Annexes to SEC(2011)1472 - Impact assessment accompanying the document: Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | SEC(2011)1472 - Impact assessment accompanying the document: Instrument for Nuclear Safety and Cooperation. |
|---|---|
| document | SEC(2011)1472  |
| date | December 7, 2011 |
Simplification
Programming and implementation of the INSC could be simplified by a better definition of the thematic and geographic priorities for the selection of cooperation projects.
2.2.2.Study on legal instruments - linking evaluation results (2006-2011) to the legal instruments objectives8
The Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learnt from the Evaluations analysed how the following major objectives of the INSC were being fulfilled:
i) Existence of an effective nuclear safety culture;
ii) Protection of EU citizens against radiation;
iii) Establishment of safeguards for accounting and control of fissile material;
iv) Prevention of nuclear accidents;
v) Mitigation of the consequences of nuclear accidents;
vi) EU cooperation with the IAEA.
Most of the results were positive; however the report also noted mixed results concerning nuclear safety culture and safeguards suggesting that the actions in question were not yet assured.
The evaluation reports recognize that the EU has made useful contributions to promoting nuclear safety principally in neighbourhood countries and that it has in fact a record of being one of the largest foreign contributors. The EU’s contribution was particularly noteworthy in addressing the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster where it acted effectively in an emergency situation and at an appropriate scale by providing up to 50%9 of the international funding required.
At the same time, , the evaluators also recognize that progress cannot be purely attributed to the EU’s input nor is there much certainty as to the longer-term sustainability of the impact. One of the results also specifically mentions that ‘Overall progress in nuclear safety is very hard to evaluate, as no risk assessment has been conducted recently’.
Identification of Any Overall Trends or Lessons Learnt
It is apparent from the Energy Thematic Evaluation (2008) that the European Commission’s has built up considerable expertise and credibility in the sector and a good network of collaborating institutions both within the EU at national level and internationally under the auspices of the IAEA. hTerefore a good basis exists on which to build further EU work in this area. However the evaluators of the 2008 study also noted a number of points which are important to stress for the future:
1. Over time without the crystallizing effect of a major nuclear disaster, such as Chernobyl, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the European Commission to build consensus around the policies it proposes to the Council10.
2. There is clearly still considerable work to be done to achieve the full “Effective nuclear safety culture” that the INSC instrument talks about as “…partner governments seem less convinced than the EU of the necessity of promoting the independence and the technical and institutional strengthening of the Regulatory Authorities.”
Although no strong overall conclusion can be drawn on the effect of the INSC due to the limited evidence emerging from the evaluations, the limited evidence is positive. The EU is now an experienced and credible actor in the field. Yet there are clearly continuing issues to be tackled and not all of them will be straightforward. On the basis of the evidence available therefore it appears to be important to maintain an EU budget in this area.
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Having argued that the INSC should probably be maintained as a separate instrument does not mean however, that no improvements could be made to the instrument. In particular the paucity of results identified in the evaluation reports does suggest that there is a case for strengthening the evaluation of EU work financed from the INSC. The clear reference to the need for an overall risk assessment of nuclear safety would also support such a conclusion.
2.3.Review of lessons learnt
The root causes of the major nuclear accidents have been mainly lack of nuclear safety culture11, design safety (safety aspects of the plant design) and operational safety. It was therefore considered appropriate that the nuclear safety cooperation programmes of the European Union addressed the nuclear operators, to improve the situation on the ground, and the nuclear regulators to ensure that they had the required technical capability and independence to enforce adherence to appropriate nuclear safety standards.
In the CIS, , under the Tacis nuclear safety programme, safety related equipment had to be supplied to ensure that urgent cases were promptly resolved. However, as these cases have been addressed and the programmes are guided by the principle of the most efficient use of resources and avoidance of practices which might have commercial and competition implications, supply of equipment has, in general, been discontinued under the INSC.
Under the INSC, cooperation was initiated with a number of third countries which intend to use nuclear energy as part of their energy mix (the so called 'emerging countries'). The cooperation covered mainly the building up of the capacity of the regulators, the regulatory infrastructure and waste management strategies to ensure that a nuclear safety culture and framework is developed at a sufficiently early stage. The selection of the countries followed the criteria proposed by the Council. This has become an important part of the programme which should be continued, but may require a clearer definition of the criteria.
