Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2022)57 - Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2022)57 - Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2022)57  |
| date | 15-02-2022 |
Contents
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The general objective of this proposal is to establish a Union secure satellite communication system (hereafter the ‘Programme’) that ensures the provision of worldwide secure, flexible and resilient satellite communication services to the Union and Member States governmental entities.
Satellite communications provide ubiquitous coverage, which is complementary to terrestrial networks (ground-based in a form of cable links such as fibre broadband or wireless). Satellite communications can provide the means for seamless digital communication in areas where terrestrial networks are absent (e.g. oceans, during flights, or in remote locations / islands with no cellular or broadband coverage), have been destroyed (e.g. during flooding events, or forest fires) or where local networks cannot be trusted (in crisis situations, or for diplomatic services in third countries or for sensitive governmental operations).
Govsatcom is a strategic asset, closely linked to national security, used by most Member States. Public users tend to favour either government-owned1 or public-private solutions2 or make use of specific accredited private providers. Use cases include surveillance operations, crisis management, including civil protection and humanitarian operations in natural or human-made disasters and connection and protection of key infrastructure.
Because of the scale and complexity of required investments, and the synergies that a common capability could bring, Govsatcom has been identified as early as 20133 as a promising field for Union initiatives, with the possibility of tangibly contributing to the objectives for a strong, secure and resilient European Union. It is now an integral part of the Space Strategy for Europe4, the European Defence Action Plan5 and the European Union Global Strategy. The notion of a Union governmental satellite communication infrastructure has been consistently welcomed in ensuing Council conclusions6.
The adoption of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013 and (EU) No 377/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU (hereinafter referred to as ‘Space Regulation’) constituted a first step towards this resilience objective, through the establishment of a dedicated GOVSATCOM component of the Union Space Programme. Its aim is to optimise the use of existing satellite communication capacity for governmental users on the basis of pooling and sharing of available national and private EU satellite communication resources. Due to the limited lifespan of a satellite (approximately 15 years for geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites) several of the governmentally owned infrastructures that will constitute part of the pooling and sharing of GOVSATCOM will need to be replenished in the coming decade7. For this reason, Regulation (EU) 2021/696 foresaw the need to assess the evolution of satellite communication needs. According to the Regulation, if this assessment ‘reveals that this approach is insufficient to cover the evolving demand, it should be possible to take a decision to move to a second phase and develop additional bespoke space infrastructure or capacities through one or several public-private partnerships, e.g. with Union satellite operators.’
Several studies8 have substantiated this evolution of needs: Traditionally, satellite communication has been used for voice communication and data transfer in remote areas (e.g. at sea), but the nature of use cases is rapidly evolving, requiring low latency9 performance and global coverage. While satellite communication has been primarily relying on geosynchronous (GEO) spacecraft, technical progress has allowed the emergence of non- geostationary-orbit (NGSO) communications constellations, comprising low-Earth-orbit (LEO) and medium-Earth-orbit (MEO) satellites to emerge and to offer performance meeting these evolving user needs.
The increasing hybrid and cyber threat levels and the propensity of natural disasters drive the changing needs of governmental actors towards higher security, reliability and availability of commensurate satellite communication solutions. The rise of quantum computers adds an additional threat. With their fundamentally improved capabilities, it is expected that quantum computers will be able to decrypt content that is currently encrypted. The European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI)10 initiative aims at developing future-proof cryptographic systems to offer unprecedented levels of secure communications by resisting future quantum computing attacks. EuroQCI is currently financed through Horizon Europe, the Digital Europe programme, as well as the Connecting Europe Facility - Digital. Furthermore, the Commission Strategic Foresight report11 identifies digital hyper-connectivity and technological transformation as one of the prevalent megatrends of the next half century, underpinned by an unprecedented demand for services, for example in data economy and finance.
