The pricing of many financial instruments and financial contracts depends on the accuracy and integrity of benchmarks. Serious cases of manipulation of interest rate benchmarks such as LIBOR and EURIBOR, as well as allegations that energy, oil and foreign exchange benchmarks have been manipulated, demonstrate that benchmarks can be subject to conflicts of interest. The use of discretion, and weak governance regimes, increase the vulnerability of benchmarks to manipulation. Failures in, or doubts about, the accuracy and integrity of indices used as benchmarks can undermine market confidence, cause losses to consumers and investors and distort the real economy. It is therefore necessary to ensure the accuracy, robustness and integrity of benchmarks and of the benchmark determination process.
(2)
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) contains certain requirements with respect to the reliability of benchmarks used to price a listed financial instrument. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) contains certain requirements on benchmarks used by issuers. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (6) contains certain requirements on the use of benchmarks by undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS). Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7) contains certain provisions which prohibit the manipulation of benchmarks that are used for wholesale energy products. However, those legislative acts only cover certain aspects of certain benchmarks and they neither address all the vulnerabilities in the provision of all benchmarks, nor do they cover all uses of financial benchmarks in the financial industry.
(3)
Benchmarks are vital in pricing cross-border transactions, thereby facilitating the effective functioning of the internal market in a wide variety of financial instruments and services. Many benchmarks used as reference rates in financial contracts, in particular mortgages, are provided in one Member State but used by credit institutions and consumers in other Member States. In addition, such credit institutions often hedge their risks or obtain funding for granting those financial contracts in the cross-border interbank market. Only a few Member States have adopted national rules on benchmarks, but their respective legal frameworks on benchmarks already show divergences regarding aspects such as the scope of application. In addition, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) agreed principles on financial benchmarks on 17 July 2013 (‘IOSCO principles for financial benchmarks’), Principles for Oil Price Reporting Agencies on 5 October 2012 (‘IOSCO principles for PRAs’) (together, ‘the IOSCO principles’), and since those principles provide a certain flexibility as to their exact scope and means of implementation, Member States are likely to adopt rules at national level which would implement such principles in a divergent manner.
(4)
Those divergent approaches would result in fragmentation of the internal market since administrators and users of benchmarks would be subject to different rules in different Member States. Thus, benchmarks provided in one Member State could be prevented from being used in other Member States. In the absence of a harmonised framework to ensure the accuracy and integrity of benchmarks used in financial instruments and financial contracts, or in order to measure the performance of investment funds, in the Union it is therefore likely that differences in Member States' laws will create obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market for the provision of benchmarks.
(5)
Union consumer protection rules do not cover the particular issue of adequate information on benchmarks in financial contracts. As a result of consumer complaints and litigation relating to the use of benchmarks in several Member States, it is likely that divergent measures, inspired by legitimate concerns of consumer protection, would be adopted at national level, which could result in fragmentation of the internal market due to the divergent conditions of competition attached to different levels of consumer protection.
(6)
Therefore, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and improve the conditions of its functioning, in particular with regard to financial markets, and to ensure a high level of consumer and investor protection, it is appropriate to lay down a regulatory framework for benchmarks at Union level.
(7)
It is appropriate and necessary for that framework to take the form of a regulation in order to ensure that provisions directly imposing obligations on persons involved in the provision, contribution and use of benchmarks are applied in a uniform manner throughout the Union. Since a legal framework for the provision of benchmarks necessarily involves measures specifying precise requirements concerning aspects inherent to such provision of benchmarks, even small divergences on the approach taken regarding one of those aspects could lead to significant impediments in the cross-border provision of benchmarks. Therefore, the use of a regulation, which is directly applicable, should reduce the possibility of divergent measures being taken at national level, and should ensure a consistent approach and greater legal certainty, and prevent the appearance of significant impediments in the cross-border provision of benchmarks.
(8)
The scope of this Regulation should be as broad as necessary to create a preventive regulatory framework. The provision of benchmarks involves discretion in their determination and is inherently subject to certain types of conflicts of interest, which implies the existence of opportunities and incentives to manipulate benchmarks. Such risk factors are common to all benchmarks and should be made subject to adequate governance and control requirements. The degree of risk, however, varies, and the approach adopted should therefore be tailored to the particular circumstances. Since the vulnerability and importance of a benchmark varies over time, restricting the scope by reference to indices that are currently important or vulnerable would not address the risks that any benchmark poses in the future. In particular, benchmarks that are currently not widely used could be used more in the future with the result that, in their regard, even a minor manipulation could have a significant impact.
