CRA that infringes the CRA Regulation;
– potentially undermined independence of CRAs due to conflicts of interest arising from the 'issuer-pays' model, ownership structure and long tenure of the same CRA; and
– insufficiently sound credit rating methodologies and processes.
The general objective of the proposal is to contribute to reducing the risks to financial stability and restoring the confidence of investors and other market participants in financial markets and ratings quality. Different policy options were considered in order to address the identified problems and thus reach the corresponding specific objectives:
– to diminish the impact of 'cliff' effects on financial institutions and markets by reducing reliance on external ratings;
– to mitigate the risks of contagion effects linked to sovereign ratings changes;
– to improve credit rating market conditions, since there is limited choice and competition in the credit rating market, with a view to improving the quality of ratings;
– to ensure a right of redress for investors, since currently there is an insufficient right of redress for users of ratings who have suffered losses due to a credit rating issued by a CRA that has infringed the CRA Regulation; and
– to improve the quality of ratings by reinforcing the independence of CRAs and promoting sound credit rating processes and methodologies. Currently, the independence of CRAs is potentially undermined due to conflicts of interest arising from the 'issuer-pays' model, the ownership structure and long tenure of business relations with one and the same CRA.
The preferred policy options are set out in section 3.4. below and reflected in this proposal. These options are expected to reduce overreliance by financial institutions on external ratings by reducing the importance of external ratings in financial services legislation. In addition, issuers' disclosure regarding the underlying asset pools of structured finance products is expected to help investors to make their own credit risk assessment, rather than leaving them to rely solely on external ratings.
The transparency and quality of sovereign ratings will be improved through verification of underlying information and publication of the full research report accompanying the rating. Comparison of ratings from distinct rating agencies, facilitated by promoting common standards for rating scales and a European Rating Index (EURIX), is expected to improve choice and optimise rating industry structure. Also, mandatory rotation of CRAs would not only substantially reduce the familiarity threat to CRA independence resulting from a long business relationship between a CRA and an issuer, but would also have a significant positive effect on improving choice in the rating industry by providing more business opportunities for smaller CRAs.
In terms of investor protection, setting up a right of redress for investors against CRAs should provide strong incentives for CRAs to comply with legal obligations and to ensure high quality ratings. Independence of ratings will be improved by introducing a requirement for issuers to change CRA periodically and enhancing the independence requirements on the ownership structure of CRAs. Also, a CRA should not be able to provide solicited ratings for an issuer and its products simultaneously.
In addition, transparency and quality of ratings would be improved by strengthening the rules on the disclosure of rating methodologies, by introducing a process for the development and approval of rating methodologies, including the requirement for CRAs to communicate and justify the reasons for modifications to their rating methodologies and by requiring CRAs to inform issuers sufficiently in advance of the publication of a rating.
In terms of costs, there would be additional costs for financial firms resulting from the requirements to enhance internal risk management and the use of internal rating models for regulatory purposes and for issuers due to enhanced disclosure requirements. CRAs will also incur additional recurring compliance costs to mitigate risks of contagion effects linked to sovereign ratings. However, measures to improve competition would not significantly increase the costs for CRAs. The policy option related to civil liability of CRAs towards investors is expected to cause compliance costs due to the need to insure their civil liability or, in the absence of the insurability, to create a financial buffer to cover potential claims from investors. Finally, the preferred options dealing with CRA independence are not expected to entail any significant costs.
The proposal is based on Article 114 TFEU.
According to the principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 i of the TEU), action at the EU level should be taken only where the aims envisaged cannot be achieved sufficiently by Member States alone and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the EU. The business of credit rating agencies is global. Ratings issued by a credit rating agency based in one Member State are used and relied upon by market participants throughout the EU. Failures or the lack of a regulatory framework for credit rating agencies in one specific Member State could adversely affect market participants and financial markets EU-wide. Therefore, sound regulatory rules applicable throughout the EU are necessary to protect investors and markets from possible shortcomings. Therefore any further actions in the field of CRAs can best be achieved by EU action.
The proposed amendments are also proportionate, as required by Article 5 i of the TEU. The amendments do not exceed what is necessary to achieve their objectives. The conditions of independence of credit rating agencies are particularly enhanced: issuers are required to regularly change the credit rating agency they pay to issue credit ratings and to appoint different credit rating agencies to issue credit ratings on them and on their debt instruments. These obligations, although limiting business freedom, are proportionate to the objectives pursued and take account of the regulatory environment. They only apply regarding a service in the public-interest (credit ratings that can be used for regulatory purposes) by certain regulated institutions (credit rating agencies) under certain conditions (issuer-pays model) and, in the case of rotation, on a temporary basis. Credit rating agencies are, however, not prevented from continuing to provide credit rating services in the market: a credit rating agency which is required to refrain from providing credit rating services to a particular issuer would still be able to provide credit ratings to other issuers. In a market context where the rotation rule applies across the board, business opportunities will arise since all issuers would need to change credit rating agency. Also, credit rating agencies may always issue unsolicited credit rating on the same issuer, capitalising on their experience.
