Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2017)119 - EU position on the addition to the list of substances in Table I of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2017)119 - EU position on the addition to the list of substances in Table I of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic ... |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2017)119  |
| date | 28-02-2017 |
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) regularly amends the list of substances that are annexed to the United Nations (UN) Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (the 1988 UN Convention) on the basis of recommendations of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).
The EU is party to the 1988 UN Convention for questions which are dealt with in Article 12 of the Convention 1 . Article 12 deals with substances which are frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances ('drug precursors').
The CND is a commission of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its functions and powers are inter alia set out in the 1988 UN Convention. It is made up of 53 UN Member States elected by ECOSOC. 12 Member States are currently members of the CND with the right to vote. 2 The Union has an observer status in the CND.
The INCB recommended on 1 February 2017 to add two substances, namely 4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP) and N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), to Table I of the 1988 UN Convention.
Changes to the Tables of the 1988 UN Convention have direct repercussions for the scope of application of Union law in the area of drug precursor control as substances added to the Tables of the 1988 UN Convention are to be incorporated into the Union law 3 . The Commission has been empowered to adopt delegated acts in order to ensure this.
It is necessary that Member States prepare the meeting of the CND when it is called to decide on the scheduling of substances by reaching a common position in the Council. Such position, due to the limitations intrinsic to the observer status of the Union should be expressed by the Member States that are currently members of the CND, acting jointly in the interest of the Union within the CND. The Union, which only has observer status in the CND, would not vote in the CND.
To this end, the Commission is proposing a position to be adopted, on behalf of the European Union, in the sixtieth session of the CND taking place in Vienna from 13 to 17 March 2017 on the scheduling of substances under the 1988 UN Convention.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The legal basis for this proposal is Article 207 in conjunction with Article 218(9) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Scheduling of precursors for the purposes of monitoring trade in these substances is a matter that relates to the common commercial policy and Article 207 (3) TFEU states that where agreements with one or more third countries or international organisations need to be negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article.
Article 218(9) TFEU applies regardless of whether the Union is a member of the body or a party to the agreement at issue. The CND is 'a body set up by an agreement' within the meaning of this Article, given that it is a body that has been given specific tasks under the 1988 UN Convention.
The CND's scheduling-decisions are "acts having legal effects'' within the meaning of Article 218(9) TFEU. According to the 1988 UN Convention decisions of the CND become binding, unless a party has submitted the decision for review to ECOSOC within the applicable time-limit. 4 The decisions of ECOSOC on the matter are final.
• Subsidiarity
Not applicable.
• Proportionality
The proposal is proportionate and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives as it addresses new drug precursors that are of concern for the Union.
• Choice of the instrument
The use of a Council Decision is required by Article 218(9) TFEU in order to establish the position to be adopted on the Union's behalf in a body set up by an international agreement.