The consequences of nuclear accidents can, to some extent, be mitigated by emergency preparedness. Therefore, emergency preparedness needs to remain an important part of the programme.
Major accidents with radiological consequences have required the help of the international community to the affected population and to restore the sites to an environmentally safe situation. This was the case with Chernobyl where the major construction projects are entering the final phase. The possibility should be left in future programmes to cooperate with third countries in this respect, if needed and appropriate.
Past activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, the use of nuclear powered ships and submarines and radioisotopes have not always been up to the standards required to protect the population and the environment. Governments and local authorities have been left with the difficult task of restoring affected sites to an environmentally safe situation and the disposal of nuclear spent fuel and waste, for which international cooperation may be required. This part of the nuclear safety programme should be among the instrument’s priorities in the future.
In order that spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste be dealt with in a proper and responsible way, the nuclear safety programmes have provided for cooperation with third countries to establish national strategies for the spent fuel and nuclear waste. As the European Union has just adopted a radioactive waste and spent fuel management directive, third countries should continue to be encouraged to adopt similar high standards, cooperation in this field should also be continued as a matter of priority.
The promotion of international cooperation will remain essential to ensure coordination of activities by the different actors and the best use of resources. The IAEA will continue to play a fundamental role in this respect, particularly to enhance the Global Nuclear Safety Regime (the framework for achieving the worldwide implementation of a high level of safety at nuclear installations). Support to IAEA activities, particularly those of global or regional nature should continue to be envisaged, with the appropriate visibility for the EU actions /contributions.
2.4.The underlying drivers of the problem
- Following the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, issues related to risk and safety assessments of operating nuclear power plants (‘stress tests’) are likely to become more relevant and to be extended to other nuclear facilities, including research reactors, spent fuel interim storage facilities, radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities.
- Cooperation with nuclear regulators (including their technical support organizations) should remain at the centre of the nuclear safety cooperation, while cooperation with nuclear operators needs to be reconsidered taking into account the performance and results of the ‘stress tests’ and specific circumstances.
- Disposal of spent fuel, waste management, decommissioning of installations, restoration of sites have gained increased relevance over the years. Future cooperation in these areas should be treated as a programme priority12.
- Geographical proximity to the EU (pre-accession countries and EU neighbourhood) should remain a priority. Nevertheless, it should not be an exclusive criterion..
- The evolution of the international situation requires a change in focus and in priorities rather than a change in the broader scope of nuclear safety cooperation.
2.5.Legal base for EU action
The legal base of the INSC (Regulation No 300/2007) is the Euratom Treaty (in particular the Article 203). Considering the legislative framework for nuclear safety at EU level, this should remain the case with the future regulation, unless the scope is enlarged (see discussion on different options under paragraph 4. here below).
2.6.Added value of the EU action
Nuclear safety
With a large number of commercial nuclear power plants (146 out of 436 worldwide) and nuclear power providing for about 30% of the electricity generation, the EU has accumulated a long experience in the domain of nuclear safety, including in decommissioning of nuclear installations and radioactive waste management. As a result a wide expertise in all the domains of nuclear safety is available in EU Member States. The diversity of technologies, which requires different approaches, allows for the necessary flexibility in addressing the needs of third countries.
The EU has adopted common legal frameworks concerning nuclear safety and radioactive waste and spent fuel management. In this respect, the EU has set up an example and expects to persuade others to adopt similar high standards.
Global Challenges, Global Response and Global Leadership
In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's internal priorities – security, growth and job creation, climate change, access to energy, health and pandemics and migration - will be achieved in isolation from the wider world. In times of economic crisis, a more coordinated and integrated approach between the EU and its Member States through joint programming will bring about more added value, increased strength and legitimacy, and more impact and effectiveness.
The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on behalf of and with Member States, giving enhanced credibility in the countries in which it works. It is best placed to take on the role of global leader on behalf of its citizens.