These advances lead global satellite communication connectivity to be increasingly handled as a strategic asset. To that end, several major non-EU government-backed projects with a variety of connectivity strategic objectives are underway12. These strategic infrastructures initiated by all major space powers highlight the growing global need for governmental services to ensure a resilient connectivity to support not only their security operations, but also to connect critical infrastructures, manage crises as well as to support border and maritime surveillance.
To date, there are no operational or in-the-making EU assets in low Earth orbit (LEO) or medium Earth orbit (MEO) that could meet the evolving governmental user needs. The existing committed satellite communication capacities providing governmental services at the disposal of the Member States are all based on a reduced number of GEO assets, covering mainly Europe. The majority of the capacity is dedicated to military missions, with a strong governance control (from owned infrastructure to stringent public private partnerships). Moreover, as the services provided by these Milsatcom capabilities are tailored to meet specific mlitary needs, in particular in terms of frequency, encryption, signal specificities, user terminal and level of classification, they cannot be used in most civilian governmental applications.
Spurred by the technological progress of low latency, there has been an emergence of various public-supported or subsidised non-EU mega-constellations in the US, China and Russia. At the same time, there is shortage of available frequency filings and orbital slots due to the dramatic increase of these mega-constellations. Coupled with the limited lifetime of GOVSATCOM capacity, this creates an urgency for an EU space-based secure connectivity system. The Programme would cover the capacity and capability gaps for governmental satellite communication services.
The Programme should also allow for the provision of commercial satellite communication services by the private sector. Such commercial services would in particular enable availability of high-speed broadband and seamless connectivity throughout Europe, removing dead zones and increasing cohesion across Member State territories, including rural, peripheral, remote and isolated areas and islands, and provide connectivity over geographical areas of strategic interest outside the Union.
A public-private partnership was assessed in the impact assessment to be the most appropriate implementation model to ensure that the objectives of the Programme could be pursued. It would permit to build upon the existing EU satellite communication technological and infrastructural base and to provide robust and innovative governmental services. At the same time, it would allow the private partners to complement the Programme infrastructure with additional capabilities to offer commercial services. This would furthermore optimise deployment and operation costs by sharing development and deployment costs on components common to both governmental and commercial infrastructures, as well as operational costs by allowing a high level of capacity mutualisation. It would stimulate innovation in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups that deploy novel space technologies and applications (‘New Space’) by enabling the sharing of research and development risks between public and private partners.
In parallel with this programme:
- the Horizon Europe Programme will allocate a dedicated share of its Cluster 4 components to R&I activities enabling the sharing of research and development risks between public and private partners, including for the potential technologies that would be developed under New Space;
- the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) will allocate a dedicated share of the Global Europe activities enabling the sharing of the deployment and exploitation risks between public and private partners for the connectivity system that will allow to offer an array of services with accrued benefits to international partners;
- the Union Space Programme will allocate a dedicated share of its GOVSATCOM component for the activities related to the development of the GOVSATCOM Hub which will form part of the ground infrastructure of the Secure Connectivity system.
• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The proposed Programme is consistent with the existing EU space policy. In particular, the programme would enhance the EU’s space capacity, currently consisting of the EU’s satellite navigation and Earth observation systems, Galileo and Copernicus respectively as well as the Space Situational Awareness capacities. The Programme builds on the EU GOVSATCOM component of the Union space programme.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal is consistent with a number of other Union policies. In particular, the provision of governmental services would ensure further cohesion in line with the Union’s Digital and Cybersecurity Strategies, by ensuring the integrity and resilience of the European infrastructure, networks and communications. The Programme would be EU-operated and provide a very high level of security, hereby strengthening the ability to provide an integrated EU response to security threats as called for in the EU Security Union Strategy and in the Global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The services would connect strategic areas such as Arctic and Africa, in line with policy targets in these regions and the Global Gateway strategy.
2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The proposal is based on Article 189(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is the legal basis for the adoption of Union measures related to the European space policy.
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
Due to the global scale and nature of connectivity, the issue cannot be addressed either at local or even at regional level.
