Annexes to COM(2009)277 - Internet governance : the next steps - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2009)277 - Internet governance : the next steps. |
|---|---|
| document | COM(2009)277  |
| date | June 18, 2009 |
The Joint Project Agreement (JPA)
The indication by the US government in 2006 that the current agreement should be the last such agreement with ICANN was largely welcomed by the international community (including the EU). At the same time, the US government has consistently indicated that it will maintain effective control of the coordination of key global naming and addressing functions and this is likely to mean that the problem regarding the ‘unilateral oversight’ of such resources will remain unresolved.
How has ICANN performed in its first ten years?
Undoubtedly, the experience of ICANN to date in its first 10 years has provided a rich range of issues for analysis. It is important to note at the outset that the stability of the Domain Name System has been maintained during this period and this is a key objective that ICANN and the US government can confidently claim to have fulfilled. The creation of a broad multi-stakeholder forum for inclusive policy making is also a feature of ICANN’s activities that has been valuable.
At the same time, while ICANN has been successful in demonstrating what is possible with such a model, it has also been useful in delineating the limitations of such a model.
One example is that the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN does not yet comprise the full community of states and is thus exposed to criticism regarding its representativeness. It has, however, issued a number of substantive principles on important public policy questions, e.g. on country code Top Level Domains, new generic Top Level Domains and Whois principles. At the same time concern has been expressed about the due consideration given by the ICANN Board to GAC advice. A further example relates to possible competition concerns which may arise from the position of ICANN, a private sector body, as a monopoly supplier of certain services.
What is meant by ‘accountability’ in the ICANN context?
Accountability means an organisation such as ICANN being answerable for its decisions. ICANN has recently devoted significant efforts to reviewing arrangements for its internal accountability — i.e. the accountability to those who actively participate in each of the various ICANN constituencies. The problem is that the vast majority of Internet users do not participate in ICANN activities. There is therefore a need to ensure that ICANN is accountable externally to the global Internet community, which in the first instance (partly by virtue of the absence of alternatives in many countries) means being accountable externally to the governments of the various countries of the world.
The only external accountability that ICANN currently has is to the US government under the JPA and the IANA contract, but this provides only for unilateral accountability to a single government. The stability and management of the root zone file is, however, a matter of crucial importance not just to the US government but to all countries of the world. However, there is no international consensus on the creation of a new intergovernmental organisation to exercise such oversight or on the delegation of such responsibilities to any existing organisation. An alternative would be to make ICANN externally accountable so that each government can exercise in their own interest those responsibilities which should properly sit at their level.
Are there other issues that need to be addressed?
The legal structure and incorporation of ICANN under Californian law poses problems, including conflicts of applicable law and jurisdictions. In addition, legitimate concerns remain[13] as to whether a governmental committee advising a private corporation is an appropriate and effective mechanism to enable governments to exercise their public policy responsibilities. Moreover, the self-regulatory approach as practised by ICANN means that incumbent operators play a potentially inappropriate role (e.g. from the standpoint of competition policy) in setting entry conditions for new competitors.
Moving the agenda forward
Translating public policy principles into action will require concerted efforts to create an inclusive dialogue to develop effective accountability mechanisms which ensure that principles are duly implemented. The deliberations and reflections on governance should also be designed to be ‘future proof’. In particular, the results of such reflections should be adaptable to prospective future developments of the Internet, including the ‘Internet of things’.
To this end, the Commission proposes that the EU should actively engage its international partners in discussions on how to stimulate and support intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation to implement the public policy principles agreed for Internet governance in the WSIS beyond the existing work carried out through action lines.
The starting point for such discussions should be the need to maintain private-sector leadership in all matters of the day-to-day management of the Internet. The multi-stakeholder process must also be encouraged wherever possible.
At the same time, public policies for key global Internet resources (especially those that require global coordination) need to be based on multilateral intergovernmental cooperation.
One element of an evolution of the current governance system could be the completion of an internal ICANN reform leading to full accountability and transparency.
As regards external accountability, the current arrangements for unilateral oversight in regard to ICANN and IANA need to be replaced with an alternative mechanism to ensure that ICANN has multilateral accountability .
This should be part of an evolutionary approach to allow governments to duly exercise their responsibilities. In this context, the question will need to be addressed of how to ensure that the legal character of ICANN’s incorporation in California does not prevent proper account being taken of governmental input.
In addition, the EU should take a leadership role in working towards the goal of increased security and stability of the Internet by initiating dialogue with international partners.
Finally, the Commission also proposes that the EU should seek to initiate discussions with the US government on how a more equitable arrangement might be found for oversight of the management of IANA which respects the national priorities of the US while at the same time reflecting the legitimate expectations and interests of the international community.
[1] http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm.
[2] Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre
[3] And indeed further afield, covering Europe as a whole, central Asia and the Middle East.
[4] COM(98) 111, 20.2.1998 ‘International policy issues related to Internet governance’ (followed by subsequent communications on the same subject later in the same year: COM(1998) 476, 29.7.1998, and then again in 2000: COM(2000) 202, 11.4.2000).
[5] See 8.2.
[6] COM(2000) 202.
[7] OJ C 293, 14.10.2000, p. 3.
[8] Cf. document 10285/05 (Presse 156).
[9] Conclusions of the telecommunications Council of 26-27 June 2005 regarding the WSIS, and of 28 November 2008 regarding ‘Future networks and the Internet’ (COM(2008) 594).
[10] Source: Verisign ‘Domain Name Industry Brief’, February 2009.
[11] See: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/iana/ianacontract_081406.pdf.
[12] Paragraphs 35 and 63 of the Tunis Agenda. See: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html
[13] As illustrated by the continued absence of several major countries from the GAC and the fundamental criticisms that continue to be made by several countries that actively participate.