The critical weight of the EU
With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the critical weight to respond to global challenges, while the action of Member States can be limited and fragmented, with projects which are often too small to make a sustainable difference in the field. This critical mass also puts the EU in a better position to conduct policy dialogue with partner governments. This is reflected, for example in the strong position of the EU in discussions and negotiations with the G8 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which manages large nuclear safety funds on behalf of international donors.
The INSC should remain an instrument accompanying the EU policy dialogue with third countries.
When programming its cooperation, the EU pays particular attention to the structural as well as economic capacity of the countries concerned. The possibility to react to unforeseen needs is envisaged within the current INSC regulation and was made available to Japan after the Fukushima accident.
The EU is best placed to coordinate
The EU has a network of international agreements all over the world, not matched by individual Member States, which gives them influence in almost all fields of international relations, including nuclear safety. The EU plays a major role in this domain but needs to continue enhancing its visibility.
The EU can do more than other international organisations as it has a holistic approach to development and external relations.
Division of labour through the EU is a crucial component of its added value. With its network of international agreements with partners and organisations all over the world, the EU is a natural coordinator, and can influence almost all fields of international relations, which individual Member States, acting within common policies and strategies, cannot do alone.
Furthermore, at a time of budgetary restrictions, when several Member States are compelled to exit entire sectors and countries, the EU is able to continue playing an active role.
3.Objectives
3.1.Policy framework and objectives
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The need to adopt the highest nuclear safety standards worldwide has recently become even more evident in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident
The health, environmental, social and economic impact of nuclear accidents in third countries in the EU has been confirmed to be potentially very high. The need to establish effective cooperation aimed at preventing accidents through the establishment of high levels of nuclear safety is being reaffirmed.
. While the EU recognizes that the use of nuclear power is a sovereign decision, it is in the EU’s best interest that nuclear installations are operated safely, in particular in the EU neighbourhood, and that nuclear materials are properly accounted for. The EU will cooperate with third countries and organizations in these respects.
General objectives
- Cooperate in the implementation of the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries in order to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public, as nuclear accidents have trans-boundary consequences (Euratom Treaty).
- Cooperate with third countries to make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended (Art. 2b of the Euratom Treaty).
Specific objectives
- Support the promotion and implementation of the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection in nuclear installations and radiological practices in third countries.
- Support the development and implementation of responsible strategies concerning the disposal of spent fuel, waste management, decommissioning of installations and restoration of former nuclear sites.
- Support international cooperation on nuclear safety to ensure that the highest and most robust levels of nuclear safety are in place and implemented.
- Support the promotion and implementation of effective frameworks and methodologies for the improvement of nuclear safeguards worldwide.
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Operational Measures to be implemented to support the objectives
The following measures are of particular importance for supporting the achievement of the above objectives.
a. the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture at all levels, in particular through:
- continuous support for regulatory bodies, technical support organisations, and the reinforcement of the regulatory framework, notably concerning licensing activities, including the review and follow up of the risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’);
- Cooperation with third countries in the domain of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management (i.e. transport, pre-treatment, treatment, processing, storage and disposal) and development of specific strategies for the responsible management of spent nuclear fuel and waste;
- the development and implementation of strategies for decommissioning existing installations and the remediation of former nuclear sites; the recovery and safe disposal of nuclear objects sunken in the sea or dispersed on land;l
- support for the performance of effective and comprehensive safety and risk assessments (in line with the specifications adopted by the EU Member States) and incorporation of the lessons learnt, so that high safety levels can be achieved;
b. the promotion of effective regulatory frameworks, procedures and systems to ensure adequate protection against ionising radiations from radioactive materials, in particular from high activity radioactive sources, and their safe disposal;
c. the establishment of the necessary regulatory framework and methodologies (including nuclear forensics methods) for the implementation of nuclear safeguards13, including for the proper accounting and control of fissile materials at State and operators level;
d. the establishment of effective arrangements for the prevention of accidents with radiological consequences as well as the mitigation of such consequences should they occur (monitoring the environment in case of releases, design and implementation of mitigation and remediation activities), and for emergency-planning, preparedness and response, civil protection and rehabilitation measures;
e. measures to promote international cooperation (including in the framework of relevant international organisations, notably IAEA) in the above fields, including the implementation and monitoring of international Conventions and Treaties, exchange of information capacity building and training in the domain of nuclear safety and research.