The Programme would complement the existing EU GOVSATCOM arrangements on pooling and sharing of the existing governmental satellite communication capacity. However, no EU Member State alone has the capacity to fulfil the totality of evolving user needs and the accompanying costs.
An EU solution provides added value because action and coordination at EU level would avoid duplication of efforts across the Union and Member States. It would lead to a better exploitation of existing assets, to greater security and resilience, notably through quantum cryptography, to better coverage, and to provision of a greater array of services. Other EU and Member State thematic policies would benefit too.
Action at EU level has the benefit of economies of scale. The individual user needs across Member States are generally heterogeneous and often unpredictable in terms of scope, capacity, timing and location. A common denominator of all use cases is the need for flexibility due to the often unpredictable, fluctuating need for satellite communication capacity. Acquiring such flexibility of access to capacity requires large investments.
• Proportionality
The proposal does not introduce any measures beyond those necessary to achieve the main objectives of this Programme. In particular, the proposal defines the minimum requirements for the establishment of a European secure connectivity system and for the provision of suitable governmental satellite communication services. In this regard, the system’s capacity will be designed to complement inter alia existing Member States satellite communication capacities and cover planned additional capacity needs. The proposal does not introduce any restriction to the ability of Member States’ governmental actors to choose those capabilities they decide to use.
The proposal is expected to have a positive spill-over effect on the Union’s space sector, including the New Space. In addition, citizens will benefit from an improved operational performance in civil protection.
Finally, the budget allocated to the Programme is apt to achieving the objectives set and does not go beyond what is necessary. The funds needed to deliver the Programme have been determined based on a several careful analyses and estimates carried out as part of the impact assessment and described below.
• Choice of the instrument
A Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council is the preferred instrument. It ensures the uniformity and direct application, required for the effective implementation of the Programme, while giving it due visibility and providing it with the financial resources it needs for its implementation.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
• Stakeholder consultations
This Programme is supported by inputs from expert group meetings, public consultations and workshops that gathered the views of all relevant stakeholders (Member States and industry), more precisely:
- Since 2016, numerous expert group meetings with Member States have taken place in the context of the EU GOVSATCOM initiative, discussing governmental satellite communication needs, the establishment of pooling and sharing, implementation aspects and developments towards the current Programme.
- In 2021, numerous bilateral meetings with Member States took place to gather their specific needs for governmental satellite communication and potential concerns relating to the Programme. Most Member States stated that they clearly support the Programme and its overall objectives.
- In May and November 2021, the Commission held two workshops with Member States on ’Secure Connectivity - State of Play’. During these workshops, progress on the technical study on secure connectivity was presented, together with possible exploitation models of the system. The workshops allowed for active interventions, questions and comments from Member States that were taken into account in the development of this proposal.
- In June 2021, the Commission held the ‘Secure Connectivity Workshop for the European New Space Ecosystem’. 458 participants (including 196 SME and start-ups) discussed innovative ideas for the Secure Connectivity Programme and the potential role of New Space.
- As part of the public feedback for the Inception Impact Assessment, the Commission received feedback from 13 stakeholders, representing the views of a group of EU sparsely populated territories (1), private companies (8), business associations (2), a non-governmental organisation (1), and a private citizen (1). Industry was supportive of the Programme, and the majority favoured a public-private partnership (PPP) approach.
There is a general agreement amongst Member States on a need for action. Several Member States stressed that national capacities alone might possibly satisfy short-term needs, but will not be sufficient in the long term. Some of the gaps (e.g. in the Arctic) are already documented. Furthermore, several Member States confirmed their increasing governmental needs for guaranteed access to secure satellite communication.
Member States also stressed the need for the involvement of New Space, as startups have demonstrated that they are technologically advanced and eager to contribute with innovative solutions.
EU space industry representatives confirmed during the knowledge-building phase that there are no plans for EU private companies alone to create a satellite communication constellation to meet the evolving and increasing governmental low-latency needs. However, they welcomed the opportunity to partner with the EU for the development of such system.
