Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2017)335 - Amendment of Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2017)335 - Amendment of Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in ... |
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| source | COM(2017)335  |
| date | 21-06-2017 |
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
Tackling tax avoidance and evasion is amongst the political priorities in the European Union (EU), with a view to creating a deeper and fairer single market. In this context, the Commission has presented in recent years a number of initiatives in order to promote a fairer tax system. Enhancing transparency is one of the key pillars in the Commission's strategy to combat tax avoidance and evasion. In particular the exchange of information between tax administrations is crucial in order to provide them with the necessary information to exercise their duties efficiently.
Member States find it increasingly difficult to protect their national tax bases from erosion as tax planning structures become ever-more sophisticated and take advantage of the increased mobility of capital and persons within the internal market. The proper functioning of the market is thus undermined through distortions and a lack of fairness. These harmful structures commonly consist of arrangements which develop across various jurisdictions and shift taxable profits towards beneficial tax regimes or have the effect of reducing the taxpayer´s overall tax bill. As a result, Member States often experience considerable reductions in their tax revenues which hinder them from applying growth-friendly tax policies.
Recent leaks, including the Panama Papers, have highlighted how certain intermediaries appear to have actively helped their clients to make use of aggressive tax planning arrangements in order to reduce the tax burden and to conceal money offshore. Whilst some complex transactions and corporate structures may have entirely legitimate purposes, it is also clear that some activities, including offshore structures, may not be legitimate and in some cases, may even be illegal. Different and complex structures, often involving a company located in a jurisdiction which is low tax or non-transparent, are used to create distance between the beneficial owners and their wealth with a view to ensuring low or no taxation and/or to laundering the proceeds of criminal activity. Certain taxpayers use shell companies registered in tax/secrecy havens and appoint nominee directors to conceal their wealth and income, often coming from illegal activity, by hiding the identity of the real owners of the companies (beneficial owners).
In addition, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) on foreign account information is in force in the EU through the rules laid down in Council Directive (EU) 2014/107 of 9 December 2014 1 and applies to information relating to taxable periods as of 1 January 2016. It is thus crucial that information which may escape from the scope of this Directive be captured through placing an obligation on intermediaries to report on potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements.
The proposed legislation complements other rules and initiatives, such as the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 2 and its current revision, which stand against the current lack of transparency or uncertainty over beneficial ownership. The aim is to increase transparency and access to the right information at an early stage, as this should allow the authorities to improve the speed and accuracy of their risk assessment and make timely and informed decisions on how to protect their tax revenues. Namely, if tax authorities receive information about potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements before these are implemented, they should be able to track the arrangements and respond to the tax risks that they pose by taking appropriate measures to curb them. For this purpose, information should ideally be obtained in advance, i.e. before an arrangement is implemented and/or used. This would enable the authorities to timely assess the risk of these arrangements and if necessary, react to close down loopholes and prevent a loss of tax revenue. The ultimate objective is to design a mechanism that will have a deterrent effect; that is, a mechanism that will dissuade intermediaries from designing and marketing such arrangements.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
Several calls have been made to the EU to take the lead in the field and further investigate the role of intermediaries. In particular, the European Parliament has called for tougher measures against intermediaries who assist in tax evasion schemes. 3 Member States at the informal ECOFIN Council of April 2016 4 invited the Commission to consider initiatives on mandatory disclosure rules inspired by the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 12 5 , with regard to introducing more effective disincentives for intermediaries who assist in tax evasion schemes. In May 2016, the Council presented conclusions on an external strategy and measures against tax treaty abuse 6 . In this context, the ECOFIN invited “the Commission to consider legislative initiatives on Mandatory Disclosure Rules inspired by BEPS Action 12 of the OECD project in order to introduce more effective disincentives for intermediaries who assist in tax evasion or avoidance schemes”. 7
With the aim to enhance transparency, the OECD/G20 Action 12 recommends that countries introduce a regime for the mandatory disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements but does not define any minimum standard to comply with. The final report on Action 12 was published as part of the set of BEPS actions in October 2015. Anti-BEPS measures, as recommended by the OECD, were endorsed by the G20 and most EU Member States have committed, in their capacity as OECD members, to implement them. Furthermore, the current G20 President, Germany, identified tax certainty as one of the main themes of its priorities. 8 Thus, providing tax administrations with timely information on the design and use of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements would supply them with an additional tool to take appropriate measures against certain tax planning arrangements, which ultimately increases tax certainty and is fully compatible with the G20 priorities.