The amendments also foresee that investors and large credit rating agencies are limited regarding some investment choices. Investors holding a participation of at least 5% in a CRA are prevented to hold more than 5% in any other CRA. This restriction is necessary to guarantee the perception of independence of CRAs, which could be affected should the same shareholders or members be significantly investing in different credit rating agencies not belonging to the same group of credit rating agencies, even if those shareholders or members are not in position to legally exercise dominant influence or control. This risk is higher considering that EU registered CRAs are unlisted, and therefore less transparent, companies. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that purely economic investments in credit rating agencies are still possible, the prohibition to simultaneously invest in more than one credit rating agency is not to be extended to investments channelled through collective investment schemes managed by third parties independent from the investor and not subject to his or her influence.
On 23 September 2009, the Commission adopted proposals for Regulations establishing EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA. In this respect the Commission wishes to recall the Statements in relation to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU it made at the adoption of the Regulations establishing the European Supervisory Authorities according to which: 'As regards the process for the adoption of regulatory standards, the Commission emphasises the unique character of the financial services sector, following from the Lamfalussy structure and explicitly recognised in Declaration 39 to the TFEU. However, the Commission has serious doubts whether the restrictions on its role when adopting delegated acts and implementing measures are in line with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.'
Article 1 of this proposal amends the CRA Regulation. References in the following sub-sections refer to the amended or new articles in the CRA Regulation, unless specified.
In addition to credit ratings, CRAs also publish 'rating outlooks' providing an opinion on the likely future direction of a credit rating. The Commission proposal extends the scope of the rules on credit ratings to also cover, where appropriate, 'rating outlooks'. The amended text requests in particular that CRAs disclose the time horizon during which a change of the credit rating is expected (cf. Annex I, Section D, Part II, point 2(f)). The CRA Regulation is therefore specifically adapted in different places: Articles 3, 6 i, 7 i, 8 i, and 10 i and i; in Annex I, Section B, points 1, 3, and 7; Section C, points 2, 3 and 7; Section D, Part I, points 1, 2, 4 and 5; and Section E, Part I, point 3. In addition, the amendments described below are also adapted, where appropriate, to the introduction of the “rating outlook” concept.
The new Article 5a inserted in the CRA Regulation requires certain financial institutions to make their own credit risk assessment. They should therefore avoid relying solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of assets. Competent authorities should supervise the adequacy of these financial firms' credit assessment processes including monitoring that financial firms do not over-rely on credit ratings. This rule stems from the Financial Stability Board's principles for reducing reliance on CRA Ratings of October 2010.
Also, in accordance with the new Article 5b, ESMA, EBA and EIOPA should not refer to credit ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and draft technical standards where such references have the potential to trigger mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by competent authorities or financial market participants. Moreover, they should adapt their existing guidelines and recommendations accordingly, and by 31 December 2013 at the latest.
Other amendments aim at addressing the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings by financial market participants as regards structured finance instruments and at increasing the quality of the credit ratings regarding such instruments:
– Article 8a: this new article requires issuers (or originators or sponsors) to disclose specific information on structured finance products on an ongoing basis, in particular on the main elements of underlying asset pools for structured finance products necessary for investors to make their own credit assessment and thus avoid the need to rely on external ratings. This information is to be disclosed through a centralised website operated by ESMA;
– Article 8b: this new article requires issuers (or their related third parties) who solicit a rating to engage two credit rating agencies, independent from each other, to issue two independent credit ratings in parallel on the same structured finance instruments.
Finally, it should be noted that the Commission is proposing in parallel amendments of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS)[10] and Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers to make sure that the principle of avoiding over-reliance on credit ratings is also integrated into the national legislation implementing those directives.