• Collection and use of expertise
The proposal is also underpinned by data collected and findings from the study on ‘Building Blocks Towards a Secure Space Connectivity System13’.
The Commission also contracted an independent consultant to support the analysis of the indirect benefits of the Programme by providing the relevant econometric support and analysis.
Finally, quantitative and qualitative data supporting this proposal have been collected from Member States and relevant industry stakeholders. This proposal also draws on the work of the Commission on the GOVSATCOM component of the EU Space Programme, and EuroQCI initiative, as well as on the research activities conducted within the framework of the ENTRUSTED project14.
• Impact assessment
In line with its ‘Better Regulation’ policy, the Commission conducted an impact assessment in view of the establishment of the Programme.
The problems analysed in the impact assessment, as evoked as well above, led to formulation of three specific policy objectives:
- Ensure the provision of secure satellite communication for evolving public needs;
- Increase the resilience of Member States and EU operations by guaranteed access to secure satellite communication;
- Ensure that governmental communication needs are not critically dependent on non-EU infrastructure.
To close the capacity gap in the provision of secure governmental services, the following policy options were considered in order to achieve the objectives in the most effective and efficient manner:
Under the ‘Baseline scenario’, no EU action would take place beyond what is currently being implemented through EU GOVSATCOM. The baseline is taken to mean the continuation of the EU GOVSATCOM Phase 1, i.e. limited to the current pooling and sharing of Member State and private satellite communication systems. In such a scenario individual Member States, or EU companies may decide to develop new satellite communication services, of which partial capacity can be sold to the EU GOVSATCOM pool. Transition to EU GOVSATCOM phase 2 in the initially planned timeframe would in all cases require a legislative act, additional budget and available frequency filings.
As part of the assessment, it was also considered whether the EU could purchase the secure accredited services from established solutions by the public or private sector, currently limited to foreign market providers (Option 3 – non-EU constellation). Although the EU satcom market is already well developed, there are currently no EU providers that can serve all the increasing and evolving governmental needs. However, buying the services from non-EU private sources is not the preferred option from a security and open strategic autonomy point of view since Member States and EU Institutions require, for governmental needs, a guaranteed access in an unrestricted manner to secure connectivity services without soliciting the assent of a third party. This option 3 would thus not meet the specific objectives.
Therefore, the EU needs to act to ensure the provision of these services by either fully funding and procuring its own system (Option 1 – fully public) or involving private resources (Option 2 – in the form of a concession contract with rights of commercial use). Option 1 and 2 would achieve the specific objectives to the same extent, but option 2 ranks higher with regard to the economic benefits it can generate.
The common economic benefits of Options 1 and 2 are related to the deployment of a new infrastructure that would provide a gross value added (GVA) of EUR 17-24 billion and additional jobs in the EU space industry. Investments in Space upstream infrastructure are estimated to generate a six-fold impact in downstream sectors15. Spill over effects are created by downstream sectors using the services, technologies and data provided by the space sector to enhance their business. These are estimated to have a GVA of EUR 10-19 billion.
The additional possibility offered in Option 2 for the private sector to make further investment to develop commercial services should create more economic benefits for the downstream sector, as it can address significant commercial market opportunities. Should the private partners choose to develop additional infrastructure for commercial services, this could generate a further GVA and an additional job increase in the EU space industry for both upstream and downstream sectors.
As to what concerns the social impact, governmental satellite communication enhances the resilience of EU infrastructure and public services, hence the social imprint of their operational performance. The added value of being able to communicate in case of emergencies and disasters is extremely high for citizens as well as for people responsible for critical infrastructure sites. Here again, an additional investment in commercial infrastructure would increase the social impact further.
