Annexes to COM(1985)166 -

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dossier COM(1985)166 - .
document COM(1985)166 EN
date April 11, 1985
Annex i). Rule 1 provides that participation in the Conference shall be open to Regional Groupings of States which have competence in the area of restrictive business practices and which have accepted the Set of Principles. It is specified, however, that participation does not confer on such regional groupings the right to vote. Rule 33 provides that only States participating in the Conference shall have the right to vote.

These arrangements would not allow the Community to participate on an equal footing to Member States. This would be a similar situation to that prevailing within the IGE, with which the Community and its Member States, supported by Group B, have repeatedly voiced their dissatisfaction. The Community proposes to respond to the latest communication from Group D to the Trade and Development Board on this subject (see Annex 2).

For the purposes of the draft rules of procedure for the Conference, the Community is deemed to have accepted resolution 35/63. This being so, it demands that an addition be made to Rule 33 of the draft rules of procedure reading as follows s

"Regional Groupings of States, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member

States which have accepted the Set of Principles and Rules. Such organizations shall not exercise their right to vote if their Member States exercise theirs, and vice versa."

This clarification is a legal and political consequence of the equivalent status conferred by section B (ii) (8) of the Set of Principles.

The Commission considers that unless the rules of procedure allow the Community to play a full part in the work of the Conference, it should limit its participation in the meeting to the role of a passive observer. By continuing to acquiesce in a situation ®f contributing actively to the work on an ad hoc basis as an observer, the Community would be bowing to the interpretation expounded by Group D.

The Commission therefore requests the Council's authority to negotiate for the Community when the rules of procedure for the Review Conference are drawn up a status allowing it to play a full part in the Conference in keeping with the responsibilities it has in the area of restrictive business practices. The Member States and the Commission should adopt a common position bn this matter in tlw discussions at the forthcoming meeting of the IGE.

Distr.


GENERAL . TD/B/RBP/28

27 February 1985    ,

Original: ENGLISH \

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD    '

Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices Fourth session

Geneva, 22 April 1985    '

Item 3 (c) of the provisional agenda

PREPARATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE TO REVIEW ALL '    ASPECTS OF THE SET OF MULTILATERALLY AGREED EQUITABLE

PRINCIPLES AND RULES FOR THE CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS '    PRACTICES: PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCE

Draft provisional rules of procedure of the Conference

Prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat

The following sets out a suggested text prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat of the rules of procedure for the United Nations Conference to Review all Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. ■

GE.85-50635

TD/B/RBP/28 page 1

DRAFT PROVISIONAL RULES OP PROCEDURE OP THE CONFERENCE

Chapter I

REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS '

■    Participation    ■

Rule 1

Participation in the Conference shall he open to:    .

(a) All States,

(h) Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia,

(c)    Regional Groupings of States which have competence in the area of , restrictive business practices and have accepted the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, and

(d)    Other participants referred to in operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution jj/155 of 20 December 1978.

Composition of delegations

Rule 2

Each delegation participating in the Conference shall consist of a head of delegation, and not more than two other accredited representatives, and such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

Alternates and advisers

Rule 5

The head of the delegation may designate an alternate representative or an

adviser to act as a representative.

Submission of credentials    *

Rule 4

The credentials of representatives of States and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, if possible not later than one week before the date fixed for the opening

Reference to Regional Groupings of States in this rule is based on the definition contained in section B, paragraph 8, of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. The draft rule does not confer on such regional groupings the right to vote.    •

TD/B/KHP/28 page 7

day preceding the meeting. The President may, however, permit the discussion and consideration of amendments, even though these amendments have not been circulated, or have only been circulated the same day.

-Pscisiotis on competence

Rule 28

Subject to rule 19, any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to consider any matter, or to adopt a proposal, or an amendment submitted to it, shall be put to the vote before the matter is considered or a vote is taken on the proposal or amendment in question.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 29

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor, at any time before voting on it has commenced, provided that it has not been amended by decision of the Conference. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced' by' any representative with its original priority, provided he does so promptly and it has not been substantially changed.    '

Consideration of programme budget implications

Rule 30

Before the Conference takes a decision or makes a recommendation, the implementation of which might have programme budget implications for the United Nations, it shall receive and consider a report from the secretariat on such implications.    .