The July 2016 Communication on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance 9 outlined the Commission's assessment of the priority areas for action in the coming months at EU and international level. Increased transparency by intermediaries was identified as one of the areas for future action.
The proposed legislation addresses the broad political priority for transparency in taxation, which is a pre-requisite for effectively fighting against tax avoidance, evasion and aggressive tax planning. Since a couple of years ago, EU Member States have agreed a series of legislative instruments in the field of transparency as part of which national tax authorities have to cooperate closely in exchanging information. Council Directive 2011/16/EU 10 replaced Council Directive 77/799/EEC 11 and marked the beginning of enhanced administrative cooperation amongst tax authorities in the EU. It established useful tools for better cooperation in the following fields: exchanges of information on request; spontaneous exchanges; automatic exchanges on an exhaustive list of items; the participation in administrative enquiries; simultaneous controls; and notifications of tax decisions to other tax authorities.
The automatic exchange of information is a key element of the proposed legislation, as it is envisaged that information disclosed by intermediaries to the tax authorities will then be exchanged automatically with other tax authorities in the EU. This is the latest in a series of EU initiatives that lay down a requirement for mandatory automatic exchange of information in tax matters:
·Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (DAC): the Directive provides for the mandatory automatic exchange of information, where the information is available, in respect of five non-financial categories of income and capital, with effect from 1 January 2015: 1) income from employment, 2) director's fees, 3) life insurance products not covered by other Directives, 4) pensions, and 5) ownership of and income from immovable property;
·Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 16 December 2014 12 as regards the automatic exchange of financial account information between Member States based on the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) which prescribes the automatic exchange of information on financial accounts held by non-residents;
·Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 13 as regards the mandatory automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border tax rulings;
·Council Directive (EU) 2016/881 of 25 May 2016 14 as regards the mandatory automatic exchange of information on country-by-country reporting (CbCR) amongst tax authorities.
·Commission proposal for a Directive 2016/0107 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 April 2016 15 on the disclosure of income tax information of certain undertakings and branches. The proposed rules provide for the publication of income tax information which would give the wider public access to tax-relevant data of multinational enterprises on a country-by-country basis. This is still a proposal under discussion before the Parliament and Council in accordance with the ordinary procedure.
·Agreements between Member States and third countries 16 regarding the automatic exchange of financial account information based on the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS).
It should be clarified that the existing tax instruments at EU level do not contain explicit provisions requiring Member States to exchange information in the case of tax avoidance and/or evasion schemes that come to their attention. The DAC contains a general obligation for the national tax authorities to spontaneously communicate information to the other tax authorities within the EU in certain circumstances. This includes the loss of tax in a Member State or tax savings resulting from artificial transfers of profits within groups of companies. The present initiative aims to capture, via the disclosure by intermediaries, potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements and subject them to a mandatory automatic exchange of information.
• Consistency with other Union policies (Possible future initiatives of relevance to the policy area)
The deterrent effect of the proposed ex ante disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements could be enhanced if the obligation to disclose information to the tax authorities were extended to auditors that are engaged to sign off on a taxpayer's financial statements. These auditors come across considerable amounts of data in the course of pursuing their professional tasks. As part of this, they may discover arrangements which could qualify as aggressive tax planning practices. The potential benefits from disclosing these arrangements to the authorities would indeed constitute a complement to the mandatory disclosure of similar schemes by intermediaries, i.e. designers, promoters, advisers, etc. It could therefore be envisaged to pursue such an initiative through legislation in the future.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
Article 115 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is the legal base for legislative initiatives in the field of direct taxation. Although no explicit reference to direct taxation is made, Article 115 refers to directives for the approximation of national laws as those directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. For this condition to be met, it is necessary that proposed EU legislation in the field of direct taxation aims to rectify existing inconsistencies in the functioning of the internal market. In many cases, this would imply that EU measures exclusively address cross-border situations.
