Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance (third non-life insurance Directive) (4), Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance (5), Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (6), Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) (7) regulate situations in which a natural or legal person has taken a decision to acquire or increase a qualifying holding in a credit institution, assurance, insurance or re-insurance undertaking or an investment firm.
(2)
The legal framework has so far provided neither detailed criteria for a prudential assessment of the proposed acquisition nor a procedure for their application. A clarification of the criteria and the process of prudential assessment is needed to provide the necessary legal certainty, clarity and predictability with regard to the assessment process, as well as to the result thereof.
(3)
The role of the competent authorities in both domestic and cross-border cases should be to carry out the prudential assessment within a framework of a clear and transparent procedure and a limited set of clear assessment criteria of strictly prudential nature. It is therefore necessary to specify criteria for the supervisory assessment of shareholders and management in relation to a proposed acquisition and a clear procedure for their application. This Directive prevents any circumvention of the initial conditions for authorisation by acquiring a qualifying holding in the target entity in which the acquisition is proposed. This Directive should not prevent the competent authorities from taking into account commitments made by the proposed acquirer to meet prudential requirements under the assessment criteria laid down in this Directive, provided that the rights of the proposed acquirer under this Directive are not affected.
(4)
The prudential assessment of a proposed acquisition should not in any way suspend or supersede the requirements of on-going prudential supervision and other relevant provisions to which the target entity has been subject since its own initial authorisation.
(5)
This Directive should not prevent market participants from operating effectively in the securities market. The information required for assessing a proposed acquisition, as well as the assessment of the compliance with the different criteria should, therefore, be proportionate, among other things, to the involvement of the proposed acquirer in the management of the entity in which the acquisition is proposed. The competent authorities should, in accordance with good administrative practice, complete their assessment without delay and inform the proposed acquirer also of a positive assessment, in any event if requested to do so by the proposed acquirer.
(6)
For markets that are increasingly integrated and where group structures may extend to various Member States, the acquisition of a qualifying holding is subject to scrutiny in a number of Member States. Maximum harmonisation throughout the Community of the procedure and the prudential assessments, without the Member States laying down stricter rules, is therefore critical. The thresholds for notifying a proposed acquisition or a disposal of a qualifying holding, the assessment procedure, the list of assessment criteria and other provisions of this Directive to be applied to the prudential assessment of proposed acquisitions should therefore be subject to maximum harmonisation. This Directive should not prevent the Member States from requiring that the competent authorities are to be informed of acquisitions of holdings below the thresholds laid down in this Directive, so long as a Member State imposes no more than one additional threshold below 10 % for this purpose. Nor should it prevent the competent authorities from providing general guidance as to when such holdings would be deemed to result in significant influence.
(7)
In order to ensure the clarity and predictability of the assessment procedure there should be a limited maximum period of time for completing the prudential assessment. During the assessment procedure, the competent authorities should be able to interrupt that period only once and only for the purpose of requesting additional information after which the authorities should in any event complete the assessment within the maximum assessment period. This should not prevent the competent authorities from asking for further clarification even after the time period set for completing the requested information or allowing the proposed acquirer to submit additional information at any time during the maximum assessment period, provided that this time period is not exceeded. Neither should this prevent the competent authorities from opposing the proposed acquisition, where appropriate, at any time during the maximum assessment period. Cooperation between the proposed acquirer and the competent authorities should thus remain intrinsic to the entire assessment period. Regular contact between the proposed acquirer and the competent authority of the regulated entity in which the acquisition is proposed may also commence in anticipation of a formal notification. Such cooperation should imply a genuine effort to assist each other in order, for example, to avoid unanticipated requests for information or the submission of information late in the assessment period.
(8)
With regard to the prudential assessment, the criterion concerning the ‘reputation of the proposed acquirer’ implies the determination of whether any doubts exist about the integrity and professional competence of the proposed acquirer and whether these doubts are founded. Such doubts may arise, for instance, from past business conduct. The assessment of the reputation is of particular relevance if the proposed acquirer is an unregulated entity but should be facilitated if the acquirer is authorised and supervised within the European Union.
(9)
A list established by the Member State should specify the information that may be requested for the purpose of assessments, strictly according to the criteria set out in this Directive. The information should be proportionate and adjusted to the nature of the proposed acquisition, in particular if the proposed acquirer is an unregulated entity or established in a third country. Provision should also be made for the possibility to request less extensive information in justified cases.
(10)
It is essential that the competent authorities work in close cooperation with each other when assessing the suitability of a proposed acquirer that is a regulated entity authorised in another Member State or in another sector. While it is considered appropriate that the responsibility for the final decision regarding the prudential assessment remains with the competent authority responsible for the supervision of the entity in which the acquisition is proposed, that competent authority should take into full account the opinion of the competent authority responsible for the supervision of the proposed acquirer, particularly as regards the assessment criteria directly related to the proposed acquirer.
(11)
The Commission should, in accordance with the rights and obligations set out in the Treaty, be able to monitor the application of the provisions regarding the prudential assessment of acquisitions in order to fulfil the tasks assigned to it with regard to the enforcement of Community law. Having regard to Article 296 of the Treaty, the Member States should cooperate with the Commission by providing it, once the assessment procedure has been completed, with information pertaining to prudential assessments carried out by their competent authorities where such information is requested for the sole purpose of determining whether Member States have infringed their obligations under this Directive.
(12)
The assessment criteria may, in the future, need adjustments to take into account market developments and the need for a uniform application throughout the Community. Such technical adjustments should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (8).
(13)
Since the objective of this Directive, namely the establishment of harmonised procedural rules and assessment criteria throughout the Community, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(14)
The Community's intention is to keep its financial markets open to the rest of the world and thus to help improve the liberalisation of the global financial markets in third countries. It would be beneficial for all market participants to achieve equivalent access to investment worldwide. Member States should report to the Commission cases in which Community credit institutions, investment firms, other financial institutions or insurance companies acquiring credit institutions, investment firms, other financial institutions or insurance companies situated in a third country are not granted the same treatment as domestic acquirers and encounter major impediments. The Commission should propose measures to remedy such cases or raise them in an appropriate forum.
(15)
In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making (9), Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interests of the Community, their own tables illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public.
(16)
Directives 92/49/EEC, 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC should therefore be amended accordingly,