With regard to the environmental impact of the Programme, Option 2, entailing the development of an additional infrastructure, would have an environment impact from the manufacturing and launching of the system. However, compared to other industries, the manufacturing of spacecraft do not emit significant greenhouses gases. In addition, the development would comply with the the international standards on the protection of space environment (e.g. the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines16), as well as the existing national legislation17. Furthermore, the Programme is expected to have positive contributions towards the environment similar to Galileo and Copernicus, where it has been assessed that the environmental benefits stemming from the use of the components are approximately two-fold higher than the environmental footprint generated. Environmental benefits include for example satellite communication services for maritime surveillance supporting pollution detection and response environmental monitoring, and the ability to provide seamless communication capacity whenever infrastructure is disrupted, notably due to floods, hurricanes or other extreme weather phenomena resulting from climate change.
Finally, Option 2 has additional advantages insofar as it:
- Improves the provision of governmental services (low latency, resilience, security, guaranteed access, autonomous use)
- Allows the provision of additional commercial services (economic growth, social benefits)
- Optimises costs incurred in the Union’s budget for:
- development and deployment with economies of scale
- operations with mutualisation of capacity
- Stimulates the deployment of innovative technologies, in particular with the New Space involvement (sharing the technology risk between public and private).
As to the costs, the estimated cost of the satellite communication capacity designed to serve governmental demand is around EUR 6 billion, associated to the deployment of the infrastructure needed to provide the governmental services. Under Option 2, the costs are split between the contribution from the Union budget, Member States contributions and contributions by the private sector.
The draft impact assessment was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 11 October 2021. Following the negative opinion by the Board on the first draft impact assessment report, a revised draft impact assessment was submitted to the Board for a second opinion on 21 December 2021. While noting the improvements responding to its initial comments, the Board nevertheless maintained its negative opinion on 12 January 2022, because the impact assessment still contained significant shortcomings on (1) the analytical coherence between the problem definition, objectives, options, criteria for the comparison of options and the definition of future monitoring indicators; (2) the lack of explanations on the choice of policy options with regard to technical solutions; (3) the absence of a timescale and identification of funding sources; i clarity on methodological assumptions and validity of secondary data cited; and (5) on the lack of explanations on the compatibility of the Programme with the objectives of the Climate Law.
Therefore, in order to address the comments of the Board’s second negative opinion, the impact assessment is complemented by an annex that provides additional clarifications and some evidence on the areas where the Board had provided specific suggestions of improvements in its opinion.
The working methods of the European Commission empower the Vice-President for Inter-institutional Relations and Foresight to approve the continuation of an initiative that has been subject to a second negative opinion by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. It is important to flag also that the opinions of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board are an assessment of the quality of the impact assessment and not an assessment of the related legislative proposal.
Because of the political importance of this Programme, the urgency of action and having the additional clarifications and evidence viewed as satisfactorily addressing the identified shortcomings and suggested specifications of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, the Commission – also in the light of the agreement by the Vice-President for Inter-Institutional Relations and Foresight – has considered it opportune to proceed with the Programme.
• Regulatory fitness and simplification
• Fundamental rights
The Programme is consistent with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the ‘Charter’). It puts a common tool in the form of secure satellite communication at the disposal of Member States’ governments and EU actors. In enhancing the operational effectiveness of security actors, the Programme can contribute to safeguarding and strengthening citizens’ right to security (Article 6 of the Charter) and to diplomatic or consular protection when residing in a third state (Article 46 of the Charter). The Programme can also lead to a better protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter), because the enhanced security of the satellite communication will improve the level of information assurance against, in particular eavesdropping or spoofing, by third parties.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The Union's contribution from 2021 until 2027 is EUR 2400 million at current prices, out of which EUR 1600 million will be implemented under the new Union Secure Connectivity programme from 2023 to 2027, and EUR 800 million under three other Programmes: EUR 430 million under Horizon Europe, EUR 220 million under the Union Space Programme and EUR 150 million under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).
The detailed budgetary and financial structure of the proposal on the Union budget are presented in the financial statement accompanying the proposal and will be met from the available resources of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027.