Reconsideration of proposals

Rule 51

When a proposal has been adopted or rejected, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on the motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be put to the vote immediately.    '

Rule 32

1. The Conference shall endeavour to ensure that all its substantive decisions '

are taken by consensus.    .

2. Notwithstanding any measures that may be taken in compliance with paragraph 1,

a proposal before the Conference shall be voted on if a representative so requests, j

'    I

Voting rights    1

Rule 33    '

Each State participating in the Conference shall have one vote.

Annexe 2

PROJET DE    ,

communication des CommunautSs europ&ennes concernant la participation de la CommunautS Sconomique europSenne aux travaux du Groupe inter-gouvernemental d'experts das pratiques commerciales restrictives '

o    .,

A la demands du coordfnateur du Orbtope D a 6tS diffusS aux membra# du Conoeil une communication concernant la participation de la CommunautS ftconomique europfienne aux travaux du Group* mtergouvernemental d'experts sur lea pratiques commercialea restrictives (Doc. TD/B.1031 du 4 dScembre 1984).

Lea arguments d&velopp&s dans cette communication indiquent qua le Groupe D astime qu'il eat conforme au text# de 1'Ensemble de principea et de rfcgles fiquitebles d'ltendre 1’application de cea r&gles aux _ organisations rfigionales Sana leur donner pour autant le droit de participer pleinement aux travaux du Group® intergouvernemental d'experts. Le Groupe D estiae par consequent qu'il n'y a pas lieu de modifier la pratique actuelle.

A l'&gard de cette question la CommunautS europSanne a pria position 4 pluaieurs reprises et notamment dans une communication diffusSe au Conaeil en date du 21 aeptembre 1984 (Doe. TD/B.1025). Une participation en tant que participant/obaervateur, qui rSsulte de 1'application dee rigles de procfidures des grandee commissions du Conseil aana qu'elles aient adapt&es au cas particulier de 1'Ensemble de principea et de rigles Squitables et de son mficanisme inatitutionnel, Squivaut 1 nier son droit & exercer plainement ses competences en mati&rs de pratiques commerciales restrictives.

La CommunautS maintient qu'il n’est pas admissible de nier sa    -

competence au niveau du mScanisme institutionnel alors que l'on voudrait qu'elle assume ses responsabilitSs en ce qui ooncerne la raise en oeuvre de 1’Ensemble da principea et de rfcgles fiquitables.

'    A

Le texte da 1'Ensemble de principes et do rigles 6quitables Stand, sane exception, leur application aux groupements regionaux d'states (paragraphe 8), dans la mesure o^i ils ont comp&tonce dan? le domains das pratiques commercialea restrictive* • La Comaunautfi a das comp&tencas dans ces domaines et elle las exerce • j^D^ailleurs il ne semble pas exister £ l'tieure actuella d*autre# organisations d'intSgration rSgionalas dont les compStences an raatiSre de eurveillance et de riglewentation da pratiques commercialea restrictivaa eoient comparables & celles de la Communaute europSanneT^ Aussi les travaux du Groups intergouvernemental d'experts contiennent d’ample# rSf6rencea & la politique de la ComunautS europfienne en matiSre de pratiques commerciales restrictive*.

Dans ces conditions la CommunautS europSenne dSclare que si elle est pr&te i Stre assimilSe aux Etats pour 1*application de 1*Ensemble de pratiques et de rSgles Squitables, elle ne peut l'Stre que dans 1* mesure oO la mfcme assimilation est aussi admise dans le fonotionnement du Groups intergouvernemental d1experts.

11 ne lui parait pas, en effet, ooncevable que soit maintenue 1*incoherence actuella qui donne la primautft & una rfigle da proo&dure sur les dispositions d'un engagement international.