The lack of transparency facilitates the activities of certain intermediaries that are involved in promoting and selling aggressive tax planning arrangements with cross-border implications. As a consequence of this, Member States suffer from the shifting of profits, which would otherwise be generated and become taxable in their territory, towards low-tax jurisdictions and often experience an erosion of their tax bases. In addition, such a situation gives rise to conditions of unfair tax competition against businesses that refuse to engage in these illegitimate activities. The ultimate outcome is to distort the operation of the internal market. It follows that such a situation can only be tackled through a uniform approach aimed to improve the functioning of the internal market, as prescribed in Article 115 TFEU.
• Subsidiarity
Experience shows that national provisions against aggressive tax planning cannot be fully effective. This is because a significant number of the structures devised to avoid taxes have a cross-border dimension while also capital and persons are increasingly mobile, especially within an integrated market, such as the EU internal market. The need for collective action at the level of the EU to improve the current state of play has become apparent and can usefully complement existing initiatives in this area, in particular within the context of the DAC. This is all the more so, as existing instruments at national level have shown to be only partly effective in increasing transparency.
In this light, the internal market needs a robust mechanism to address these loopholes in a uniform fashion and rectify existing distortions by ensuring that tax authorities receive appropriate information, on a timely basis, about potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements with cross-border implications.
Considering that the mandatory disclosure aims to inform tax authorities about arrangements with a dimension beyond a single jurisdiction, it is necessary to embark on any such initiative through action at the level of the EU, in order to ensure a uniform approach to the identified problem. Uncoordinated action undertaken by Member States based on own initiative would create a patchwork of rules on the disclosure of arrangements by intermediaries. As a result, the chances would be that unfair tax competition amongst Member States persists.
Even where a single Member State is involved in a potentially aggressive tax planning arrangement or series of arrangements with a third country, there is a cross-border element that could create a risk of distorting the functioning of the internal market. Namely, the structure of the internal market is premised on the principle of free circulation of people, goods, services and capital and it is coupled with the benefits arising from the corporate tax directives. It follows that the actual level of protection of the internal market is overall defined by reference to the weakest Member State. This is why a cross-border potentially aggressive tax planning arrangement that engages one Member State in reality impacts on all States.
Leaving the decision on this element to individual national initiatives would mean that some could decide to act, while others not. This is notably so, given that BEPS Action 12 is not a minimum standard and implementation in the EU could therefore diverge substantially. Indeed, 39 out of 131 stakeholders replied in the public consultation that, in case there was no EU action, no transparency requirements would be introduced and 107 stakeholders stated that it is likely or very likely that differing transparency requirements would be introduced. For all these reasons, introducing a reporting requirement through EU legislation linked with exchange of information would resolve the identified problems and contribute to improving the functioning of the internal market.
What is more, action on disclosure at the level of the EU will bring an added value, as compared to individual Member State initiatives in the field. This is because, especially if it is accompanied with exchange of information, the disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements will allow tax administrations to obtain the full picture of the impact of cross-border transactions on the overall tax base. The EU is thus in a better position than any Member State individually to ensure the effectiveness and completeness of the system for the exchange of information.
• Proportionality
The proposed policy response is limited to addressing potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements with a cross-border element. Considering that the identified distortions in the functioning of the internal market usually expand beyond the borders of a single Member State, confining the common rules to cross-border situations within the EU represents the minimum necessary for tackling the problems in an effective manner. Thus, the proposed rules represent a proportionate answer to the identified problem since they do not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties for a better functioning internal market without distortions.
• Choice of the instrument
The legal base for this proposal is Article 115 TFEU, which lays down explicitly that legislation in this field may only be enacted in the legal form of a Directive. It is therefore not permissible to use any different type of EU legal act when it comes to passing binding rules in direct taxation.
In addition, the proposed Directive constitutes the fifth amendment to the DAC since 2014; it thus follows Council Directives 2014/107/EU, (EU) 2015/2376, (EU) 2016/881 and (EU) 2016/2258.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Evaluations
The proposed legislation amends the DAC to provide for the mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements and to extend the scope of the automatic exchange of information between tax authorities to include such arrangements. So, the rationale behind the proposed amendments is linked to addressing a new topic, in order to reinforce Member States' efforts to clamp down on tax avoidance and evasion. The proposed amendments do not deal with rectifying identified deficiencies of the underlying instrument (i.e. the DAC) but instead extend its scope to an additional topic where the need for action is justified based on the findings of the OECD work on Action 12 and the Commission's consultations with stakeholders.
