Annexes to JOIN(2012)27 - EU support for sustainable change in transition societies - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | JOIN(2012)27 - EU support for sustainable change in transition societies. |
|---|---|
| document | JOIN(2012)27  |
| date | October 3, 2012 |
The EU can support relevant reforms through sector reform contracts coupled with intensified policy dialogue. Moreover, it can support and facilitate capacity development of local enterprises, notably micro, small and medium-sized ones (see the example of SANAD in the MENA region[8]). Partnering with the private sector may also be an efficient way to attract investment, strengthen linkages between Foreign Direct Investment and local business, and to stimulate employment. EU regional blending facilities have proven to be able to leverage substantial additional funding by combining EU grants with other resources, such as loans from European Finance Institutions, including the European Investment Bank.[9]
Helping to build inclusive economies and societies
It is equally important for the EU to continue to support its partner countries' efforts in addressing their citizens' aspirations for more equity, social inclusion and social protection (a specific Communication on social protection is foreseen in the second half of 2012). Support is particularly needed for actions that promote social and public service delivery to all population groups. In this regard, CSOs can play an important role by promoting ethical, inclusive and equitable business models. The involvement of young people, the future leaders, should be particularly promoted.
Transition is also a critical moment for taking concrete steps to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as key participants in transition, to boost both their security and their participation, through means such as sector budget support and actions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (for examples, see Morocco and Afghanistan)[10].
1.4. Support for conflict prevention, peace-building and security
Some transitions towards democracy face a key two-fold challenge: ensuring that security and peace contribute to sustainable development on the one hand, and that development contributes to peace and stability on the other.
Events such as elections, changes in the government or the (re)allocation of resources can trigger outbreaks of violence and/or armed conflict, and trigger setbacks in often fragile transition processes, especially in those societies which have not yet established effective and legitimate institutional frameworks to resolve conflicts peacefully.
EU support in such circumstances must involve a conflict-sensitive and context-specific approach. In tackling the root causes of conflict, it should avoid increasing the dependency, power and patronage of certain groups or exacerbating the negative impacts on coping mechanisms. The exact approach and considerations in individual country situations should be identified through a dedicated conflict analysis. In many cases, such an analysis will reveal specific issues related to the peace-building goals as developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and endorsed by the international community, including the EU.[11] These goals relate to the need for an inclusive political process and reconciliation, intercultural dialogue, access to security, justice and jobs, and accountable and effective resource management.
In any event, EU support must be implemented within a broader approach that considers all the relevant areas, including reconciliation and support for uprooted people, crisis prevention, security sector reform, resilience and climate change, sustainable and responsible management of resources, the rule of law, democratisation, civil society, human rights, public administration reform and public service delivery. As an example, the EU has contributed to reconciliation in the countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia and the clear conditionality of the accession process ensured the prosecution of war crimes and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Reform of the security sector constitutes a particular challenge in efforts to guarantee security and stability. Better civilian oversight of security services is generally a priority, as is improving the effectiveness, accountability and behaviour of the broad range of security actors. The participation of communities and civil society groups can make the provision of security both more effective and more accountable. Particular attention needs to be paid to the role and rights of vulnerable groups. As part of a comprehensive EU approach, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) can also play an important role in addressing key transition challenges. Since 2003, the EU has inter alia been providing training, advice or mentoring in support of security sector reform, monitoring peace plans or providing security support, often under a UN mandate. This is done through civilian and/or military support measures.
2. How can the EU improve its tools and approach?
2.1. Responding to partner societies' needs
To secure a peaceful and successful transition, the specific reform process of each country should respond to people's needs, defined by the country itself. While key needs and challenges in transition countries vary considerably, they very often include:
– national reconciliation and building a national consensus on fundamental issues;
– establishing well-functioning democratic institutions and processes;
– avoiding an unsustainable decline in incomes and employment and restoring or maintaining macroeconomic stability;
– promoting long-term socio-economic development and inclusion, with decent jobs, economic opportunities, basic social services, including quality healthcare, education, and social justice;
– establishing a business-friendly environment, (re)defining property rights and the role of the private sector, and reviewing the functioning of the market; and
– where necessary, restoring security, justice and the rule of law.