(9)
The critical determinant of the scope of this Regulation should be whether the output value of the benchmark determines the value of a financial instrument or a financial contract, or measures the performance of an investment fund. Therefore, the scope should not be dependent on the nature of the input data. Benchmarks calculated from economic input data, such as share prices and non-economic numbers, or values such as weather parameters should thus be included. The framework provided for in this Regulation should also acknowledge the existence of a large number of benchmarks and the different impact that they have on financial stability and the real economy. This Regulation should also provide for a proportionate response to the risks that different benchmarks pose. This Regulation should therefore cover benchmarks which are used to price financial instruments listed or traded on regulated venues.
(10)
A large number of consumers are parties to financial contracts, in particular consumer credit agreements secured by mortgages, that reference benchmarks that are subject to the same risks. This Regulation should therefore cover credit agreements as defined in Directives 2008/48/EC (8) and 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (9).
(11)
Many investment indices involve significant conflicts of interest and are used to measure the performance of a fund such as a UCITS fund. Some of those benchmarks are published and others are made available, for free or upon payment of a fee, to the public or a section of the public and their manipulation can adversely affect investors. This Regulation should therefore cover indices or reference rates that are used to measure the performance of an investment fund.
(12)
All contributors of input data to benchmarks can exercise discretion and are potentially subject to conflicts of interest, and so risk being a source of manipulation. Contributing to a benchmark is a voluntary activity. If any initiative requires contributors to significantly change their business models, they could cease to contribute. However, for entities already subject to regulation and supervision, requiring good governance and control systems is not expected to lead to substantial costs or disproportionate administrative burden. Therefore this Regulation imposes certain obligations on supervised contributors. When a benchmark is determined on the basis of readily available data, the source of such data should not be considered to be a contributor.
(13)
Financial benchmarks are not only used in the issuance and manufacturing of financial instruments and contracts. The financial industry also relies on benchmarks for measuring the performance of investment funds for the purpose of return tracking or of determining the asset allocation of a portfolio or of computing the performance fees. A given benchmark can be used either directly as a reference for financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds, or indirectly within a combination of benchmarks. In the latter case, the setting and review of the weights to be assigned to various indices within a combination for the purpose of determining the pay-out or the value of a financial instrument or a financial contract or measuring the performance of an investment fund also amounts to use as such an activity does not involve discretion, in contrast to the activity of provision of benchmarks. The holding of financial instruments referencing a certain benchmark is not considered to be use of the benchmark.
(14)
Central banks already meet principles, standards and procedures which ensure that they exercise their activities with integrity and in an independent manner. It is therefore not necessary that central banks be subject to this Regulation. When central banks provide benchmarks, especially where those benchmarks are intended for transaction purposes, it is their responsibility to set appropriate internal procedures in order to ensure the accuracy, integrity, reliability and independence of those benchmarks, in particular with respect to transparency in governance and computation methodology.
(15)
Furthermore, public authorities, including national statistics agencies, should not be subject to this Regulation where they contribute data to, provide or have control over the provision of, benchmarks for public policy purposes, including measures of employment, economic activity, and inflation.
(16)
An administrator is the natural or legal person that has control over the provision of a benchmark and in particular administers the arrangements for determining the benchmark, collects and analyses the input data, determines the benchmark and publishes it. An administrator should be able to outsource to a third party one or more of those functions, including the calculation or publication of the benchmark, or other relevant services and activities in the provision of the benchmark. However, where a person merely publishes or refers to a benchmark as part of that person's journalistic activities but does not have control over the provision of that benchmark, that person should not be subject to the requirements imposed on administrators by this Regulation.
(17)
An index is calculated using a formula or some other methodology on the basis of underlying values. There exists a degree of discretion in constructing the formula, performing the necessary calculation and determining the input data which creates a risk of manipulation. Therefore, all benchmarks sharing that characteristic of discretion should be covered by this Regulation.
(18)
However, where a single price or value is used as a reference to a financial instrument, for example where the price of a single security is the reference price for an option or future, there is no calculation, input data or discretion. Therefore single price or single value reference prices should not be considered to be benchmarks for the purposes of this Regulation.