The above measures should not be limited to countries operating (or with foreseen) nuclear power plants, but also include those having civil nuclear installations and radiological practices, including, inter alia, research reactors and laboratories, radioactive waste management facilities, uranium ore mining and processing sites. As such, cooperation will extend to countries that may neither have nor have planned the construction of nuclear power plants.
3.2.Consistency with external action priorities
The measures adopted in the framework of cooperation in the domain of nuclear safety must be consistent with the EU’s overall strategic policy framework. In particular they must be consistent with the overall cooperation framework established with single partner countries.
3.3.Consistency with other EU policies
Consistency with the measures envisaged in the domain of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation, in the framework of the IFS must be ensured, particularly those related to nuclear safety, including countering illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials, border control and emergency preparedness.
3.4.Geographical/thematic coverage
The need to focus the nuclear safety cooperation in the EU neighbourhood and accession countries is obvious. Nevertheless, it should not exclude the possibility for actions in other geographical areas, as appropriate (in particular if EU overseas territories are concerned). Criteria concerning the prioritization of cooperation with third countries, the specific topics to be addressed (safety/safeguards/environmental remediation/other) and the type of beneficiary need to be more clearly established in the context of a new regulation.
Today, the INSC covers activities in 18 countries (see above 2.1). It could be expended to several (up to 10 more) additional countries of the CIS and of the neighbourhood or accession countries (in particular those maintaining research reactors or having no policy for hospital or industrial nuclear waste).
The specific domains of nuclear safety listed in paragraph 3.1 above should all be covered in the new regulation.
4.Policy options
Possible options including a 'no EU action' and a 'no change' option are discussed below. These options must be linked to the estimated budget allocated to the new instrument (EUR 631 million).
4.1.Option 0: No further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Instrument)
Some cooperation activities in nuclear safety could be included in the geographical cooperation instruments and be implemented as such. However this would create difficulties regarding the legal basis of the respective instruments, as nuclear safety falls under the Euratom framework.
4.2.Option 1: ’No change’ (cooperation with third countries would continue in the framework of the existing INSC Regulation)
The necessary fine-tuning of the cooperation framework, in view of the developments and lessons learnt as well as the need to refocus the implementation of the Regulation could be taken account of in the preparation of the Strategy Papers. However this option would not allow for a revision of the geographic scope and for a new setting of the criteria for cooperation and priorities in the regulation. In addition, it would not be in line with the proposed budget.
4.3.Option 2: Amend the INSC Regulation
An amended Regulation may provide for taking into account the evolution of the international situation on nuclear safety, for incorporating the lessons learnt and the criteria for cooperation. This would permit a clearer understanding of the limits of intervention when considering cooperation projects, leading to a simplification and a more efficient decision-making process than is the case for the existing regulation.
The amended regulation could also provide for a revision of the geographical scope to include the countries in the pre-accession process (currently covered by the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)) whenever such an extension proves to be relevant (e.g. for supporting nuclear regulations for countries which decided to embark into nuclear energy production, prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials). However IPA will continue to be used for actions that support the candidate countries and potential candidates in order to be eventually in line with the EU acquis, i.e. the Euratom Treaty and related Euratom Council Directives plus the International Conventions to which the EU is a party.
The geographic scope would thus include all ‘third countries’ (non EU Member States) which satisfy the criteria for cooperation. This option would include countries covered by the IPA as well as industrialized / high income countries. The latter should be included only to allow for exceptional measures to be undertaken, for example following major nuclear accidents, as in the case with Fukushima in Japan, if needed and appropriate.
In addition, an amended Regulation could provide for more clarification on the range of cooperation with countries that neither have nuclear power plants in operation nor are expected to embark into nuclear power programmes, but seek nonetheless cooperation in the domain of the management of radioactive waste, decommissioning and the related licensing issues.
A specific mandate to cooperate in large scale and long-term projects for the recovery and management of sunken radioactive objects in the Arctic Sea or on sites with dispersed radioactive sources and to address the remediation of uranium legacy sites (worldwide) could be included. Participation in international funds to address these issues would be fully possible within the foreseen budgets.