This group of amendments establishes stricter independence rules which aim at addressing conflicts of interests with regard to the issuer-pays model and CRAs' shareholder structure:
– Article 6a: this new article prevents any member or shareholder of a CRA that holds a participation of at least 5% to hold 5% or more in any other CRA, unless the CRAs in question are members of the same group;
– Article 6b: this new article introduces a rotation rule for the CRAs engaged by the issuer (i.e. it does not apply to unsolicited ratings) to either rate the issuer itself or its debt instruments. The CRA engaged should not be in place for more than 3 years or for more than a year if it rates more than ten consecutive rated debt instruments of the issuer. However, this latter rule shall not lead to shortening the permitted period of engagement to less than a year. Where the issuer solicits more than one rating for itself or for its instrument, be it because of a legal obligation to do so or voluntarily, only one of the agencies has to rotate. However, the maximum duration for each of these CRAs is fixed at a period of six years. The former CRA (or any other CRA belonging to the same group or having shareholder links with the former CRA) should not be able to rate again the same issuer or its instruments until an appropriate cooling off period has elapsed. This article also foresees that the outgoing CRA provides the incoming CRA with a handover file including relevant information;
This rotation rule is expected to significantly mitigate the potential conflicts of interest issues relating to the issuer-pays model. Moreover, the Commission will continue to monitor the appropriateness of credit rating agencies' remuneration models and will submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and the Council by 7 December 2012, as required by Article 39 i of the Regulation. In this context, the Commission will also consider more far going solutions to this issue as currently assessed in other jurisdictions, including the US.
Article 6b does not apply to sovereign ratings;
– Annex I, Section C, point 8 in relation to Article 7 i: the rules on the internal rotation of staff within a CRA have been adapted to take account of the new Article 6b. The new rules provide that the lead rating analysts should not be involved in rating the same entity for more than 4 years, thus preventing those analysts from moving to another CRA with a client file. Rules on internal rotation rules are furthermore provided for in the case a CRA provides unsolicited ratings or sovereign ratings;
– Annex I, Section B, point 3: the Regulation would prevent a CRA from issuing credit ratings (or would require that CRA to disclose that the credit rating may be affected) where there are actual or potential conflicts of interests created by the involvement of (in addition to the CRA and its staff, already covered by the rules) persons who hold more than 10% of the capital or voting rights of the CRA, or are otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the CRA, in certain situations, such as investment in the rated entity, being member of the board of the rated entity etc;
– Annex I, Section B, point 4: persons who hold more than 5% of the capital or voting rights of the CRA, or are otherwise in a position to exercise significant influence on the business activities of the CRA should not be allowed to provide consultancy or advisory services to the rated entity regarding the corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities of that rated entity.
3.4.4. Amendments in relation to the disclosure of information on methodologies of CRAs, credit ratings and rating outlooks
Another group of amendments strengthen the rules on the disclosure of rating methodologies, with a view to promoting sound credit rating processes and, in fine, improve rating quality:
– Articles 8(5a), 8(6)(aa) and 22a i: these proposed provisions lay down procedures for the preparation of new rating methodologies or the modification of existing ones. They require the consultation of stakeholders on the new methodologies or the proposed changes and on their justification. CRAs should furthermore submit the proposed methodologies to ESMA for the assessment of their compliance with existing requirements. The new methodologies may only be used once they have been approved by ESMA. The rules also require the publication of the new methodologies together with a detailed explanation;
– Article 8 i: each CRA will be under the obligation to correct errors in its methodologies or in their application, as well as to inform ESMA, the rated entities and generally the public of such errors;
– Annex I, Section D, Part I, point 2a: the requirement to provide guidance on methodologies and underlying assumptions behind ratings is extended from structured finance products to all asset classes. The guidance provided by the CRAs should be clear and easily comprehensible.
Other disclosure obligations for CRAs are also reinforced:
– Annex I, Section D, Part I, point 3: this provision deals with the information to be provided by CRAs to issuers on the principal grounds on which the rating or an outlook is based in advance of the publication of the rating or outlook, in order to give an opportunity to the rated entity to detect any errors in the rating. The proposed rule requires CRAs to inform issuers during the working hours of the rated entity and at least a full working day before publication. This rule applies to all ratings, whether solicited or not, and to outlooks;
– Annex I, Section D, Part I, point 6: CRAs should disclose information about all entities or debt instruments submitted to it for their initial review or for preliminary rating. Thus, the new rule extends this obligation beyond the ratings of structured finance products. This amendment entails the corresponding deletion of point 4 in Part II of Section D of Annex I.
Rules applying specifically to sovereign ratings (the rating of a State, a regional or local authority of a State or of an instrument for which the issuer of the debt or financial obligation is a State or a regional or local authority of a State) are particularly reinforced, with a view to improving the quality of such ratings:
– Article 8 i, new second subparagraph: CRAs are required to assess sovereign ratings more frequently: every six months instead of every twelve months;
– Annex I, Section D: a new Part III on additional obligations in relation to the presentation of sovereign ratings is added. CRAs must in particular publish a full research report when issuing and amending sovereign ratings, in order to improve transparency and enhance users’ understanding. Sovereign ratings should only be published after the close of business and at least one hour before the opening of trading venues in the EU;
– Annex I, Section E, Part III, points 3 and 7: the rules on the publication of a transparency report by CRAs are strengthened by requiring CRAs to be transparent as to the allocation of staff to the ratings of different asset classes (i.e. corporate, structured finance, sovereign ratings). CRAs should also provide disaggregated data on their turnover, including data on the fees generated per different asset classes. This information should allow assessing to what extent CRAs use their resources for the issuance of sovereign ratings.