As situations vary widely, there is no uniform prescription for a successful transition process or EU response. For instance, a fragile state within the group of least developed countries, such as Burma/Myanmar, may require a somewhat different response from that of more advanced middle income countries like Tunisia or Egypt.
EU support should to be tailored to consider the specific situation and needs of each country along with the added value that EU support can bring, and an assessment of the specific interests and potential risks for the EU. The starting point should generally be the countries' own assessments of needs and how these can be addressed. The swift deployment, during the initial stage of a transition, of a joint EU services mission involving all those responsible for the different available instruments, is key to prepare in a timely manner a comprehensive, integrated and long-term response. For instance in the framework of the enlargement policy, peer assessment missions with the participation of Member States experts, as well as broad consultations with other donors, international organisations and civil society have proved to deliver good results in the preparation of EU assistance. In the context of aid for trade, the EU has also provided support for the trade needs assessment, diagnostic studies and elaboration of trade strategies through dedicated programmes in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
2.2. Anchoring the process with early achievements
Given the uncertainty and instability linked to transition processes, it is critical to achieve, as soon as possible, some tangible improvements to establish confidence and to promote political stability and social cohesion. While long-term strategies are being put in place, potential areas for such early achievements can cover basic democratic rights and freedoms including cultural rights, job creation and removing constraints to growth, public service delivery, including basic social services, as well as recovery of lost assets and re-establishment of livelihoods particularly in post-conflict situation.
In the area of democratic governance, typical examples of areas where such quick wins could be possible include freedom of expression and credible elections (see the example of Tunisia[12]), a representative and legitimate constituent assembly and the adoption of a new constitution through participatory processes. As experience in current and past EU enlargement processes has demonstrated, trust of citizens in the rule of law and protection of human rights can be strengthened through concrete support of relevant institutions and setting up of independent supervisory bodies, as well as through improved access to information and data on key economic and social issues.
In the short run, democratic transition may weaken economic activity, employment rates and macroeconomic stability. It is crucial that measures are taken and projects implemented that can help usher in fast improvements in income generation, social safety nets and basic service delivery, and can guard against unsustainable poverty increases. This is often necessary to generate support for economic reforms with a longer-term impact – or at least to overcome resistance to change. For instance, funds and projects promoting job creation through the development of SMEs and microcredit schemes[13] can be used in this context. Reforms can be facilitated also at industry level, in particular where there is potential for rapid take-off and for tangible results in terms of incomes and jobs.
Programmes for quick-win job creation and short-term employment should, however, strive to include longer-term follow-up for instance by vocational training and job mediation services that help programme participants find regular work. The need for quick wins should be built into longer-term strategies for employment generation and should not spawn new entrenched interests and unsustainable situations.
In the area of security, immediate steps to help stabilise a country following a possible conflict are often needed to prevent the situation from deteriorating and the transition process from backsliding. Successful, although very different, examples of EU support include negotiating and monitoring steps towards peace (enlargement countries, Georgia, Aceh Indonesia); supporting border management (enlargement countries, Libya); training police officers (enlargement countries, Afghanistan); temporarily ensuring international civil administration or policing and justice functions (EULEX, Kosovo[14]); and supporting the United Nations, for instance through a bridging operation (Chad and the DRC) or assistance to a UN monitoring mission as in Syria.
2.3. Applying incentives, constraints and conditionalities
While incentives, constraints and conditionalities cannot be the main driver of reforms, they can support the process. Different EU external policy frameworks, including enlargement policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, contain such measures. These may be financial (in the form of assistance, for example), economic (such as inclusion in European networks and policy dialogues) or political (including political dialogue); they can be positive or negative (involving, say, imposing or lifting sanctions). In the enlargement policy, for instance, negotiations for accession are opened only upon a set of conditions such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities. Moreover, in trade policy, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) contains incentives that may indirectly support reforms even though this is not its policy objective, given inter alia that trade instruments have to be consistent with WTO rules.