Detailed guidance on criteria for cooperation with third countries and the priorities could be provided in an annex to the regulation.
4.4.Option 3: New instrument
Safety, security and safeguards are complementary. Clearly security (protection) and safety are closely related as safety necessarily contributes towards protection. A new instrument could provide for a unified approach towards nuclear safety, security and safeguards (the ‘3S’) and further explore the synergies between the INSC and the IFS. In this case, the issues related to radiological and nuclear materials risk mitigation, which are presently addressed in the framework of the IFS, would be covered by an ‘extended’ INSC Regulation.
5.Analysis of Impacts
5.1.Likely economic, social and environmental impacts of each of the options
Nuclear accidents may have dramatic economic, social and environmental impacts, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident (1986) and the Fukushima accident (2011). They may affect also the health of populations. Both accidents produced large contaminated areas, fatalities, displacement / resettlement of affected population and resulted in the need to decommission / dismantle very expensive nuclear power plants and to replace the lost power generating capacity. Such accidents disrupt economic and social life and affect the choices concerning the energy mix in some countries (moratorium or phasing out nuclear energy). Furthermore they may have an impact on the environment as the replacement power plants may require, for example, the use of fossil fuels or hydropower.
The EU proposed actions are intended to help prevent the occurrence of nuclear accidents and to minimize and mitigate their consequences (through emergency preparedness measures) should they occur. Each of the above options pursues these objectives. However, option 0 would be likely to discontinue most of the on-going actions undertaken by the EU on nuclear safety.
5.2.Impacts on external action, in particular on Policy Coherence for Development
Except for option 0, which would discontinue cooperation on nuclear safety with third countries, no specific impacts are anticipated on Policy Coherence for Development.
However the external action in the domain of nuclear safety would appear to be more effective if an amended Regulation is adopted which would resolve the shortcomings of the present INSC.
5.3.Impact in terms of management / implementation modalities
There appears to be no major differences in the implementation modalities of the Options 1, 2 and 3 outlined above. Option 3 would maintain the present situation and role of the EEAS, but Options 1 and 2, concerning regulations whose legal basis is the Euratom Treaty, would imply a leading role for the Commission services both at the policy definition level and at the implementation level. In any case, coherence with EU’s external action and external policy strategies must be ensured.
Option 0 would raise major problems with the legal basis as well as implementation issues due to the difficulties in mobilising the necessary resources and specific expertise in the context of the geographic instruments.
6.Comparing the options
6.1.Weighing of positive and negative impacts per option
Option 0 - limited cooperation might still be possible in the framework of the geographical instruments, but it would likely lead to the discontinuation of most of the on-going actions on nuclear safety, including cooperation with nuclear regulatory authorities in the EU neighbourhood countries. It would have a definite impact on the credibility of the EU vis-à-vis the partner countries with which it is already engaged in cooperation in the domains of nuclear safety and safeguards.
This option would require a multiple legal basis. During the implementation phase it may raise difficulties due to the requirement for specific competences on nuclear safety as well as in coordination. The fragmentation would also lead to a possible reduction in the visibility of the EU actions.
Should this option be pursued, the basic objectives and the underlying issues risk not being addressed by the EU.
Option 1 - would simply extend the application of the INSC through the period 2014-2020. It would basically leave the situation as it is, with the current problems of interpretation and implementation not being addressed in the Regulation but left to be defined in high-level programming documents (e.g. Strategy Paper and Multi-Annual Indicative Programme), whose definition might remain controversial and time-consuming.
This option has the advantage of simplifying discussion and using the current structure and experience gained in the previous period. However it would miss the opportunity to provide a clearer mandate to address consequences of nuclear accidents (through dedicated mitigation activities), to better define the scope currently covered by the INSC and IFS concerning issues related to nuclear safeguards and to clarify the criteria and priorities for cooperation with third countries.
Should this option be pursued, the outstanding issues in the implementation of the INSC would not be addressed or resolved.
