The financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 exposed important shortcomings in financial supervision, both in particular cases and in relation to the financial system as a whole. Nationally based supervisory models have lagged behind financial globalisation and the integrated and interconnected reality of European financial markets, in which many financial institutions operate across borders. The crisis exposed shortcomings in the areas of cooperation, coordination, consistent application of Union law and trust between national competent authorities.
(2)
In several resolutions before and during the financial crisis, the European Parliament has called for a move towards more integrated European supervision, in order to ensure a true level playing field for all actors at Union level and reflect the increasing integration of financial markets in the Union (in its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan, of 21 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union, of 11 July 2007 on financial services policy (2005 to 2010) – White Paper, of 23 September 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on hedge funds and private equity, and of 9 October 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on Lamfalussy follow-up: future structure of supervision, and in its positions of 22 April 2009 on the amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) and of 23 April 2009 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies).
(3)
In November 2008, the Commission mandated a High-Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière to make recommendations on how to strengthen European supervisory arrangements with a view to better protecting the citizen and rebuilding trust in the financial system. In its final report presented on 25 February 2009 (the ‘de Larosière Report’), the High-Level Group recommended that the supervisory framework be strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of future financial crises. It recommended far-reaching reforms to the supervisory structure of the financial sector within the Union. The de Larosière Report also recommended that a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) be created, comprising three European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) – one for each of the banking, the securities and the insurance and occupational pensions sectors – and a European Systemic Risk Council.
(4)
In its Communication of 4 March 2009 entitled ‘Driving European Recovery’, the Commission proposed to put forward draft legislation creating the ESFS and in its Communication of 27 May 2009 entitled ‘European Financial Supervision’, it provided more details of the possible architecture of that new supervisory framework.
(5)
In its conclusions following its meeting on 18 and 19 June 2009, the European Council recommended that a European System of Financial Supervisors, comprising three new ESA, be established. The system should be aimed at upgrading the quality and consistency of national supervision, strengthening oversight of cross-border groups, establishing a European single rule book applicable to all financial institutions in the internal market. It emphasised that the ESA should also have supervisory powers for credit rating agencies and invited the Commission to prepare concrete proposals on how the ESFS could play a strong role in crisis situations.
(6)
On 23 September 2009, the Commission adopted proposals for three regulations establishing the ESFS including the creation of the three ESA.
(7)
In order for the ESFS to work effectively, changes to legal acts of the Union in the field of operation of the three ESA are necessary. Such changes concern the definition of the scope of certain powers of the ESA, the integration of certain powers established in legal acts of the Union, and amendments to ensure a smooth and effective functioning of the ESA in the context of the ESFS.
(8)
The establishment of the three ESA should be accompanied by the development of a single rule book to ensure consistent harmonisation and uniform application and thus contribute to a more effective functioning of the internal market.
(9)
The regulations establishing the ESFS provide that, in the areas specifically set out in the relevant legislation, the ESA may develop draft technical standards, to be submitted to the Commission for adoption in accordance with Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by means of delegated or implementing acts. This Directive should identify a first set of such areas and should be without prejudice to adding further areas in the future.
(10)
The relevant legislation should define those areas where the ESA are empowered to develop draft technical standards and how they should be adopted. The relevant legislation should lay down the elements, conditions and specifications as detailed in Article 290 TFEU in the case of delegated acts.
(11)
The identification of areas for technical standards should strike an appropriate balance between building a single set of harmonised rules and avoiding unduly complicated regulation and enforcement. The only areas selected should be those in which consistent technical rules will contribute significantly and effectively to the achievement of the objectives of the relevant legislation, while ensuring that policy decisions are taken by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in accordance with their usual procedures.
(12)
Matters subject to technical standards should be genuinely technical, where their development requires the expertise of supervisory experts. The technical standards adopted as delegated acts should further develop, specify and determine the conditions for consistent harmonisation of the rules included in basic instruments adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, supplementing or amending certain non-essential elements of the legislative act. The technical standards adopted as implementing acts should set conditions for the uniform application of legally binding Union acts. Technical standards should not involve policy choices.
(13)
In the case of regulatory technical standards it is appropriate to introduce the procedure provided for in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (4), of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (5) and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (6), respectively. Implementing technical standards should be adopted in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, respectively. The European Council endorsed the four-level ‘Lamfalussy’ approach to make the regulatory process for Union financial legislation more efficient and transparent. The Commission is empowered to adopt level-2 measures in many areas, and a large number of level-2 Commission regulations and directives are in force. In cases where the regulatory technical standards are designed to further develop, specify or determine the conditions of application of such level-2 measures, they should be adopted only once the relevant level-2 measures have been adopted and should be compatible with that level-2 measure.