Sanctions and restrictive measures
Sanctions, as part of a wider set of political initiatives in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, can be instrumental to help maintain the political momentum for change and transition in situations which otherwise risk deteriorating rapidly. They should ideally be imposed at UN level wherever feasible to ensure adoption and implementation of similar measures by the largest number of countries. EU autonomous measures can provide a targeted and timely complement to UN based measures. Where agreement at the UN is not possible, EU autonomous measures can be used to exert pressure in the targeted country or situation.
In case of positive developments, EU measures can be swiftly lifted or amended to support and encourage transition processes. Some limited measures may however be retained to prevent threats or adverse impacts on the transition process or the measures may also be suspended as a way of encouraging positive developments that have taken place, whilst retaining a method of exerting continued pressure in anticipation of further improvements.
Incentive-based approach
Incentive-based approaches under the EU enlargement policy have produced positive results, for instance in the Western Balkans. Progress on the EU accession path is linked to concrete steps in the reform agenda. As an example, Montenegro had to meet a number of key priorities set out in the Commission's opinion on the membership application, which included important rule of law and human rights aspects, before accession negotiations could be opened. Also the visa liberalisation dialogue with five Western Balkan countries was based on detailed roadmaps with specific benchmarks and led to concrete improvements in areas such as document security and the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as border controls, migration policy and document security.
The ENP also follows a so-called "more for more" principle. Countries which go further and faster with specific, measurable democratic reforms, will receive greater support from the EU. To reflect this new incentive-based approach, two umbrella programmes were set up to offer additional “more-for-more” resources: Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) for the southern Neighbourhood (see the example of Tunisia[15]) and Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC) for the Eastern Neighbourhood. The programmes will fund initiatives addressing new challenges in relation to democratic reform and inclusive socio-economic development in particular.
A similar approach could be applied beyond the EU's neighbourhood, provided that measures taken to address crises and support civil society, cooperation among local authorities and people-to-people contacts fall outside the "more for more" approach.
The incentive-based approach of the Governance Initiative under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) for countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) enjoyed only limited success, partly because the initial governance allocation did not sufficiently differentiate among partner countries and the commitments to future reforms were not sufficiently monitored, which reduced the impact on governance performance.
Experience in these different contexts has indeed shown that effective monitoring and open information about the government's progress are crucial in assisting the reform process and can play a key role in motivating partner countries to speed up reforms. Its impact can increase yet further if multiple stakeholders are involved in the process and the general public is informed about the government's performance (see the example of Benin[16]).
In incentivising reforms, the following lessons should therefore be heeded:
– rewards should be unambiguously defined at the outset and granted for actual achievements and real performance;
– preference should be given to work schemes that enhance ownership and thereby commitment to results and impact;
– performance should be monitored on a regular basis and shortcomings addressed through appropriate follow-up;
– the government's progress should be exposed to a wide audience in open consultations; and
– dialogue should take place with all relevant stakeholders.
2.4. Involving all relevant stakeholders
The experience of Member States which joined the EU in the past decade and the current enlargement cases shows that a successful transition must enjoy broad public support. Civil society, local authorities and a wide range of non-state actors (including social and economic partners, consumer associations and the private sector) have an important role to play in domestic reforms as they can highlight existing shortcomings, suggest concrete solutions and put pressure on the authorities to continue the transition process.
The supporting role of the EU has not been confined to actions by the Commission, the European External Action Service and Member States; other EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions also have an important role to play.[17]
Specific support to civil society
The EU has various tools to support civil society organisations (CSO), including the Instrument of Pre-Accession (IPA), the Civil Society Facilities for the enlargement and neighbourhood, EIDHR, European Endowment for Democracy, thematic programme for non-state actors and local authorities under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and capacity-development programmes under the European Development Fund (EDF) and the DCI. Experience from the EU enlargement policy shows that it is important to create an enabling environment (legal framework and rules on funding, inclusion in political consultation procedures) that allows civil society in the country to develop in a sustainable manner. Therefore, all EU instruments in this area are designed to empower actors based on their capabilities and strengths in their own areas and hence are crucial for addressing socio-economic issues, political disputes or conflicts of interest, for instance.