Option 2 - would allow the present uncertainties and inconsistencies to be resolved and provide the opportunity to clearly establish the future focus of EU cooperation in the domain of nuclear safety and safeguards. A revised Regulation would provide a clearer basis for the development of the Strategy papers and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes. The clearer definition of geographic and thematic objectives and priorities in the regulation itself would improve the efficiency of the implementation of the instrument. A more effective and timely management of the project cycle could therefore be expected.
In comparison with options 0 and 3, it would allow for continuity and the use of the experience of a well tried system, while resolving a number of issues which have been identified. This, as well as the utilization of a single legal basis, would simplify the approach and the discussions on the new instrument. This appears to more than compensate for a possible greater coherence to be gained by an entirely new instrument covering nuclear safety, security and safeguards (option 3).
Option 3 - could provide for a unified approach towards nuclear safety, security and safeguards (the ‘3S’) and resolving the outstanding overlapping / conflict between the INSC and the IFS. However, while resolving the overlapping / conflict of interpretation between nuclear safeguards and nuclear security measures (which might include not only illicit trafficking but also, e.g., nuclear forensics), it would maintain the need for close coordination with other risk mitigation actions (chemical and biological).
In addition, the discussion of such a new instrument would likely be problematic and time-consuming due to the complexity of the dual legal basis and the prerogatives of the EU Member States on security matters. The adoption of a dual legal basis might also have an impact on the consistency with the approach on matters under the exclusive competences established under the Euratom Treaty (nuclear safety and safeguards).
It appears preferable to resolve the identified issues by better coordination during the elaboration of strategy papers and the implementation phase of separate regulations for the INSC and IFS.
6.2.Trade-offs and synergies associated with the options
Option 2 can be regarded as an improvement of the situation relative to option 1. If adopted, it is expected to simplify the implementation of future cooperation on nuclear safety and safeguards with third countries.
Option 3 would take advantage of the synergies between the actions currently undertaken in the context of the INSC and IFS, however it would require complex negotiations and might not lead to a major simplification of the current situation (option 1).
6.3.Preferred option
Option 2 appears to be the one offering the most advantageous solution while providing for continuity of the EU’s actions and resolving the problems experienced in the implementation of the current Regulation.
7.Monitoring and evaluation
7.1.Core indicators of progress towards objectives
The INSC is an enabling Regulation establishing the essential elements and the basis for the EU intervention. The annual action programmes detail the activities to be carried out by the EU, including the objectives pursued by the respective actions and the expected results. Specific indicators are defined prior to implementation, having in mind the particularities of each action.
The implementation of the actions complies with performance-based management. which serves the following purposes:
- making the most of limited resources;
- improving decision making processes and decisions;
- achieving transparency and accountability.
A performance management system involves the setting of objectives, the decision of how to measure progress and the selection of indicators. This implies a three stage process, firstly a sound analysis of the policies with a common understanding – through policy dialogue – of the objectives and of the logical linkages between the objectives, activities and outcomes. Next comes the question of identifying what can be measured in relation to the objectives, which of the purposes above it serves and the availability, reliability and precision of statistical data, including such questions as the frequency of measurement and the use of proxy indicators. Finally the decisions need to be codified to the link between the programmes, the methods of calculation, the interpretive framework and the allocation of responsibility for their provision.
The success of the nuclear safety cooperation with third countries in achieving the above objectives may be assessed, inter alia, through the following results indicators.
Results indicators
- Number and importance of issues identified during IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) missions (concerning nuclear regulators);
- Number and importance of issues identified during IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions (concerning nuclear operators);
- Number and importance of reported nuclear safety incidents, by the respective country;
- Signature and ratification of international treaties and conventions;
- Status of development and implementation of spent fuel and nuclear waste strategies;
- For ‘emerging countries’, number and importance of issues identified during IAEA IRRS missions and progress in ‘Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for Nuclear Power Programme’ (Ref IAEA DS 424).
- Number and importance of irregularities in IAEA nuclear safeguards reports.
7.2.Outline for monitoring and evaluation arrangements
The European Commission's Monitoring and Evaluation systems are increasingly focussed on results. They involve internal staff as well as external expertise.
