Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2012)614 - Improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2012)614 - Improving the gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related measures. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2012)614  |
| date | 14-11-2012 |
Company boards in the EU are characterised by persistent gender imbalances, as evidenced by the fact that only 13.7% of corporate seats in the largest listed companies are currently held by women (15% among non-executive directors).[1] Compared to other areas of society, especially to the public sector[2], the under-representation of women on the boards of publicly listed companies is particularly significant.
Member States and the EU institutions have undertaken numerous efforts in the course of several decades to promote gender equality in economic decision-making, notably to enhance female presence in company boards, by adopting recommendations and encouraging self-regulation. Two Council Recommendations (in 1984 and 1996) encouraged the private sector to increase the presence of women at all levels of decision-making, notably by positive action programmes, and called upon the Commission to take steps to achieve balanced gender participation in this regard.[3] National self-regulation and corporate governance initiatives were aimed at encouraging companies to appoint more women into top-level positions.
However, progress in increasing the presence of women on company boards has been very slow, with an average annual increase in the past years of just 0.6 percentage points.[4] The rate of improvement in individual Member States has been unequal and has produced highly divergent results. The most significant progress was noted in those Member States and other countries where binding measures had been introduced.[5] Self-regulatory initiatives in a number of Member States have not yielded any similarly noticeable changes. At the current pace it would take several decades to approach gender balance throughout the EU.
Growing discrepancies between Member States are likely to increase given the very different approaches pursued by individual Member States. Some Member States have developed national legislation but addressed different groups of companies and with differing legal approaches. National legislations, if they address the problem at all, are evolving in different directions. Some Member States have privileged a 'comply or explain' model, where companies not complying with a gender balance objective have to disclose the reasons for not doing so. Others establish an outright binding legal gender balance objective with sanctions. Some Member States target listed companies, while others focus on large companies (regardless of listing) or state-owned companies only. Some Member States are focusing their measures on non-executive board members of listed companies while others cover both executive and non-executive board members of listed companies.
The divergence or the absence of regulation at national level does not only lead to the discrepancies in the number of women among executive and non-executive directors and different rates of improvement across Member States, but also poses barriers to the internal market by imposing divergent corporate governance requirements on European listed companies. This varied evolution of national legislations has led to a fragmentation of the legislative frameworks across the EU, which translates into inconsistent legal obligations of difficult comparability, confusion and higher costs for companies, investors and other stakeholders, and, ultimately, hinders the proper functioning of the internal market. In particular, these differences in legal and self-regulatory requirements for the composition of corporate boards can lead to practical complications for listed companies operating across borders, notably when establishing subsidiaries or in mergers and acquisitions, as well as for candidates for board positions. The current lack of transparency of the selection procedures and qualification criteria for board positions in most Member States represents an important barrier to more diversity of board members and negatively affects both board candidates' careers and their freedom of movement, as well as investor decisions. The opacity of board appointments makes it more difficult for women with the necessary qualifications for board positions to apply for such positions in general and even more so in another Member State. Lack of transparency on qualification criteria for company directors may also have a negative impact on investors' confidence in a company, in particular in cross-border situations. Disclosing relevant information on gender composition of boards would also translate into better accountability of companies, better informed and sounder decision-making, better allocation of capital, and, ultimately, higher and more sustainable growth and employment in the EU.
The under-utilisation of the skills of highly qualified women’s constitutes a loss of economic growth potential. Fully mobilising all available human resources will be a key element to addressing the EU's demographic challenges, competing successfully in a globalised economy and ensuring a comparative advantage vis-à-vis third countries. Moreover, gender imbalance in the boards of publicly listed companies in the EU can be a missed opportunity at company level in terms of both corporate governance and financial company performance[6]. The core of the problem lies in the persistence of multiple barriers faced by the constantly growing number of highly qualified women who are available for board seats[7] on their way to the top positions in corporations. The reluctance to appoint female candidates to board positions is often rooted in gender stereotypes in recruitment and promotion, a male-dominated business culture and the lack of transparency in board appointment processes. These elements, which are often referred to in their entirety as a glass ceiling, undermine the optimal functioning of the labour market for top management positions throughout the EU.