The DAC has so far not been evaluated. The first report in this regard is due by 1 January 2018. Thereafter, the Commission will have to submit a report on the application of the DAC to the European Parliament and to the Council every 5 years. For this purpose, Member States have undertaken to communicate to the Commission the necessary information for the evaluation of the effectiveness of administrative cooperation as well as statistical data.
The proposed legislation has been designed in the most cost efficient way. The envisaged framework will thus make use, following the necessary adjustments, of an existing IT tool for the exchange of information which was initially set up to accommodate exchanges on cross-border advance rulings (DAC 3).
• Stakeholder consultations
On 10 November 2016 the European Commission launched a Public Consultation to gather feedback on the way forward for EU action on creating disincentives for advisors and intermediaries who facilitate potentially aggressive tax planning schemes.
A number of possible options were presented and stakeholders gave their feedback in a total of 131 responses. The largest share of replies came from trade/business associations/professional associations with 27% of the replies and private citizens with 20% of the replies. Geographically speaking, the largest share of responses came from Germany with 24% of the total responses.
Out of all respondents, 46 replied that they had received professional tax advice and in more than half of the cases, this input was received from tax advisors - the largest professional group (52%). In addition, 30 respondents responded that they provided tax advice, and half of them stated that they maintained contact with the tax authorities.
• Member States
The principle underlying the proposed legislation is in line with the trends in international taxation, as those featured in the context of the OECD/G20 project against BEPS. Most Member States are members of the OECD, which organised extensive public consultations with stakeholders on each of the anti-BEPS action items between 2013 and 2015. Consequently, the Member States who are OECD members participated in lengthy and detailed discussions on the anti-BEPS actions at the OECD and it should be taken that they were sufficiently consulted on this initiative.
On 2nd March 2017, DG TAXUD organised a meeting of the Working Party IV and Member States had the opportunity to debate the disclosure of potentially aggressive tax arrangements by intermediaries followed by an automatic exchange of information amongst tax authorities.
In addition the Commission organised targeted discussions with representatives of Member States who already have practical experience with mandatory disclosure rules at national level.
• Impact assessment
The Commission conducted an impact assessment of relevant policy alternatives which received a positive opinion from the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 24 May 2017 (SEC(2017) 307) 17 . The Regulatory Scrutiny Board made a number of recommendations for improvements that have been taken into account in the final impact assessment report (SWD(2017) 236) 18 .
Different policy options have been assessed against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence in comparison to the baseline scenario. The challenge has been how to design a proportionate system to target the most aggressive forms of tax planning. The OECD report on BEPS Action 12 gives examples of the approaches taken by tax authorities in a number of jurisdictions around the world, including the three national mandatory disclosure regimes that exist in the EU, namely in Ireland, Portugal and the UK.
The public consultation set out a list of policy options for stakeholders. Some of these options concerned the type of appropriate legal instrument for the proposed initiative. That is, whether legislation or soft law in the form of a Recommendation or Code of Conduct presents the optimal solution. Amongst the options that built on binding rules, the stakeholders were invited to mainly consider the possibility of agreeing a common framework for disclosing information to tax authorities or alternatively, of coupling the disclosure with an automatic exchange of the disclosed data across tax authorities in the EU.
Following the consultations with stakeholders, it became clear that all of the available policy choices which involved binding rules would lead to a similar outcome. Thus, if there is a (mandatory) disclosure of data to the tax authorities, it always enables some form of exchange of information. This is because spontaneous exchanges form part of the general framework of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation. Therefore the exchange of information is present in distinct forms under all policy options that involve a disclosure of data.
It was further considered that the only real comparison between policy choices could in practice be drawn between a context where there is an obligation to disclose information on potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements (coupled with exchange of information) and a context where there is no such obligation, i.e. the so-called status quo. In addition, the prospect for limiting the exchange of information to spontaneous exchanges would not appear consistent with the series of initiatives that the Commission has lately undertaken in the field of Transparency. Thus, the framework for information exchange, both in the rules that implement the common reporting standard (CRS) in the EU and in advance cross-border rulings, involves automatic exchanges.