(19)
Reference prices or settlement prices produced by central counterparties (CCPs) should not be considered to be benchmarks because they are used to determine settlement, margins and risk management and thus do not determine the amount payable under a financial instrument or the value of a financial instrument.
(20)
The provision of borrowing rates by creditors should not be considered to be benchmark provision for the purposes of this Regulation. A borrowing rate provided by a creditor is either set by an internal decision or calculated as a spread or mark-up over an index (e.g. EURIBOR). In the first case, the creditor is exempt from this Regulation for activity concerning financial contracts entered into by that creditor with its own clients, while in the latter case the creditor is considered to be only a user of a benchmark.
(21)
In order to ensure the integrity of benchmarks, benchmark administrators should be required to implement adequate governance arrangements to control conflicts of interest and to safeguard confidence in the integrity of benchmarks. Even where effectively managed, most administrators are subject to some conflicts of interest and could have to make judgements and decisions which affect a diverse group of stakeholders. It is therefore important that administrators have in place a function that operates with integrity to oversee the implementation and effectiveness of the governance arrangements that provide effective oversight.
(22)
The manipulation or unreliability of benchmarks can cause damage to investors and consumers. Therefore, this Regulation should set out a framework for retention of records by administrators and contributors as well as for providing transparency about a benchmark's purpose and methodology which facilitates a more efficient and fairer resolution of potential claims in accordance with national or Union law.
(23)
Auditing and the effective enforcement of this Regulation requires ex post analysis and evidence. This Regulation should therefore set out requirements for adequate record-keeping by benchmark administrators relating to the calculation of the benchmark for a sufficient period of time. The reality that a benchmark intends to measure and the environment in which it is measured are likely to change over time. Therefore it is necessary that the process and methodology of the provision of benchmarks are reviewed on a periodic basis to identify shortcomings and possible improvements. Many stakeholders can be impacted by failures in the provision of the benchmark and can help identify such shortcomings. This Regulation should therefore set out a framework for the establishment of a complaints handling mechanism by benchmark administrators to enable stakeholders to notify the benchmark administrator of complaints and ensure that the benchmark administrator objectively evaluates the merits of any complaint.
(24)
The provision of benchmarks frequently involves the outsourcing of important functions such as calculating the benchmark, gathering input data and disseminating the benchmark. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the governance arrangements, it is necessary to ensure that any such outsourcing does not relieve benchmark administrators of any of their obligations and responsibilities, and is done in such a way that it does not interfere with either the administrators' ability to meet their obligations or responsibilities, or the relevant competent authority's ability to supervise them.
(25)
The benchmark administrator is the central recipient of input data and is able to evaluate the integrity and accuracy of input data on a consistent basis. It is therefore necessary that this Regulation requires administrators to take certain measures where an administrator considers that input data does not represent the market or economic reality that a benchmark intends to measure, comprising measures to change the input data, the contributors or the methodology or else to cease providing that benchmark. Furthermore, an administrator should, as part of its control framework, establish measures to monitor, where feasible, input data prior to the publication of the benchmark and to validate input data after publication, including comparing that data against historical patterns where applicable.
(26)
Any discretion that can be exercised in providing input data creates an opportunity to manipulate a benchmark. Where the input data is transaction-based data, there is less discretion and therefore the opportunity to manipulate the data is reduced. As a general rule, benchmark administrators should therefore use actual transaction-based input data where possible but other data can be used in those cases where the transaction data is insufficient or inappropriate to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the benchmark.
(27)
The accuracy and reliability of a benchmark in measuring the economic reality it is intended to measure depends on the methodology and input data used. It is therefore necessary to adopt a transparent methodology that ensures the benchmark's reliability and accuracy. Such transparency does not mean the publication of the formula applied for the determination of a given benchmark, but rather the disclosure of elements sufficient to allow stakeholders to understand how the benchmark is derived and to assess its representativeness, relevance and appropriateness for its intended use.
(28)
It could become necessary to change the methodology to ensure the continued accuracy of the benchmark, but any changes in the methodology have an impact on users and stakeholders of the benchmark. It is therefore necessary to specify the procedures to be followed when changing the benchmark methodology, including the need for consultation, so that users and stakeholders can take the necessary action in light of those changes or notify the administrator if they have concerns about those changes.