Task Managers in Delegations and Headquarters continuously monitor the implementation of projects and programmes in various ways, including wherever possible through field visits. Monitoring provides valuable information on progress; it helps managers to identify actual and potential bottlenecks, and to take corrective action.
External, independent experts are contracted to assess the performance of EU external actions through three different systems. These assessments contribute to accountability, and to the improvement of ongoing interventions; they also draw lessons from past experience to inform future policies and actions. The tools all use the internationally-recognised OECD-DAC evaluation criteria including (potential) impact.
Firstly, at the project level, the Headquarters-managed Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) system provides a brief, focused snapshot of the quality of a sample of interventions. Using a highly structured, standardised methodology, independent ROM experts attribute grades which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the project and give recommendations on how to improve effectiveness.
Project-level evaluations, which are managed by the EU Delegations (when they are in charge of the projects), deliver a more detailed, in depth analysis and help project managers to improve ongoing interventions and prepare future ones. External, independent experts with thematic and geographic expertise are hired to conduct the analysis and gather feedback and evidence from all stakeholders, not least the final beneficiaries.
The Commission also conducts strategic evaluations of its policies, from programming and strategy to the implementation of interventions in a specific sector (such as health, education etc), in a country or region, or of a specific instrument. These evaluations are an important input to the formulation of policies and the design of instruments and projects. These evaluations are all published on the Commission's website and a summary of the findings is included in the Annual Report to the Council and the European Parliament.
1The instruments are the following: Internal Agreement for the 11th European Development Fund, Development Cooperation Instrument, Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance, European Neighbourhood Instrument, Instrument for Stability, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, Partnership Instrument and the instruments for the EU-Greenland Partnership. The Macro-Financial Assistance instrument, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Humanitarian aid instrument and the Civil Protection mechanism are not part of this joint exercise.
2i.e. peace and security, poverty reduction, humanitarian aid, investing in stability and growth in enlargement and neighbourhood countries, tackling global challenges, promoting EU and international standards and values, and supporting growth and competitiveness abroad.
3Nuclear safety concerns the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment
4The safeguards system comprises an extensive set of technical measures by which the IAEA [and Euratom within the EU] independently verify the correctness and the completeness of the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities.
5The major Chernobyl projects, which are financed through EBRD managed funds, are currently scheduled to be completed in 2015. The international donors (mostly G8 and the EU) have already pledged enough funds to cover the cost of the projects. No further sums are planned for the EBRD managed funds for Chernobyl over the period 2014-2020.
6Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, First Report - Annual Action Programmes for 2007, 2008 and 2009. Ref. COM(2011) 111 final, SEC(2011) 284 final.
7Limited cooperation continued under the INSC in order to complete ongoing projects, for which a new Financing Agreement was not required, however this will cease once the projects are completed.
8Ref. Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learnt from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit, based on an evaluation carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Draft Final Report, March 2011.
9The EU is the largest contributor to the Chernobyl Funds managed by the EBRD, these were set up to finance projects at the site costing about EUR 2 billion. The EU's contributions to these Funds amount to some 25% of the total. In addition the EU financed directly other specific projects at the Chernobyl site.(EC Services' note).
10The situation changed considerably after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. (EC Services note).
11Safety culture was originally defined in IAEA's INSAG 4 as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.”
12Possible projects may include, inter alia, the remediation of uranium legacy sites in Central Asia (object of an international initiative strongly supported by the UN organisations and by the Governments of the region, to which the Commission already participates through the INSC); the recovery, processing and storage of sunken objects in the Arctic Sea (nuclear submarines and other objects containing spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste, part of the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy); and issues related to the responsible management of radioactive waste in countries that do not presently have any nuclear power generation capacity or consider developing it. A symbolic case in this respect is Iraq, with a comprehensive programme for the dismantling of its shut-down, heavily damaged, nuclear installations and the management of the resulting radioactive waste. Other third countries also face problems related to the management of radioactive waste deriving from practices not related to power production (e.g. in the medical sector), which need to be properly addressed at the level of their nuclear regulatory authorities and organizations responsible for waste management.
13Cooperation in this domain is limited to the technical aspects of safeguards, the non-proliferation aspects should be dealt within the framework of the IFS.