(14)
Binding technical standards contribute to a single rulebook for financial services legislation as endorsed by the European Council in its conclusions of June 2009. To the extent that certain requirements in Union legislative acts are not fully harmonised, and in accordance with the precautionary principle on supervision, binding technical standards developing, specifying or determining the conditions of application for those requirements should not prevent Member States from requiring additional information or imposing more stringent requirements. Technical standards should therefore allow Member States to do so in specific areas, when those legislative acts provide for such discretion.
(15)
As set out in the regulations establishing the ESFS, before submitting the technical standards to the Commission, the ESA should, where appropriate, conduct open public consultations relating thereto and analyse the potential related costs and benefits.
(16)
It should be possible for technical standards to provide for transitional measures subject to adequate deadlines, if the costs of immediate implementation would be excessive compared to the benefits involved.
(17)
The regulations establishing the ESFS provide for a mechanism to settle disagreements between national competent authorities. Where a competent authority disagrees with the procedure or content of an action or inaction by another competent authority in areas specified in legal acts of the Union in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, where the relevant legislation requires cooperation, coordination or joint decision-making by national competent authorities from more than one Member State, the ESA, at the request of one of the competent authorities concerned, should be able to assist the authorities in reaching an agreement within the time limit set by the ESA which should take into account any relevant time limits in the relevant legislation, and the urgency and complexity of the disagreement. In the event that such disagreement persists, the ESA should be able to settle the matter.
(18)
The regulations establishing the ESA require that the cases where the mechanism to settle disagreements between national competent authorities may be applied are to be specified in the sectoral legislation. This Directive should identify a first set of such cases and should be without prejudice to adding further cases in the future. This Directive should not prevent the ESA from acting in accordance with other powers or fulfilling tasks specified in their establishing regulations, including non-binding mediation and contributing to the consistent, efficient and effective application of legal acts of the Union. Moreover, in those areas where some form of non-binding mediation is already established in the relevant legal act, or where there are time limits for joint decisions to be taken by one or more national competent authorities, amendments are needed to ensure clarity and minimum disruption of the process for reaching a joint decision, but also that where necessary, the ESA should be able to resolve disagreements. The binding procedure for the settlement of disagreements is designed to solve situations where national competent authorities cannot resolve, among themselves, procedural or substantive issues relating to compliance with legal acts of the Union.
(19)
This Directive should therefore identify situations in which a procedural or a substantive issue of compliance with Union law needs to be resolved and the national competent authorities are not able to resolve the matter on their own. In such a situation, one of the national competent authorities concerned should be able to raise the issue with the European Supervisory Authority concerned. That European Supervisory Authority should act in accordance with its establishing regulation and with this Directive. The European Supervisory Authority concerned should be able to require the competent authorities concerned to take specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle the matter and to ensure compliance with Union law, with binding effects on the competent authorities concerned. In cases where the relevant legal act of the Union confers discretion on Member States, decisions taken by a European Supervisory Authority should not replace the exercise of discretion by the competent authorities in compliance with Union law.
(20)
Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (7) provides for mediation or joint decisions as regards the determination of significant branches for the purposes of supervisory college membership, model validation and group risk assessment. In all of those areas, amendments should clearly state that in the event of disagreement during a specified time period, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) may resolve the disagreement using the process outlined in Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. That approach makes it clear that, while the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) should not replace the exercise of discretion by the competent authorities in compliance with Union law, it should be possible for disagreements to be resolved and cooperation to be strengthened before a final decision is taken or issued to an institution.
(21)
In order to ensure a smooth transition of the current tasks of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors and the Committee of European Securities Regulators to the new ESA, references to those Committees should be replaced in the relevant legislation with references to the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), respectively.
(22)
In order to give full effect to the new framework provided for in the TFEU, it is necessary to adapt and replace the implementing powers designed under Article 202 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) with the appropriate provisions in accordance with Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. That review should be finalised within 3 years from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the remaining powers conferred under Article 202 EC Treaty should cease to apply on that date.
(23)
The alignment of committee procedures to the TFEU and, in particular, to Articles 290 and 291 thereof, should be effected on a case-by-case basis. In order to take account of the technical developments in the financial markets and to specify the requirements laid down in the directives amended by this Directive, the Commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU.
(24)
The European Parliament and the Council should have 3 months from the date of notification to object to a delegated act. At the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council, it should be possible to prolong that period by 3 months in regard to significant areas of concern. It should also be possible for the European Parliament and the Council to inform the other institutions of their intention not to raise objections. Such early approval of delegated acts is particularly appropriate when deadlines need to be met, for example where there are timetables in the basic act for the Commission to adopt delegated acts.