(29)
Employees of the administrator can identify possible infringements of this Regulation or potential vulnerabilities that could lead to manipulation or attempted manipulation. This Regulation should therefore put in place a framework to enable employees to alert administrators confidentially of possible infringements of this Regulation.
(30)
The integrity and accuracy of benchmarks depends on the integrity and accuracy of the input data provided by contributors. It is essential that the obligations of contributors in respect of such input data are clearly specified, that compliance with those obligations can be relied upon, and that the obligations are consistent with the benchmark administrator's controls and methodology. It is therefore necessary that the benchmark administrator produces a code of conduct to specify those requirements and the contributor's responsibilities concerning the provision of input data. The administrator should be satisfied that contributors adhere to the code of conduct. Where contributors are located in third countries, the administrator should be satisfied to the extent possible.
(31)
Contributors are potentially subject to conflicts of interest and are able to exercise discretion in the determination of input data. Therefore, it is necessary for contributors to be subject to governance arrangements in order to ensure that those conflicts are managed and that the input data is accurate, conforms to the administrator's requirements and can be validated.
(32)
Many benchmarks are determined by the application of a formula using input data that is provided by the following entities: a trading venue, an approved publication arrangement, a consolidated tape provider, an approved reporting mechanism, an energy exchange or an emission allowance auction platform. In some situations, data collection is outsourced to a service provider that receives the data entirely and directly from those entities. In those cases, existing regulation and supervision ensure the integrity and transparency of the input data and provide for governance requirements and procedures for the notification of infringements. Therefore, those benchmarks are less vulnerable to manipulation, are subject to independent verifications, and the relevant administrators are accordingly released from certain obligations set out in this Regulation.
(33)
Different types of benchmarks and different benchmark sectors have different characteristics, vulnerabilities and risks. The provisions of this Regulation should be further specified for particular benchmark sectors and types. Interest rate benchmarks are benchmarks that play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy and so it is necessary to introduce specific provisions in this Regulation for such benchmarks.
(34)
Physical commodities markets have unique characteristics which should be taken into account. Commodity benchmarks are widely used and can have sector-specific characteristics, so it is necessary to introduce specific provisions in this Regulation for such benchmarks. Certain commodity benchmarks are exempt from this Regulation but would need to nevertheless respect the relevant IOSCO principles. Commodity benchmarks can become critical since the regime is not limited to benchmarks based on submissions by contributors which are in majority supervised entities. For critical commodity benchmarks subject to Annex II, the requirements of this Regulation regarding mandatory contribution and colleges are not applicable.
(35)
The failure of critical benchmarks can impact market integrity, financial stability, consumers, the real economy, or the financing of households and businesses in Member States. Those potentially destabilising effects of the failure of a critical benchmark could be felt in a single Member State or in more than one. It is therefore necessary that this Regulation provides for a process to determine those benchmarks that should be considered to be critical benchmarks and that additional requirements apply to ensure the integrity and robustness of such benchmarks.
(36)
Critical benchmarks can be determined using a quantitative criterion or a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria. In addition, in cases where a benchmark does not meet the appropriate quantitative threshold, it could nonetheless be recognised as critical where the benchmark has no or very few market-led substitutes and its existence and accuracy are relevant for market integrity, financial stability or consumer protection in one or more Member States, and where all the relevant competent authorities agree that such a benchmark should be recognised as critical. In the event of disagreement between the relevant competent authorities, the decision of the competent authority of the administrator on whether such a benchmark should be recognised as critical should prevail. In such a case, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), should be able to publish an opinion on the assessment made by the competent authority of the administrator. Furthermore, a competent authority can also designate a benchmark as critical based on certain qualitative criteria where the administrator and the majority of the contributors to the benchmark are located in its Member State. All critical benchmarks should be included in a list established by a way of an implementing act by the Commission, which should be reviewed and updated regularly.
(37)
The cessation of the administration of a critical benchmark by an administrator could render financial contracts or financial instruments invalid, cause losses to consumers and investors, and impact financial stability. It is therefore necessary to include a power for the relevant competent authority to require mandatory administration of a critical benchmark in order to preserve the existence of the benchmark in question. In the event of insolvency proceedings of a benchmark administrator, the competent authority should provide an assessment for the consideration of the relevant judicial authority of whether and how the critical benchmark could be transitioned to a new administrator or could cease to be provided.