The persistent under-representation of women on boards is a key element of a broader lack of board diversity in general with its negative consequences. In boards with a predominance of members of one sex there is a considerably higher likelihood of a narrow 'group think'. This can contribute to the failure of an effective challenge of the management decisions, as the lack of diverse views, values, and competences may lead to less debate, ideas and challenge in the boardroom. Insufficient board diversity is linked above all to insufficient market incentives for companies to change the situation. In this respect, inadequate recruitment practices for board members contribute to perpetuating the selection of members with similar profiles. The selection often draws on a too narrow pool of people, non-executive directors are still often recruited through an “old boys' network” from among business and personal contacts of the current board members. The inadequate transparency on board diversity is reinforcing the problem, as the level of information and the extent to which this information is available to the public at large is often insufficient.
As far as the objectives for board composition, the transparency of recruitment and reporting on gender diversity of boards are concerned, the identified problems affect the overall performance of companies, their accountability, the ability of investors to assess and factor appropriately and timely all relevant information, and the efficiency of the EU financial markets. As a consequence, the internal market potential for sustainable growth and employment may not be fully exploited. Clear requirements as regards the targets to be achieved by companies as regards the gender of the non-executive directors, the transparency of the recruitment process (qualifications criteria) and reporting obligations as regards gender diversity of boards are therefore necessary.
Recently, the issue of enhancing female participation in economic decision-making has become increasingly prominent in the national, European and international arenas, focusing particularly on the economic dimension of gender diversity.
The European Commission reaffirmed its support for an increased participation of women in positions of responsibility, both in its Women's Charter[8] and its Strategy for Equality between Women and Men 2010-2015,[9] whilst also publishing several reports taking stock of the situation.[10]
In the European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020, adopted on 7 March 2011, the Council acknowledged that gender equality policies are vital to economic growth, prosperity and competitiveness and urged action to promote the equal participation of women and men in decision-making at all levels and in all fields, in order to make full use of all the talents.
The European Parliament repeatedly called upon companies and Member States to increase female representation of women in decision-making bodies and invited the Commission to propose legislative quotas to attain the critical threshold of 30 per cent female membership of management bodies by 2015 and 40 per cent by 2020.[11]
The European social partners have reaffirmed their commitment to further action in this area in their work programme for 2012-2014.
The purpose of the proposal is to substantially increase the number of women on corporate boards throughout the EU by setting a minimum objective of a 40% presence of the under-represented sex among the non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and by requiring companies with a lower share of the under-represented sex among the non-executive directors to introduce pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria in selection procedures for those positions in order to attain that objective.
The proposal seeks to promote gender equality in economic decision-making and to fully exploit the existing talent pool of candidates for more equal gender representation on company boards, thereby contributing to the Europe 2020 objectives. The proposed Directive will lead to breaking down the barriers that women face when aiming for board positions and to improved corporate governance, as well as enhanced company performance.
Minimum harmonisation as regards both a requirement for listed companies to take appointment decisions on the basis of an objective comparative assessment of the qualifications of candidates and the setting of a quantitative objective for the gender balance among non-executives directors seems essential to ensure a competitive playing field and to avoid practical complications for listed companies in the internal market.
The quantified objective of 40% set by this Directive only applies to non-executive directors in order to strike the right balance between the necessity to increase the gender diversity of boards on the one hand and the need to minimise interference with day-to-day management of a company on the other hand. Non-executive directors and supervisory boards have an essential role in appointing the highest level of management and shaping the company's human resources policy. A stronger presence of the under-represented sex among non-executive directors will therefore have positive ripple effects for gender diversity throughout the career ladder.
The proposal focuses on publicly listed companies, due to their economic importance and high visibility. They set standards for the private sector at large. Moreover, they tend to have larger boards and have a similar legal status across the EU, providing the necessary comparability of situations.
