Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2012)668 - Fixing of the fishing opportunities for 2013 for certain fish stocks which are subject to international negotiations or agreements - Main contents
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| dossier | COM(2012)668 - Fixing of the fishing opportunities for 2013 for certain fish stocks which are subject to international negotiations or ... |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2012)668  |
| date | 19-11-2012 |
All fishing opportunities regulations must limit the harvesting of the fish stocks to levels which must be consistent with the overall objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). In this respect, Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy sets out the objectives for the annual proposals for catch and fishing effort limitations to ensure that Union fisheries are ecologically, economically and socially sustainable.
The key feature of the annual fishing opportunities exercise is in fact its short-term nature. This is due essentially to historical reasons, relating to the way in which the CFP provides for the sharing of the maritime space and the resources therein among national Union fleets. It is important to maintain an annually-renewed process for this Union-wide pact at the basis of the CFP.
However, this does not stand in the way of the introduction of long-term management approaches. The Union has made good progress in this regard and key stocks of commercial interest are now subject to multi-annual management plans. Yearly TACs and effort ceilings must comply with them.
This proposal concerns fishing opportunities that are available to Union vessels in Union and non-EU waters and to third country vessels fishing in Union waters as a result of decisions agreed in multilateral or bilateral fora. In preparing for international negotiations, the Union forms a position based on scientific advice and its own policy objectives, which apply equally to internal decisions. The outcome of such negotiations implies the Union's consent to assume obligations vis-à-vis third parties. The Union has no substantive margin of discretion beyond the internal allocation among Member States when it comes to implementing such decisions in Union law. As for internal allocation, the principle of relative stability applies.
The present proposal thus covers:
· Shared stocks, i.e. stocks that are jointly managed with Norway in the North Sea and the Skagerrak, or under the NEACF-related Coastal State Agreements.
· Stocks with traditional quota exchanges or with potential interest for exchanges: stocks which, while not being jointly managed, are (or could be) subject to annual exchanges of quotas between the Union and Norway and/or other third countries.
· By-catch species in the sole and plaice fisheries, even if not exchanged. This is for the sake of consistency with progress towards multi-species or mixed-fisheries management, as appropriate.
· Fishing opportunities resulting from agreements reached in the framework of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs).
However, most of the fishing opportunities contained in this proposal are marked as 'pm' (pro memoria). This is due to the fact that either:
– the advice on some stocks will not be available by the time the proposal is scheduled for adoption; or
– certain catch limitations and other recommendations from the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the North East Atlantic Fishery Commission (NEAFC), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPFC) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), are pending the annual meetings of these organisations; or
– for stocks in Greenland waters, as well as stocks jointly managed or exchanged with Norway and other third countries, the figures are not available yet, pending the conclusion of consultations in November and December 2012 with those countries.
The measures proposed are designed in accordance with the objectives and the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and are consistent with the Union's policy on sustainable development.
Contents
- RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
- BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
- Grounds and objectives
- Scope
- Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union
- Consultation of interested parties
- Collection and use of expertise
- Impact assessment
- Legal basis
- Summary of the proposed action
- Application
- Subsidiarity principle
- Proportionality principle
- Choice of instruments
- 5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
- Review/revision/sunset clause
- Detailed explanation of the proposal
The Commission has followed the orientations outlined in its Communication to the Council and European Parliament on improving consultation on Community fisheries management (COM(2006)246 final), which sets out the principles for the so called front-loading process.
Furthermore, the Commission organised an event for stakeholders in September 2012, at which the outcomes of the scientific advice and its key implications were presented and discussed.
As for the methodology used, the Commission consulted two main expert organisations: ICES, an international independent scientific body, and STECF. Advice from ICES is based on an advice framework developed by its scientists and used in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding agreed with the Commission. The STECF gives its advice following terms of reference that it receives from the Commission.
All STECF reports are available, after formal adoption by the Commission, on the DG MARE website. All ICES reports are available on ICES' website.
This proposal essentially transposes internationally agreed measures. Any elements relevant to assess possible impacts of the fishing opportunities are dealt with in the preparation and conduct phase of international negotiations in the framework of which the Union's fishing opportunities are agreed with third parties.
The legal basis of this proposal is Article 43 i of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The Union's obligations for sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources arise from obligations set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002.
The proposal establishes the catch and effort limitations applicable to Union fisheries and to international fisheries where Union vessels participate, in order to achieve the objective of the CFP of ensuring fisheries at levels that are environmentally, economically and socially sustainable.
The provisions in the area of the proposal are applicable until 31 December 2013, with the exception of certain provisions on effort limitations, which are applicable until 31 January 2014, and certain TACs with specific seasonal cycles (e.g. Capelin in Greenland waters).
The proposal falls under the Union exclusive competence as referred to in Article 3(1)(d) of the Treaty. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply.
The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reason: the CFP is a common policy. According to Article 43 i of the Treaty it is incumbent upon the Council to adopt the measures on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities.
The proposed Council Regulation allocates fishing opportunities to Member States. Having regard to Article 20 i of Regulation 2371/2002 Member States are free to allocate in turn such opportunities among regions or operators as they see fit. Therefore, Member States have ample room for manoeuvre on decisions related to the social/economic model of their choice to exploit their allocated fishing opportunities.
The proposal has no new financial implications for Member States. This Regulation is adopted by Council every year, and the public and private means to implement it are already in place.
Proposed instrument: Regulation.
The proposal has no implication for the Union budget.
Simplification
The proposal provides for simplification of administrative procedures for public authorities (Union or national), in particular as regards requirements regarding the effort management.
The proposal concerns an annual Regulation for the year 2013 and therefore does not include a revision clause.
This proposal is limited to the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities and conditions functionally linked to the use of those opportunities.
As regards catch limitations and effort management in general, the proposal is in accordance with the principles for the so-called frontloading process which are set out in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament on improving consultation on Community fisheries management (COM(2006)246 final) and in the Communication from the Commission concerning a Consultation on Fishing Opportunities for 2013 (COM(2012)278 final), which sets out the views and intentions of the Commission concerning its proposals for fishing opportunities, pending the scientific advice on the state of the stocks for 2013.
As mentioned above, the proposal also includes catch limitations agreed in the context of certain Regional Fisheries Management Organisations.
In relation to effort management for cod fisheries, a system based on kilowatt days has been applied since 2009 and will be continued in 2013.