Contents
The preferred option is a requirement for Member States (i) to lay down an explicit obligation of their national tax authorities for a mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with a cross-border element; and (ii) to ensure that their national tax authorities automatically exchange this information with the tax authorities of other Member States by using the mechanism provided for in the DAC.
The requirement to report under a mandatory disclosure regime will increase the pressure on intermediaries to refrain from designing, marketing and implementing aggressive tax planning arrangements. Similarly, taxpayers will be less inclined to create or use such schemes if they know the schemes would have to be reported under a mandatory disclosure regime. Currently tax authorities have limited knowledge on non-domestic tax planning arrangements and such disclosure could provide them with timely information to be able to quickly respond with operational measures, legislative and/or regulatory changes. In addition, the data could be used for risk assessment and audit purposes. These benefits will help Member States protect their direct tax bases and raise/collect tax revenues. A mandatory disclosure regime will also help create a level playing field for corporations as the larger companies are more likely to use such schemes for tax avoidance purposes in a cross-border context than SMEs. From a societal perspective, a mandatory disclosure regime will provide a fairer tax environment given the aforementioned benefits.
The costs of the proposal in terms of national tax revenue depend on the way Member States adjust their legislation and allocate resources to comply with their disclosure obligations. However, it is envisaged that existing reporting and exchange of information systems, such as the central directory for advance tax rulings, will provide a framework that can accommodate the automatic exchange of information on reportable tax planning arrangements between national authorities.
The costs for intermediaries should be very limited because the reportable information is likely to be available in the summary sheets that promote a scheme to taxpayers. Only under a limited set of circumstances would taxpayers be required to report themselves such schemes and incur costs related to the reporting obligations.
The proposal has been designed in a way to reduce regulatory burdens for intermediaries, taxpayers and public administrations to the minimum. The preferred policy response represents a proportionate answer to the identified problem since it does not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaties for a better functioning of the internal market without distortions. Indeed, the common rules will be limited to creating the minimum necessary common framework for the disclosure of potentially harmful arrangements. For example:
(i) The rules set out clear reporting responsibilities to avoid double reporting.
(ii) The common rules are limited to addressing potentially aggressive tax planning schemes with a cross-border element within the EU.
(iii) No publication requirement of the reported tax schemes, only automatic exchange between EU Member States.
(iv) The imposition of penalties for non-compliance with the national provisions that implement the Directive into national law will remain under the sovereign control of Member States.
In addition, the harmonised approach reaches up to the point that the competent national authorities come to know about the potentially aggressive arrangements. Thereafter, it is for Member States to decide how they pursue cases of illegitimate arrangements.
In terms of legislative options, three possibilities have been considered:
i. A Commission Recommendation (non-binding instrument) to encourage Member States to introduce a mandatory disclosure regime and referral to the group of the Code of Conduct on business taxation;
ii. An EU Code of Conduct for intermediaries (non-binding instrument) for certain regulated professions;
iii. An EU Directive (binding instrument) to require Member States to introduce a mandatory disclosure regime combined with exchange of information.
Valuing the different options has led to a preferred option in the form of a Directive. The analysis shows that this option has clear advantages in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence as it would address the problems identified at the least of cost. In addition, the option of a Directive remains advantageous compared to the alternative of not taking any action.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
See Legislative Financial Statement.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
Member States shall communicate to the Commission a yearly assessment of the effectiveness of the automatic exchange of information as well as of the practical results achieved. Member States shall also provide relevant information and a list of statistical data, which is determined by the Commission in accordance with the procedure of Article 26 i (implementing measures), for the evaluation of this Directive. The Commission shall submit a report on the application of this Directive to the European Parliament and to the Council every five years, which should start counting after 1 January 2013. The results of this proposal (which amends the DAC) will be included in the evaluation report to the European Parliament and to the Council that will be issued by 1 January 2023.
• Explanatory documents (for directives)
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
The proposed legislation mainly consists of the following elements:
·Disclosure to the tax authorities coupled with automatic exchange of information (AEoI)
The proposed Directive places an obligation on to intermediaries to disclose potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements to the tax authorities if they are involved in such arrangements, as part of their profession, by way of designing and promoting them. The obligation is limited to cross-border situations, i.e. situations in either more than one Member State or a Member State and a third country. Thus, it is only in such circumstances that due to the potential impact on the functioning of the internal market, one can justify the need for enacting a common set of rules, rather than leaving the matter to be dealt with at the national level. To ensure the maximum effectiveness of the proposed measures given the cross-border dimension of the reportable arrangements, the disclosed information shall be exchanged automatically amongst national tax authorities. In practice, the rules propose that the exchange is carried out through submitting the disclosed arrangements to a central directory where all Member States have access to.