The proposed objective of 40% for the minimum share of both sexes is in line with the targets currently under discussion and set out in a number of EU Member States/EEA countries. This figure is situated between the minimum of the critical mass of 30%, which has been found necessary in order to have a sustainable impact on board performance and full gender parity (50%).
Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union and with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Equality between women and men is one of the Union's founding values and core aims under Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU. In accordance with Article 8 TFEU the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women in all its activities.
There are several important legal measures in place to promote equal treatment and equal opportunities of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including self-employment[12].
The proposal is consistent with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('Charter'). It will help to promote fundamental rights, particularly those related to equality between women and men (Article 23) and to the freedom to choose an occupation (Article 15). The proposal also touches upon the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16) and on the right to property (Article 17). It does so in a justified manner: in line with the principle of proportionality the proposal's focus is on non-executive board members who – while being important actors in particular in relation to corporate governance – are not involved in the day-to-day running of operations.
Article 21(1) of the Charter prohibits, in principle, any discrimination based on sex. Article 23 recognises, however, that the principle of equality does not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.
This principle of positive action is also recognised in Article 157 i TFEU.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established the criteria that need to be met in order to reconcile the two concepts of formal equality of treatment and positive action aimed at bringing about de facto equality, both of which are recognised in the Charter as well as in Article 157 TFEU and in Article 3 of Directive 2006/54/EC.
The criteria are:
the measures must concern a sector in which women are under-represented;
they can only give priority to equally qualified female candidates over male candidates:
they must not give automatic and unconditional priority to equally qualified candidates, but must include a 'saving clause' which includes the possibility of granting exceptions in justified cases which take the individual situation into account, in particular the personal situation of each candidate.
The proposal is in compliance with these criteria (see Article 4(3)).
Contents
- RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
- DETAILED EXPLANATION
- Background
- Policy context
- Purpose of the proposal
- Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union and with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
- Consultation and expertise
- Impact assessment
- 3. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL
- Subsidiarity
- Proportionality
- Choice of instrument
- European Economic Area
- OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
- Article 2: Definitions
- Article 3: Exclusion of small and medium-sized enterprises
- Article 4: Objectives with regard to non-executive directors
- Article 5: Additional measures by companies and reporting
- Article 6: Sanctions
- Article 7: Minimum requirements
- Article 8: Implementation
- Articles 9, 10 and 11: Review; Entry into force and expiry; Addressees
From 5 March to 28 May 2012, the Commission organised a public consultation to gather stakeholders' views on whether any action should be taken to tackle gender imbalance on corporate boards, and, if so, what kind of action. Of the total number of 485 replies, 161 were sent by individual citizens and 324 were sent by organisations. These included 13 Member States, 3 regional governments, 6 cities or municipalities, 79 companies (both large listed companies and SMEs), 56 business associations at EU and national level, 53 NGOs (most of them women's organisations), trade unions, professional associations, political parties, associations of investors and shareholders, actors involved in corporate governance and others.
There was a broad consensus on the urgent need to increase the share of women on company boards. By far the majority of respondents agreed that a gender-diverse workforce and board structure is a driver of innovation, creativity, good governance and market expansion for companies and that it would be short-sighted to leave untapped the economic potential of qualified women. Views varied among stakeholders as to the appropriate means to bring about change. While some, predominantly the business stakeholders, favoured continued self-regulation, other stakeholders, including trade unions, women organisations, other NGOs and a number of regional and municipal authorities, advocated a more ambitious approach in the form of binding objectives. Some stakeholders suggested focusing in the first place on non-executive board members and supervisory boards, as this would constitute a less significant interference with the daily management of companies, while executive board members should follow later.
A 2011 Eurobarometer survey[13] revealed that 88% of Europeans think that women should be equally represented in company leadership positions. When given the possibility to choose between three options to achieve gender balance on company boards, opinion is divided between self-regulation by companies (31%), binding legal measures (26%), and non-binding measures such as Corporate Governance Codes and Charters (20%). Nevertheless, 75% of Europeans are in favour of legislation provided that it takes qualifications into account and does not automatically favour members of one sex.