EUR 1600 million are allocated to the Union Secure Connectivity Programme through reductions of EUR 260 million of the Union Space Programme, EUR 150 million of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) ‘emerging challenges and priorities cushion’, EUR 400 million of the European Defence Fund (EDF), EUR 440 million under the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) and EUR 200 million under the digital strand of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), EUR 50 million from the unallocated margin of heading 1 and EUR 100 million from the unallocated margin of heading 5 of the MFF.
The Commission proposes to handle the reductions of the financial envelopes of the European Space programme, CEF, EDF, DEP and NDICI within the 15% variation provided by point 18 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources.
Article 14 of the proposal provides that the Programme will be implemented under direct management in accordance with the Financial Regulation or under indirect management with the bodies referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.
The estimated costs of the Programme are the result of extensive analyses, supported by the experience acquired by the Commission in the management of the EU Space Programme and through preparatory studies and stakeholder consultations. The estimated requirements in Human Resources as indicated in the Financial Statement accompanying this Regulation reflect the essential need of continuity in the expertise.
5. OTHER ELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
Article 6(1) of the proposal specifies that the Programme shall be implemented through contracts, including but not limited to concession contracts as defined under Article 2(14) of the Financial Regulation or mixed contracts.
The Programme will be evaluated after three years from the Regulation’s entry into force and every four years thereafter. The evaluation of the Programme will, in line with the Commission’s Better Regulation Guidelines, assess the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added value of the Programme. In accordance with Article 37 of the proposal, the focus will in particular be on the performance of the services provided by the Programme and on the evolution of the user needs. In addition, an assessment on critical components and maturity of EU supply chain will be carried out, to ensure that governmental communication needs are not critically dependent on non-EU infrastructure. End-user EU Institutions and Agencies, the concessionaire and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) together with the Commission will perform the evaluation.
• Explanatory documents (for directives)
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
The proposal consists of 11 Chapters. It is structured as follows:
Chapter I contains the general provisions setting out the subject matter of the proposal, which is to establish the Union secure connectivity communication system for the period of the Union’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The Chapter also sets out both the general and specific objectives of the Programme, as well as its scope. Furthermore, the Chapter defines the Programme infrastructure. Finally, the Chapter contains a provision specifying that the Programme shall support an innovative and competitive Union space sector and stimulate the New Space ecosystem in the Union, including the participation of SMEs, start-ups and innovators from across the Union Member States.
Chapter II lays down and defines the services to be provided by the Programme. Furthermore, the Chapter sets out the rules on the provision of the governmental services and defines the participants and the users of the governmental services.
Chapter III sets out the funding mechanism of the Programme. It defines the funding streams and sets out the financial envelope for the contribution from the Union budget.
Chapter IV sets out the rules on the implementation of the Programme, which shall be carried out by means of contracts concluded by the Commission with a contractor. Such a contract shall be awarded in accordance with the procurement principles laid down in Article 17, as well as the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation, and may take the form of a concession contract or a mixed contract. Should the conclusion of the concession contract or mixed contract prove unviable, the Commission, according to paragraph 3, shall have the power to implement the Programme by means of a supply/services or works contract. The Chapter also sets out the rules governing the ownership and use of the assets forming part of that infrastructure
Chapter V relates to the governance of the Programme. It details the role to be played by this Programme’s four main actors, namely the Commission, the European Union Agency for the Space Programme, the Member States, and the European Space Agency, and the relations between these various actors.
Chapter VI deals with security, which is particularly important in view of the Programme’s strategic nature and the links between space and security. A high level of security has to be achieved and maintained by imposing effective governance arrangements that are largely based on the Member States’ experience and on the experience gained by the Commission in recent years. Furthermore, like any programme with a strategic dimension, the Programme has to undergo independent security accreditation following the appropriate standards in this respect.
Chapter VII sets out the criteria for the participation of third countries and international organisations in the Programme and for the access of third countries and international organisations to the Programme’s governmental services.
Chapters VIII and IX set out respectively provisions for programming and evaluation of the Programme and for delegation and implementing measures.