(38)
Without prejudice to the application of Union competition law and the ability of Member States to take measures to facilitate compliance with it, it is necessary to require administrators of critical benchmarks, including critical commodity benchmarks, to take adequate steps to ensure that licences of, and information on, benchmarks are provided on a fair, reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory basis to all users.
(39)
Contributors that cease to contribute input data to critical benchmarks can undermine the credibility of such benchmarks, as the capability of such benchmarks to measure the underlying market or economic reality would as a result be impaired. It is therefore necessary to include a power for the relevant competent authority to require mandatory contributions from supervised entities to critical benchmarks in order to preserve the credibility of the benchmark in question. Mandatory contribution of input data is not intended to impose an obligation on supervised entities to enter into, or to commit to entering into, transactions.
(40)
Due to the existence of a large variety of types and sizes of benchmarks, it is important to introduce proportionality in this Regulation and to avoid putting an excessive administrative burden on administrators of benchmarks the cessation of which poses less threat to the wider financial system. Thus, in addition to the regime for critical benchmarks, two distinct regimes should be introduced: one for significant benchmarks and one for non-significant benchmarks.
(41)
Administrators of significant benchmarks should be able to choose not to apply a limited number of detailed requirements of this Regulation. Competent authorities should, however, maintain the right to require the application of those requirements, based on criteria outlined in this Regulation. Delegated acts and implementing acts that apply to significant benchmark administrators should take due account of the principle of proportionality and aim to avoid administrative burden where possible.
(42)
Administrators of non-significant benchmarks are subject to a less detailed regime, whereby administrators should be able to choose not to apply some requirements of this Regulation. In such a case, the administrator in question should explain why it is appropriate not to do so in a compliance statement which should be published and provided to the administrator's competent authority. That competent authority should review the compliance statement and should be able to request additional information or require changes to ensure compliance with this Regulation. While non-significant benchmarks could still be vulnerable to manipulation, they are more easily substitutable, therefore transparency to users should be the main tool used for market participants to make informed choices about the benchmarks they consider appropriate for use. For that reason, the delegated acts in Title II should not apply to non-significant benchmark administrators.
(43)
In order for users of benchmarks to choose appropriately from among, and understand the risks of, benchmarks, they need to know what a given benchmark intends to measure and its susceptibility to manipulation. Therefore, the benchmark administrator should publish a benchmark statement specifying those elements. In order to ensure uniform application and that benchmark statements are of reasonable length but at the same time focus on providing the key information needed to users in an easily accessible manner, ESMA should provide further specification of the content of the benchmark statement, differentiating appropriately among the different types and specificities of benchmarks and their administrators.
(44)
This Regulation should take into account the IOSCO principles, which serve as global standards for regulatory requirements for benchmarks. As an overarching principle, in order to ensure investor protection, supervision and regulation in a third country should be equivalent to Union supervision and regulation of benchmarks. Therefore, benchmarks provided from that third country can be used by supervised entities in the Union where a positive decision on equivalence of the third- country regime has been taken by the Commission. In such circumstances, competent authorities should enter into cooperation arrangements with supervisory authorities in third countries. ESMA should coordinate the development of such cooperation arrangements and the exchange between competent authorities of information received from third countries. However, in order to avoid any adverse impact resulting from a possible abrupt cessation of the use in the Union of benchmarks provided from a third country, this Regulation also provides for certain other mechanisms (namely, recognition and endorsement) under which third-country benchmarks can be used by supervised entities located in the Union.
(45)
This Regulation introduces a process for the recognition of administrators located in a third country by the competent authority of the Member State of reference. Recognition should be granted to administrators complying with the requirements of this Regulation. Acknowledging the role of the IOSCO principles as a global standard for the provision of benchmarks, the competent authority of the Member State of reference should be able to grant recognition to administrators on the basis of them applying the IOSCO principles. To do so, the competent authority should assess the application of the IOSCO principles by a specific administrator and determine whether such application is equivalent, for the administrator in question, to compliance with the various requirements established in this Regulation, taking into account the specificities of the regime of recognition as compared to the equivalence regime.
(46)
This Regulation also introduces an endorsement regime allowing, under certain conditions, administrators or supervised entities located in the Union to endorse benchmarks provided from a third country in order for such benchmarks to be used in the Union. To do so, the competent authority should take into account whether, in providing the benchmark to be endorsed, compliance with the IOSCO principles would be equivalent to compliance with this Regulation, taking into account the specificities of the regime of endorsement as compared to the equivalence regime. An administrator or a supervised entity that has endorsed a benchmark provided from a third country should be fully responsible for such endorsed benchmarks and for the fulfilment of the relevant conditions referred to in this Regulation.