3.4.6. Amendments in relation to the comparability of credit ratings and fees for credit ratings
Enhancing competition in the credit rating market and improving ratings quality is another objective of this proposal. This objective is in particular pursued by the following amendments, which promote the comparability of credit ratings and provide for more transparency on fees charged for credit ratings:
– Article 11a: this new article require CRAs to communicate their ratings to ESMA, which would ensure that all available ratings for a debt instrument are published in the form of a European Rating Index (EURIX), freely available to investors;
– Article 21(4a): this new paragraph empowers ESMA to develop draft technical standards, for endorsement by the Commission, on a harmonised rating scale to be used by CRAs. All ratings would need to follow the same scale standards, ensuring that ratings can be compared more easily by investors. This provision would make EURIX more useful for investors and other stakeholders;
– Annex I, Section B, point 3a: fees charged by CRAs to their clients for the provision of ratings (and ancillary services) should be non-discriminatory (i.e. based on actual cost and the transparency pricing criteria) and not based on any form of contingency (i.e. not depend on the result or outcome of the work performed). This new provision also aims at avoiding conflicts of interest (e.g. rated entities could pay higher fees in exchange of overly favourable ratings);
– Annex I, Section E, Part II, points 2(a) and 2(aa): the amended point 2(a) requires CRAs to annually disclose to ESMA a list of fees charged to each client, for individual ratings and any ancillary service. The disclosure on fees is completed by the new provision on point 7 of Part III of Section E of Annex I described above. The new point 2 (aa) requires CRAs to also disclose to ESMA their pricing policy, including pricing criteria in relation to ratings for different asset classes.
Finally, the proposed regulation requires ESMA to undertake some monitoring activities regarding market concentration (cf. Article 21(5)) and the Commission to prepare a report on this issue (Article 39(4)).
3.4.7. Amendments in relation to the civil liability of credit rating agencies vis-à-vis investors
Although this proposal for a Regulation also contains provisions aiming at reducing the risk of excessive reliance on external credit ratings (see section 3.4.2 of this explanatory memorandum), credit ratings, whether issued for regulatory purposes or not, will in the foreseeable future continue to have an impact on investment decisions. Hence, CRAs have an important responsibility towards investors in ensuring compliance with the rules of the CRA Regulation. This is reflected in the proposed Article 35a of the CRA Regulation which will render a CRA liable in case it infringes, intentionally or with gross negligence, the CRA Regulation, thereby causing damage to an investor having relied on a credit rating of such CRA, provided the infringement in question affected the credit rating.
The text of the Regulation is also adapted to clarify some obligations with regard to 'certified' CRAs established in third countries. Thus, Articles 5 i, 11 i, 19 i and 21(4)(e) of the CRA Regulation are amended accordingly.
The list of infringements in Annex III and Article 36a i of the CRA Regulation have also been adapted following the other changes to the Regulation.
In order to bring the CRA Regulation in line with the terminology of the Lisbon Treaty, references to the 'Community' are replaced by references to the 'Union'.
This proposal is not aimed at setting up a European credit rating agency. As requested by the European Parliament in its report on credit rating agencies of 8 June 2011 this option was assessed in detail in the impact assessment accompanying this proposal. The impact assessment found that even if a publicly funded CRA may have some benefits it terms of increasing the diversity of opinions in the rating market and providing an alternative to the issuer pays model, it would be difficult to address concerns relating to conflicts of interest and its credibility, especially if such CRA would rate sovereign debt. However, these findings should by no means discourage other actors from setting up new credit rating agencies. The Commission will monitor to what extent new private entrants in the credit rating market will provide for more diversity.
A number of measures in the current proposal should contribute to more diversity and choice in the credit rating industry:
– the proposed rotation rule will require regular changes of credit rating agencies which should open up the CRA market for new entrants; and
– the proposed prohibition for large credit rating agencies to acquire other CRAs over a period of ten years.
The Commission is also exploring ways whether and to what extent Union funds could be used to promote the creation of networks of smaller CRAs which would allow them to pool resources and generate efficiencies of scale.
The Commission's proposal has no impact on the European Union budget. In particular, tasks that would be entrusted to ESMA as mentioned in the proposal would not entail additional EU funding.
It should also be noted that Article 19 of the CRA Regulation[11] provides that ESMA's expenditure necessary for the registration and supervision of CRAs according to the Regulation shall be fully covered by fees charged to the credit rating agencies.