The Commission will also have limited access to the exchanged information (i.e. at the level it is entitled to for advance cross-border rulings) in order to monitor the proper functioning of the Directive.
·Who bears the burden of disclosure
The obligation of disclosure concerns those “persons” (i.e. natural or legal persons or entities without legal personality) who are identified as intermediaries.
The obligation to disclose may not be enforceable upon an intermediary due to Legal Professional Privilege or simply because the intermediary does not have a presence within the Union. It can also be the case that there is no intermediary because a taxpayer designs and implements a scheme in-house. In such circumstances, tax authorities will not lose the opportunity to receive information about tax-related arrangements that are potentially linked to aggressive structures. Instead, the disclosure obligation is then shifted to the taxpayers who use the arrangement.
·More than one person qualifies as an intermediary or taxpayer
It is common place that an intermediary maintain a presence in several States by way of offices, firms, etc. and that it also engage other local independent actors in providing tax advice on certain arrangements. In such circumstances, the only the intermediary who carries the responsibility vis-à-vis the taxpayer(s) for designing and implementing the arrangement(s) shall file the requisite information with the tax authorities.
If the obligation to file information has shifted to the taxpayer and more than one related parties are meant to use the same reportable cross-border tax arrangement, only the taxpayer that was in charge of agreeing the arrangement(s) with the intermediary shall bear the onus of filing information.
·Timing for the disclosure and AEoI
As the disclosure runs better chances of achieving its envisaged deterrent effect where the relevant information reaches the tax authorities early on, the proposed legislation prescribes that the reportable cross-border arrangements be disclosed before the scheme(s) is actually implemented. On this premise, intermediaries shall disclose the reportable arrangements within 5 days beginning on the day after such arrangements become available to a taxpayer for implementation.
Where the disclosure is shifted to taxpayers in the absence of a liable intermediary, the timing for disclosure is placed slightly later; that is, within 5 days beginning on the day after the reportable cross-border arrangement or the first step in a series of such arrangements has been implemented.
The subsequent automatic exchange of information on these arrangements shall happen every quarter of a year. Due to the earlier disclosure of this information, the tax authorities most strongly connected with the arrangement will obtain sufficient input to undertake action against tax avoidance early on.
·List of hallmarks instead of defining aggressive tax planning
An endeavour to define the concept of aggressive tax planning would risk being an exercise in vain. This is because aggressive tax planning structures have evolved over the years to become particularly complex and are always subject to constant modifications and adjustments to react to defensive counter-measures by the tax authorities. In this light, the proposed legislation includes a compilation of the features and elements of transactions that present a strong indication of tax avoidance or abuse. These features and elements are referred to as hallmarks and it suffices that an arrangement fall within the scope of one of those to be treated as reportable to the tax authorities.
·AEoI via the EU common communication network (CCN)
Regarding the operational aspects of the mandatory automatic exchange of information, the proposed Directive refers to the mechanism introduced by Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376, i.e. common communication network (CCN). This will serve as a common framework for the exchanges and for this purpose its scope will be enlarged.
The information will be recorded on a secure central directory on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation. Member States will also implement a series of practical arrangements, including measures to standardise the communication of all requisite information through creating a standard form. This will involve specifying the linguistic requirements for the envisaged exchange of information and accordingly upgrading the CCN.
·Effective penalties for non-compliance at national level
The proposed legislation leaves it to Member States to lay down penalties applicable against the violation of the national rules that transpose this Directive into the national legal order. Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that the common framework be implemented. The penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
·Implementing measures
In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of the proposed Directive and more precisely, the mandatory automatic exchange of information amongst tax authorities, the Commission is conferred upon implementing powers on the following topics:
i. To adopt a standard form with a limited number of components, including the linguistic arrangements;
ii. To adopt the necessary practical arrangements for upgrading the central directory on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation.
These powers shall be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
·Delegated acts
In order to address the potential need for updating the hallmarks based on information derived from disclosed arrangements, the Commission is conferred upon the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.