The Impact Assessment (IA) analysed five policy options, fully described in the IA Report:
– Option 1: the baseline scenario (i.e. no further action at EU level);
– Option 2: a Commission Recommendation encouraging Member States to achieve the objective of at least 40% of board members of each gender by 2020;
– Option 3: a Directive introducing a binding objective of at least 40% of each gender by 2020 for non-executive directors;
– Option 4: a Directive introducing a binding objective of at least 40% of board members of each gender by 2020 for non-executive directors and a flexible objective for executive directors, which would be set by the companies themselves;
– Option 5: a Directive introducing a binding objective of at least 40% of board members of each gender by 2020 for both executive and non-executive directors.
The outcome of the comparison of the consequences of the different policy options was that (i) binding measures are more effective in meeting the policy objectives than non-binding measures, (ii) measures that target both executive and non-executive board members are more effective than measures only targeting one group and (iii) binding measures will generate more societal and economic benefits than non-binding measures.
At the same time the effectiveness of the different policy options is directly linked to the extent of interference with the rights of the companies and the shareholders as their owners, including their fundamental rights. Compared to a non-binding measure with a tangible yet limited effect, a substantial increase of the impact in terms of the policy objectives would require an instrument with binding force, which would prescribe minimum requirements for the composition of boards.
Binding measures would entail comparatively larger costs and administrative burdens which, however, remain rather modest in comparison to the projected economic benefits. The administrative burden is expected to be minimal for all policy options, given that these options would cover only publicly listed companies which are expected to be able to use existing reporting mechanisms.
The current proposal opts for the increased effectiveness of fixed objectives and the resulting economic and wider societal benefits in relation to non-executive board members which justify a higher degree of interference with fundamental rights. The proposal refrains from establishing a fixed binding objective for executive board members, due to the greater need for sector-specific knowledge and experience in the day-to-day management of a company. However, companies should be obliged to make commitments in relation to executive directors that reflect their specific circumstances, and to report on the compliance with these commitments. The proposal is therefore based on Option 4.
Legal base
Article 157(3) TFEU is the legal basis for any binding measures aimed at ensuring the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including positive action.
The proposal is based on Article 157(3) TFEU.
Measures introduced by some Member States to strengthen the gender balance on company boards vary widely, and a substantial number of Member States, in particular those where the share of women among directors is particularly low, have not taken any action in this area. They do not show any willingness or face resistance to act on their own initiative. At the same time, there are discrepancies in terms of the numbers of women on boards in Member States, with the key indicator ranging from 3% to 27% - a situation which jeopardises the attainment of the fundamental objective of gender equality in economic decision-making across the Union.
The projections in the IA report based on comprehensive information on existing or planned legislative and self-regulatory initiatives in this area in all Member States show that without EU action the female representation in boards of publicly listed companies is expected to evolve from 13.7% in 2012 to 20.4% (20.84% excluding SMEs) in 2020 for the EU. Only one Member State (France) will have achieved a 40% female representation in boards by 2020 as the result of national binding quota legislation. Only 7 more Member States - Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, Denmark and Sweden - are estimated to reach 40% before 2035. In addition to being unsatisfactory from a gender equality perspective, this would not be sufficient to bring about the “critical mass” of women on boards across the Union which, as research shows, is needed to generate positive effects on company performance. Based on this scenario, the EU as a whole is not expected to even achieve 40% of women on boards by 2040. Irrespective of the general possibility for Member States to act efficiently, the concrete indications of Member States regarding their intentions, including their replies to the public consultation and the projections based on all available information, clearly demonstrate that action by Member States individually will not achieve the objective of a more balanced gender representation on company boards in line with the policy objectives set out in this proposal by 2020 or at any point in the foreseeable future.