(47)
All benchmark administrators are able to exercise discretion, are potentially subject to conflicts of interest, and risk having inadequate governance and control systems in place. As administrators control the benchmark determination process, requiring authorisation or registration and supervision of administrators is the most effective way of ensuring the integrity of benchmarks.
(48)
Certain administrators should be authorised and supervised by the competent authority of the Member State where the administrator in question is located. Entities already subject to supervision and that provide financial benchmarks other than critical benchmarks should be registered and supervised by the competent authority for the purposes of this Regulation. Entities that provide only indices that qualify as non-significant benchmarks should also be registered by the relevant competent authority. Authorisation and registration should be distinct processes with authorisation requiring a more extensive assessment of the administrator's application. Whether an administrator is authorised or registered should not affect the supervision of that administrator by the relevant competent authorities. Additionally, a transitional regime should be introduced, according to which persons providing benchmarks which are not critical and are not widely used in one or more Member States could be registered, with a view to facilitating the initial phase of application of this Regulation. ESMA should maintain at the Union level a register that contains information on authorised or registered administrators, on benchmarks and the administrators that provide those benchmarks by virtue of a positive decision under either the equivalence regime or the recognition regime, on Union administrators or supervised entities that have endorsed benchmarks from a third country, and on any such endorsed benchmarks and their administrators located in a third country.
(49)
In some circumstances a person provides an index but could be unaware that the index in question is being used as a reference for a financial instrument, a financial contract or an investment fund. That is particularly the case where the users and benchmark administrator are located in different Member States. It is therefore necessary to increase the level of transparency concerning which specific benchmark is being used. Such transparency can be achieved by improving the content of the prospectuses or key information documents required by Union law and the content of the notifications required by Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (11).
(50)
A set of effective tools and powers and resources for the competent authorities of Member States guarantees supervisory effectiveness. This Regulation should therefore, in particular, provide for a minimum set of supervisory and investigative powers which should be entrusted to competent authorities of Member States in accordance with national law. When exercising their powers under this Regulation, competent authorities and ESMA should act objectively and impartially and remain autonomous in their decision-making.
(51)
For the purpose of detecting infringements of this Regulation, it is necessary for competent authorities to be able to access, in accordance with national law, the premises of legal persons in order to seize documents. Access to such premises is necessary when there is reasonable suspicion that documents and other data related to the subject-matter of an inspection or investigation exist and could be relevant to prove an infringement of this Regulation. Additionally, access to such premises is necessary where the person to whom a demand for information has already been made fails to comply with it, or where there are reasonable grounds for believing that if a demand were to be made, it would not be complied with, or that the documents or information to which the information requirement relates would be removed, tampered with or destroyed. If prior authorisation is needed from the judicial authority of the Member State concerned, in accordance with national law, access to premises should take place after having obtained that prior judicial authorisation.
(52)
Existing recordings of telephone conversations and data traffic records from supervised entities can constitute crucial, and sometimes the only, evidence to detect and prove the existence of infringements of this Regulation, in particular the compliance with governance and control requirements. Such records and recordings can help to verify the identity of the person responsible for the submission of input data, those responsible for its approval and whether organisational separation of employees is maintained. Therefore, competent authorities should be able to require existing recordings of telephone conversations, electronic communications and data traffic records held by supervised entities, in those cases where a reasonable suspicion exists that such recordings or records related to the subject-matter of the inspection or investigation could be relevant to prove an infringement of this Regulation.
(53)
This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to respect for private and family life, the protection of personal data, the right to freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to consumer protection, the right to an effective remedy, the right of defence. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied in accordance with those rights and principles.
(54)
The rights of defence of the persons concerned should be fully respected. In particular, persons subject to proceedings should be provided with access to the findings upon which the competent authorities has based the decision and should be given the right to be heard.
(55)
Transparency regarding benchmarks is necessary for reasons of financial market stability and investor protection. Any exchange or transmission of information by competent authorities should take place in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data laid down in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (12). Any exchange or transmission of information by ESMA should take place in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13).