CSO platforms and networks have proven important in strengthening civil society's outreach. The enabling environment should be addressed in political dialogues with partner governments to ensure that CSOs have space within which to operate. Where this is not possible, the EIDHR is well-placed to support civil society since, if need be, it can be used without the government's consent.
A Communication on engagement with civil society is foreseen for the second half of 2012.
Inclusive dialogues and consultations
Policy dialogues play an important role in assisting partner countries to achieve successful political, social and economic reforms. For instance, regular meetings with representatives of the enlargement countries are essential in the Stabilisation and Association Process and are further strengthened though country specific dialogues, such as the Structured Dialogue on Judiciary with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dialogues can be facilitated by the EU Delegations and strengthened with the participation of Member States, where appropriate.
The EU has conducted its policy dialogues primarily with government partners in the past. That said, it has also acquired some positive experiences of multi-stakeholder dialogues. The Structured Dialogue on the Involvement of Civil Society and Local Authorities in EU Development Cooperation is an inspiring example. Another one is the "Speak Up!" conference organised by the Commission in the context of the enlargement process in 2011 which brought together journalists and media professionals to discuss challenges concerning freedom of expression and media in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Civil society in enlargement countries also provides valuable contributions to the European Commission's annual Progress Reports and to the preparation of projects financed through IPA.
The EU should actively promote more inclusive policy dialogues and support the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in reform processes (see the example of Benin under the EDF Governance Initiative[18]); the process followed in enlargement countries is a good example. It should make full use of the tools available for supporting political and civil society in this context, while taking appropriate account of the sensitive issues of legitimacy, accountability and representativeness.
The EU should also help transition countries consult (emerging) political actors, local authorities and the wide range of non-state actors mentioned above. It is also important to involve specific groups in society, such as young people, women and marginalised groups (minorities, the poor, displaced people). Moreover, when it comes to economic reform and private sector development specifically, active public-private dialogue is essential.
2.5. Enhancing knowledge-sharing and development capacities
Knowledge-sharing platforms
The European Transition Compendium, designed to disseminate transition information, has been made available through an online interactive database and can now be consulted by various stakeholders around the world.
The Commission should set up a broader platform or network for sharing knowledge on democratic transformation issues with developing countries, other donors, emerging economies, civil society, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders. Such a platform could be made available through the existing capacity4dev platform.
Twinning and Capacity Development
The High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011 marked a shift towards a more modern view of capacity development as being not just about technical assistance and training, but also about support for change and reform, including better access to knowledge.
In supporting transition processes, the EU should foster capacity development and technical cooperation with its partners. Inspiration can be taken from the innovative tools developed in its enlargement policy and already extended to the neighbourhood, including, in particular:
– TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange), which provides support through EU public sector expertise for the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation.
– Twinning, which contributes to institutional development through partnerships between public institutions in beneficiary countries and their counterparts in EU Member States. Together with SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), twinning has supported public administration reforms and helped develop modern and efficient administrations in beneficiary countries.
– In the Eastern Partnership, the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) initiative specifically addresses institution reforms in areas linked to the new bilateral agreements with the EU[19]. Each country identified its own key reform challenges under the CIB, and designed comprehensive Institutional Reform Plans.
Beyond neighbourhood, ad hoc solutions have been set-up to mobilize expertise under various external instruments, such as expert facilities implemented under the Instrument for Stability or the Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX) under the DCI which encourages the peer-to-peer transfer of expertise and know-how to beneficiary countries.