(25)
In the Declaration (No 39) on Article 290 TFEU, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, the Conference took note of the Commission's intention to continue to consult experts appointed by the Member States in the preparation of draft delegated acts in the financial services area, in accordance with its established practice.
(26)
The new supervisory architecture established by the ESFS will require national competent authorities to cooperate closely with the ESA. Amendments to the relevant legislation should ensure there are no legal obstacles to the information sharing obligations included in the regulations establishing the ESA.
(27)
Information transmitted to or exchanged between competent authorities and the ESA or the ESRB should be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, to which the persons employed or formerly employed by the competent authorities receiving the information are subject.
(28)
The regulations establishing the ESA provide that they may develop contacts with supervisory authorities from third countries and assist in preparing equivalence decisions pertaining to supervisory regimes in third countries. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (8) and Directive 2006/48/EC should be amended to allow the ESA to establish cooperation agreements with third countries and exchange information where those third countries can provide guarantees that professional secrecy will be protected.
(29)
Having a single consolidated list or register for each category of financial institution in the Union, which is currently the duty of each national competent authority, will improve transparency and is more appropriate in the context of the single financial market. The ESA should be given the task of establishing, publishing and regularly updating registers and lists of financial actors within the Union. This concerns the list of authorisations of credit institutions granted by national competent authorities, the register of all investment firms and the list of regulated markets under Directive 2004/39/EC. Similarly, the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) should be given the task of establishing, publishing and regularly updating the list of approved prospectuses and the certificates of approval under Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading (9).
(30)
In those areas where the ESA are under an obligation to develop draft technical standards, those draft technical standards should be submitted to the Commission within 3 years of the creation of the ESA unless another deadline is established by the relevant legislative act.
(31)
The tasks of the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) in relation to Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (10) should be without prejudice to the competence of the European System of Central Banks to promote the smooth operation of payment systems, in line with the fourth indent of Article 127(2) TFEU.
(32)
The technical standards to be drafted by the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) in accordance with this Directive and in relation to Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (11) should be without prejudice to the competences of Member States with regard to prudential requirements on such institutions as provided for in Directive 2003/41/EC.
(33)
Under Article 13(5) of Directive 2003/71/EC, the competent authority of the home Member State may transfer the approval of a prospectus to the competent authority of another Member State, subject to the agreement of that competent authority. Article 28(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 requires that such delegation agreements be notified to the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) at least 1 month before they are put into effect. However, given the experience in transfer of approval under Directive 2003/71/EC, which provides for shorter deadlines, it is appropriate not to apply Article 28(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 to that situation.
(34)
There is currently no need for the ESA to develop draft technical standards on the existing requirements that the persons who effectively direct the business of investment firms, credit institutions, UCITS and their management companies be of sufficiently good repute and sufficiently experienced so as to ensure their sound and prudent management. However, given the importance of those requirements, the ESA should give priority to identifying best practices in guidelines and to ensuring the convergence of supervisory and prudential processes towards those best practices. They should similarly identify best practices and ensure convergence with respect to prudential requirements relative to the head office of those bodies.
(35)
The European single rule book, applicable to all financial institutions in the internal market, should ensure adequate harmonisation of criteria and methodology to be applicable by the competent authorities to assess the risk of credit institutions. More particularly, the purpose of developing draft technical standards in relation to the Internal Ratings Based approach, the Advanced Measurement Approach and the internal model for market risk approach, as provided for by this Directive, should be to ensure the quality and robustness of such approaches, as well as the consistency of their review by the competent authorities. Those technical standards should allow the competent authorities to permit financial institutions to develop different approaches based on their experience and specificities, in accordance with the requirements laid down in Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (12) and subject to the requirements of the relevant technical standards.
(36)
Since the objectives of this Directive, namely improving the functioning of the internal market by means of ensuring a high, effective and consistent level of prudential regulation and supervision, protecting depositors, investors and beneficiaries and thereby businesses and consumers, protecting the integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning of financial markets, maintaining the stability and sustainability of the financial system, preserving the real economy, safeguarding public finances and strengthening international supervisory coordination, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of their scale, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(37)
The Commission should, by 1 January 2014, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the submission by the ESA of the draft technical standards provided for in this Directive and present any appropriate proposals.
(38)
Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems (13), Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate (14), Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (15), Directive 2003/41/EC, Directive 2003/71/EC, Directive 2004/39/EC, Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (16), Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (17), Directive 2006/48/EC, Directive 2006/49/EC and Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (18) should therefore be amended accordingly,