(56)
Taking into consideration the principles set out in the Commission's Communication of 8 December 2010 on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, and legal acts of the Union adopted as a follow-up to that Communication, Member States should, in order to ensure a common approach and deterrent effect, lay down rules on administrative sanctions and other administrative measures, including pecuniary sanctions, applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and should ensure that they are implemented. Those administrative sanctions and other administrative measures should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
(57)
Administrative sanctions and other administrative measures applied in specific cases should be determined taking into account, where appropriate, factors such as the repayment of any identified financial benefit, the gravity and duration of the infringement, any aggravating or mitigating factors, the need for administrative pecuniary sanctions to have a deterrent effect and, where appropriate, include a reduction in return for cooperation with the competent authority. In particular, the actual amount of administrative pecuniary sanctions to be imposed in a specific case should be able to reach the maximum level provided for in this Regulation, or the higher level provided for in national law, for very serious infringements, while administrative pecuniary sanctions significantly lower than the maximum level should be able to be applied to minor infringements or in case of settlement. The possibility of imposing a temporary ban on the exercise of management functions within benchmark administrators or contributors should be available to the competent authority.
(58)
This Regulation should not limit the ability of Member States to provide for higher levels of administrative sanctions and should be without prejudice to any provisions in the law of Member States relating to criminal sanctions.
(59)
Even though nothing prevents Member States from laying down rules for administrative and criminal sanctions for the same infringement, Member States should not be required to lay down rules for administrative sanctions for the infringements of this Regulation which are subject to national criminal law. In accordance with national law, Member States are not obliged to impose both administrative and criminal sanctions for the same offence, but they should be able to do so if their national law so permits. However, the maintenance of criminal sanctions instead of administrative sanctions for infringements of this Regulation should not reduce or otherwise affect the ability of competent authorities to cooperate, access and exchange information in a timely way with competent authorities in other Member States for the purposes of this Regulation, including after any referral of the relevant infringements to the competent judicial authorities for criminal prosecution.
(60)
It is necessary to reinforce provisions on exchange of information between competent authorities and to strengthen the duties of assistance and cooperation which they owe to each other. Due to increasing cross-border activity, competent authorities should provide each other with the relevant information for the exercise of their function, so as to ensure the effective enforcement of this Regulation, including in situations where an infringement or suspected infringement is of concern to authorities in two or more Member States. When exchanging information, strict professional secrecy is needed to ensure the smooth transmission of that information and the protection of particular rights.
(61)
In order to ensure that decisions made by competent authorities to impose an administrative sanction or other administrative measure have a deterrent effect on the public at large, they should be published. The publication of decisions imposing an administrative sanction or other administrative measure is also an important tool for competent authorities to inform market participants of the type of behaviour that is considered to infringe this Regulation and to promote wider good behaviour amongst market participants. If such publication risks causing disproportionate damage to the persons involved, or jeopardises the stability of financial markets or an on-going investigation, the competent authority should either publish the administrative sanction or other administrative measure on an anonymous basis or delay the publication. In addition, competent authorities should have the option not to publish a decision imposing administrative sanctions or other administrative measures at all where anonymous or delayed publication is considered insufficient to ensure that the stability of financial markets is not jeopardised. Competent authorities are also not required to publish administrative sanctions or other administrative measures which are deemed to be of a minor nature where publication would be disproportionate.
(62)
Critical benchmarks can involve contributors, administrators and users in more than one Member State. Thus, the cessation of the provision of such a benchmark or any events that can significantly undermine its integrity could have an impact in more than one Member State, meaning that the supervision of such a benchmark only by the competent authority of the Member State in which the administrator of the benchmark is located will not be efficient and effective in terms of addressing the risks that the critical benchmark poses. In such a case, in order to ensure the effective exchange of supervisory information among competent authorities and coordination of their activities and supervisory measures, colleges, comprising competent authorities and ESMA, should be formed. The activities of the colleges should contribute to the harmonised application of rules under this Regulation and to the convergence of supervisory practices. The competent authority of the administrator should establish written arrangements regarding the exchange of information, the decision-making process, which could include rules on voting procedures, any cooperation for the purposes of mandatory contribution measures, and the cases where the competent authorities should consult each other. ESMA's legally binding mediation is a key element of the achievement of coordination, supervisory consistency and convergence of supervisory practices.