This situation entails a certain number of risks for the attainment of the fundamental objective of gender equality across the Union. The Founding Treaties intended to create a competitive level-playing field between Member States by enshrining the principle of equal pay and of gender equality on the labour market, to avoid any downward competition between Member States in labour and equal treatment matters. Member States may indeed hesitate to regulate in this area on their own, as they could perceive a risk of putting their own companies at a disadvantage with companies from other Member States. This perception, reinforced by pressure from the business community, represents an additional major obstacle preventing Member States from taking adequate action.
Furthermore, scattered and divergent regulation at national level is bound to create practical problems in the functioning of the internal market. Different company law rules and sanctions for not complying with a national binding quota, such as exclusion from public procurement, could lead to complications in business life and have a deterrent effect on companies' cross-border investments and the establishment of subsidiaries in other Member States. Diverging rules or the absence of rules on the selection procedure for the key positions of non-executive board members without any minimum standards and the impact of these differences for corporate governance and the assessment of corporate governance by investors could further lead to problems in the functioning of the internal market.
The potential for competitiveness and growth inherent in making full use of the talent pool of the best qualified women for board positions can be realised more effectively, by reasons of scale, if all Member States engage in that direction, in particular those where figures are currently low and no action has been taken or even envisaged. Only an EU-level measure can effectively help to ensure a competitive level-playing field throughout the Union and avoid practical complications in business life by means of minimum harmonisation of corporate governance requirements relating to appointment decisions based on objective qualifications criteria in order to attain gender balance among non-executives directors.
It can therefore be concluded that the objectives of the envisaged action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States on their own and may be better achieved through coordinated action at EU level rather than through national initiatives of varying scope, ambition and effectiveness. The proposal therefore complies with the principle of subsidiarity.
Non-binding measures such as past EU-level recommendations and calls for self-regulation have not achieved and cannot be expected to achieve the objective of improving gender equality in economic decision-making throughout the EU. Further-reaching action to be taken at EU-level is therefore necessary to achieve those aims. This should, however, not go beyond what is strictly required to achieve sustainable progress in the share of women on company boards, without impinging on the functioning of private companies and the market economy.
This minimum harmonisation proposal is limited to setting common objectives, giving Member States sufficient freedom to determine how they should be best achieved at national level, taking into account national, regional or local circumstances including national company law and company board recruitment practices. In particular, the proposal requires only such changes to national company law that are strictly necessary for the minimum harmonisation of requirements for the appointment decisions and it respects the different board structures across Member States. It does not cover small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for which such measures could represent a disproportionate burden. In addition, as explained above, the proposal establishes quantitative objectives only for non-executive board members, thereby considerably limiting interference in the daily management of the company. As non-executive directors perform mainly supervisory tasks, it is also easier to recruit qualified candidates from outside the company or the specific sector – a consideration which is of importance for areas of the economy where members of a particular sex are especially under-represented in the workforce.
The temporary nature of the proposed Directive (see Article 10) underpins its compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
A directive is the instrument that best ensures a coherent minimum level of gender diversity among non-executive directors in boards of publicly listed companies across the EU, whilst allowing Member States to adjust the detailed regulation to their specific situations in terms of national company law and to choose the most appropriate means of enforcement and sanctions. It also allows individual Member States to go beyond the minimum standard, on a voluntary basis.
This is a text of relevance to the European Economic Area and the Directive will be applicable to the non-EU member States of the European Economic Area following a decision of the EEA Joint Committee.
The proposal has no implications for the Union budget.
Article 1: Purpose
This provision states the aim of this Directive.
This Article sets out the key definitions, which are based on those in Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and of the Committees of the (supervisory) board[14], on Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises[15] in relation to the definition of SMEs, and on Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings, as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings[16] in relation to the definition of public undertakings.
The definitions ensure in particular that the Directive is equally applicable to various systems of board structures for listed companies that exist in the Member States, i.e. to a dual ('two-tier') system in which there are separate management and supervisory boards, to a unitary ('one-tier') system combining the management and supervisory functions in one single board, as well as to mixed systems featuring elements of one-tier and two-tier systems or giving companies an option between different models.