2.6. Cooperating with Member States, other donors and organisations
The EU and its Member States should increasingly "act as one" to support transition societies. This would help to avoid duplications of efforts, omissions or contradictions and to improve the impact and effectiveness of EU action. They should continue to strive for greater internal coherence and synergy in their dialogue, programmes, and actions, and use joint programming, where appropriate. Encouraging achievements in the area of democracy support, beyond the successful reforms under the enlargement process include:
– the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support, which creates a framework for a common EU understanding, approach and programming (in Bolivia and Tunisia, for instance);
– EU Human Rights Country Strategies, jointly prepared by the Commission, EEAS and Member States; and
– The envisaged Joint Framework Documents, defining a joint strategic approach in relation to a partner country in all policy areas. These could be of particular interest when coordinating the EU policy response to transition processes.
In supporting transition processes the EU should explore triangular cooperation and other options for cooperating with developing countries that are also emerging as providers of development cooperation and have recent experience with democratic transition.
It should also look at enhancing cooperation with regional organisations and regional networks, which can exert leverage and act as a major catalyst in consolidating reforms and regional integration in their respective regions. These might include regional parliamentary assemblies or regional electoral commissions; they could assist constitutional, electoral and capacity-building processes in their respective regions, and in doing so, rely on regional best practice. This would increase the legitimacy of external support. These organisations can also play a valuable role in monitoring progress towards democratisation.
Most major regional organisations have democracy charters or instruments of similar substance, and are opening the door to more systematic interregional work. By virtue of its own experience and that of its Member States, the EU is a natural partner for such organisations.
The EU supports initiatives by international organisations, including the UN and the Council of Europe, that aim at accompanying political processes, strengthening democracy and promoting socio-economic development in transition countries. In the area of security, for instance, the EU is working closely together with international and regional actors such as the UN, Arab League, African Union and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many partner countries also contribute to CSDP missions and operations. Building long-term relationships in the area of security and defence with the EU partners, including southern and eastern neighbours, may also contribute to the consolidation of their internal transformation and democratisation processes thus enhancing regional security and stability.
Conclusion
The EU already has a range of useful policies and tools available to support transition countries worldwide as they embark on the path to democracy, which it has successfully developed and deployed, especially but not only in its immediate neighbours. These range along a spectrum from incentivising initial and further reform to supporting the design of reform, its implementation and helping to achieve sustainability. The EU can play a key role, in particular, by helping to create an enabling environment for some of the crucial elements of successful democratic and economic transformations, such as for various democratic actors, enterprise, investments, trade and social protection.
These tools and methodologies should form a coherent part of the EU's overall framework of support to partner countries, especially where they are engaging in transition. While experience shows that transition processes should, first and foremost, be owned by the state and its citizens, experience also shows that the EU does have valuable expertise to offer, adapted of course to the needs and wishes of partner countries anywhere in the world, as part of a wider EU package of political, economic or other support. For that purpose, the EU stands ready to mobilize its entire range of available instruments and improve its implementation tools and methods to further increase the impact of its support.
[1] See European Transition Compendium.
[2] EU Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations, Brussels, 17 November 2009, and the accompanying Agenda for Action.
[3] Staff Working Document, section 2.1.1.
[4] Ibid, section 2.1.1; see also the reference document on "Engaging and Supporting Parliaments Worldwide: EC strategies and methodologies for action to support parliaments".
[5] Communication on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change (the "Agenda for Change"), section 2; and the Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012.
[6] See European Transition Compendium.
[7] The Agenda for Change, section 3. This includes capacity building on sustainable low emission and climate resilient development, including access to sustainable sources of energy.
[8] Staff Working Document, section 2.1.5.
[9] Ibid, section 1.4.
[10] Ibid, sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, respectively.
[11] The 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan.
[12] Staff Working Document, section 1.2.1.
[13] Ibid, section 2.1.5.
[14] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
[15] Staff working Document, section 2.1.4.
[16] Ibid, section 2.1.4.
[17] Ibid, section 2.1.3.
[18] Ibid, section 2.1.4.
[19] Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, Visa Facilitation/Liberalisation and Readmission Agreements