(63)
Benchmarks can reference financial instruments and financial contracts that have a long duration. In certain cases, such benchmarks risk no longer being permitted to be provided once this Regulation comes into effect because they have characteristics that cannot be adjusted to conform to the requirements of this Regulation. At the same time, prohibiting the continued provision of such a benchmark could result in the termination or frustration of the financial instruments or financial contracts and so harm investors. It is therefore necessary to make provision to allow for the continued provision of such benchmarks for a transitional period.
(64)
In cases where this Regulation captures or potentially captures supervised entities and markets covered by Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) would need to be consulted by ESMA in order to draw upon ACER's expertise in energy markets and to mitigate any dual regulation.
(65)
In order to specify further technical elements of this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the specification of technical elements of definitions; in respect of the calculation of the nominal amounts of financial instruments, notional amount of derivatives and the net asset value of investment funds referencing a benchmark to determine whether such benchmark is critical; in respect of reviewing the calculation method used to determine the threshold for the determination of critical and significant benchmarks; in respect of establishing the objective reasons for the endorsement of a benchmark or family of benchmarks provided in a third country; in respect of establishing the elements to assess whether the cessation or the changing of an existing benchmark could reasonably result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument, or the rules of any investment fund, which references such benchmark; and in respect of the extension of the 24-month period envisaged for the registration instead of authorisation of certain administrators. When adopting those acts, the Commission should take into account the market or technological developments and the international convergence of supervisory practice in relation to benchmarks, in particular the work of IOSCO. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making (14) of 13 April 2016. In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.
(66)
Technical standards should ensure consistent harmonisation of the requirements for the provision of and contribution to indices used as benchmarks and adequate protection of investors and consumers across the Union. As a body with highly specialised expertise, it would be efficient and appropriate to entrust ESMA with the elaboration of draft regulatory technical standards which do not involve policy choices for submission to the Commission. The Commission should adopt draft regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, regarding the procedures and the characteristics of the oversight function; regarding how to ensure the appropriateness and the verifiability of the input data as well as the internal oversight and verification procedures of a contributor; regarding the information to be provided by an administrator about the benchmark and methodology; regarding the elements of the code of conduct; regarding the requirements concerning systems and controls; regarding the criteria that the competent authority should take into account when deciding whether to apply certain additional requirements; regarding the contents of the benchmark statement and the cases in which an update of such a statement is required; regarding the minimum content of the cooperation arrangements between the competent authorities and ESMA; regarding the form and content of the application for recognition of a third country administrator and presentation of the information that is to be provided with such an application; and regarding the information to be provided in the application for authorisation or registration.
(67)
In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to establish and review a list of public authorities in the Union, to establish and review the list of critical benchmarks, and to determine the equivalence of the legal framework to which providers of benchmarks of third countries are subject for the purposes of full or partial equivalence. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (15).
(68)
The Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards developed by ESMA establishing templates for the compliance statements, procedures and forms for exchange of information between competent authorities and ESMA, by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
(69)
Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to lay down a consistent and effective regime to address the vulnerabilities that benchmarks pose, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, given that the overall impact of the problems relating to benchmarks can be fully perceived only in a Union context, but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of this Regulation, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
(70)
Given the urgency of the need to restore confidence in benchmarks and promote fair and transparent financial markets, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication.
(71)
Consumers are able to enter into financial contracts, in particular mortgages and consumer credit contracts, that reference a benchmark, but unequal bargaining power and the use of standard terms mean that they can have a limited choice about the benchmark used. It is therefore necessary to ensure that at least adequate information is provided by creditors or credit intermediaries to consumers. To that end, Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU should therefore be amended accordingly.
(72)
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 requires persons discharging managerial responsibilities, as well as persons closely associated with them, to notify the issuer and the competent authority of every transaction conducted on their own account relating to financial instruments that are themselves linked to shares and debt instruments of their issuer. However, there are a variety of financial instruments that are linked to shares and debt instruments of a given issuer. Such financial instruments include units in collective investment undertakings, structured products or financial instruments embedding a derivative that provides exposure to the performance of shares or debt instruments issued by an issuer. Every transaction in such financial instruments above a de minimis threshold should be subject to notification to the issuer and the competent authority. An exception should be made where either the linked financial instrument provides an exposure of 20 % or less to the issuer's shares or debt instruments, or the person discharging managerial responsibilities or person closely associated with them did not and could not know the investment composition of the linked financial instrument. Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 should therefore be amended,