The definition of director clarifies that the objectives set by the directive cover all non-executive directors, including employee representatives in those Member States where a certain proportion of the non-executive directors can or must be appointed or elected by the company's workforce and/or organisations of workers pursuant to national law or practice while the practical procedures for ensuring that the objectives provided for in this Directive are attained should be defined by the Member States concerned (see Recital 21).
This Article excludes from the scope of the Directive listed companies which are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as defined by Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.[17]
Paragraph 1 imposes on listed companies which do not have a presence of the under-represented sex of at least 40 per cent of non-executive directors an obligation to make the appointments to those positions on the basis of a comparative analysis of the qualifications of each candidate, by applying pre-established, clear, neutrally formulated and unambiguous criteria, in order to attain the said percentage at the latest by 1 January 2020. A shorter deadline for achieving the objective (1 January 2018) is set for listed companies which are public undertakings within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings.[18] Member States exercise a dominant influence over such companies and therefore have more instruments to bring about the change more rapidly.
Paragraph 2 specifies the method of calculation of the exact number of non-executive director positions necessary to meet the objective mentioned in paragraph 1. The exact number of board positions necessary to comply with the objective should be the number closest to 40 per cent, whether below or above that threshold, but at the same time listed companies should not be obliged to appoint members of the under-represented sex to half or more of the non-executive board positions in order to avoid excessive constraints.
Paragraph 3 imposes a preference rule with the aim of meeting the objective laid down in paragraph 1. This preference rule provides that, in the presence of equally qualified candidates of both sexes priority shall be given to the candidate of the under-represented sex unless an objective assessment taking account of all criteria specific to the individual candidates tilts the balance in favour of the candidate of the other sex. This procedural requirement is necessary to ensure that the objectives comply with the case-law[19] of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning positive action. The requirements laid down in this paragraph should be met at the appropriate stage of the selection process depending on national law and the articles of association of listed companies.
Paragraph 4 imposes a disclosure obligation and a burden of proof rule applicable in cases of challenges to the selection procedure by an unsuccessful candidate.
Paragraph 5 provides for a possibility of justifying non-compliance with the objective where the members of the under-represented sex represent less than 10 per cent of the workforce.
Paragraph 6 provides that the objective laid down in Paragraph 1 can also be met where the members of the under-represented sex hold at least one third of all director positions, irrespective of whether they are executive or non-executive.
Paragraph 1 imposes an obligation for listed companies to undertake individual commitments regarding the representation of both sexes among executive directors to be achieved by 1 January 2020, or by 1 January 2018 in the case of listed companies which are public undertakings.
Paragraph 2 imposes an obligation for listed companies to provide and publish information on the gender composition of their boards and on compliance with Article 4(1) and Article 5(1) on a yearly basis.
Paragraph 3 imposes on listed companies which fail to meet the objectives concerning the non-executive directors or commitments concerning executive directors an additional obligation to explain the reasons and to include the description of measures taken and planned in order to meet the objectives or commitments in the future.
Paragraph 4 concerns the competences of the national equality bodies established under Directive 2006/54/EC.
This Article obliges Member States to lay down rules on sanctions applicable in case of breach of this Directive. These sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. A non-exhaustive list of possible concrete measures is set out in paragraph 2.
This provision states the minimum harmonisation nature of the Directive.
Member States are under an obligation to adopt the relevant transposition measures within two years from the date of adoption of the Directive. The Article further specifies the obligations concerning those measures and their communication to the Commission. Paragraph 3 enables Member States which before the entry into force of this Directive have already taken measures to ensure a more balanced representation of women and men among the non-executive directors of listed companies to suspend the application of the procedural requirements related to appointments contained in Article 4(1), (3), i and (5), provided that they can demonstrate that the measures taken are of equivalent efficacy in order to attain the objective set in Article 4(1).
The Directive imposes a reporting obligation on Member States. The Commission is obliged to review and report on the application of the Directive every two years, in particular on whether the aims of the Directive have been achieved.
The objectives remain in force only until sustainable progress in gender composition of boards has been achieved and the Directive includes a sunset clause to that effect.