Annexes to SEC(2011)1536 - Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for the Regluation establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) - Main contents
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| dossier | SEC(2011)1536 - Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for the Regluation establishing the European Border Surveillance System ... |
|---|---|
| document | SEC(2011)1536  |
| date | December 12, 2011 |
Option 3.3 would offer more potential than the other two options in terms of information management, allowing for a centralised and possibly classified information exchange. However, Option 3.3 would be even more difficult to achieve than Option 3.2, because Frontex would have to re-negotiate also all the agreements concluded between Member States and ten third countries under the networks CoastNet, BSCF and SEAHORSE.81 Consequently, it would achieve the general objectives of EUROSUR only in the long-term.
6.4.2. Consistency
Options 3.1 and 3.2 build largely on existing capabilities, allowing Member States and third countries to take into account regional priorities and specificities. Option 3.3 is not in line with the EUROSUR approach of making best use of existing infrastructures and systems. Furthermore, making Frontex the 'hub' for the information exchange between Member States and third countries – as envisaged under Option 3.3 - has been rejected by Member States when discussing this issue in the relevant working groups in 2010-2011.
6.4.3. Costs
Cost comparison between policy options 3.1 to 3.3 (2011-2020)
| Policy Option 3.1 Decentralised option | Policy Option 3.2 Regional option | Policy Option 3.3 Centralised option | |
| Total costs | M€ 0,0 | M€ 5,37 | M€ 25,29 |
There is no cost related to Option 3.1, because from a financial point of view it does not constitute a change from the baseline, since a connection from all three regional networks with their respective NCCs was established before the end of 2011. Concerning Option 3.2, the costs for establishing and maintaining the SEAHORSE Mediterraneo in 2011-2020 between three third countries and Member States in the region are estimated at M€ 5,37.82
With regard to Option 3.3, the costs for replacing the three regional networks by the EUROSUR network are around M€ 25,29, taking into account the cost estimates elaborated for Policy Option 2.2 and assuming that about 15 third countries would be connected directly to the EUROSUR network. The decommissioning costs for the existing networks have been estimated to 10% of the annual average baseline costs of the three networks83.
6.4.4. Fundamental rights
Under Option 3.1 Member States' authorities are exchanging in the regional networks SEAHORSE, CoastNet and BSFC operational information, but no personal data with neighbouring third countries.
The same would apply to Options 3.2 and 3.3. Cooperating with third countries on in order to prevent irregular migrants from entering the Schengen area undetected could have a significant negative impact on fundamental rights in case the third country authorities use such information to identify persons or groups of persons which are likely to be subject to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or any other violations of fundamental rights.
The legislative proposal on EUROSUR must therefore provide the appropriate safeguards in order to prevent such a situation.
6.5. Sub-options 4.1 to 4.3 for the common application of surveillance tools
Comparative assessment of Policy Options 4.1 to 4.3
| The service for the common application of surveillance tools at EU level is provided by: | Effectiveness | Consistency | Costs | Fundamental rights |
| Baseline scenario 4.1. External service providers to each concerned NCC directly 4.2. Frontex together with EMSA and EUSC 4.3. Frontex alone | 0 + ++ ++ | 0 - - ++ - | 0 - -- - - | 0 - + + |
6.5.1. Effectiveness
As described in the baseline scenario, due to the high costs and the lack of ready-made solutions only a few Member States currently use satellites for border surveillance purposes, utilizing private sector providers and national space agencies. Due to a diversified approach of Member States the overall coverage and therefore detection and response to relevant threats would be less effective.
Option 4.1 would envisage that Member States use existing capabilities established by the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). The benefits of cooperating with the EUSC and EMSA would be as follows: The EUSC could help in particular with regard to the detection and identification of small boats leaving third-country coasts, which requires very high resolution imagery. The availability of such imagery is restricted, because it is often collected for national defence purposes. Therefore it is not always available and if so, under strict license conditions. The added value of EMSA is that it manages ship reporting systems, such as SafeSeaNet, containing AIS data that can be to a large extent commercially purchased, but (unlike in SafeSeaNet) does not have quality control. LRIT data is owned by Flag States (governments) and is not commercially available. This means that the remote maritime traffic picture cannot be composed in a similar way by commercial companies since access to data is limited.
However, under Option 4.1 there would be still a considerable risk of duplication of efforts, both between the two agencies which have developed operational services for the use of satellite imagery as well as between Member States, because they would task EMSA and the EUSC in parallel and without coordination among them.
Option 4.2 would be even more efficient than Option 4.1, because Frontex would coordinate the requests coming from the national coordination centres as well as the services to be provided from the EUSC and EMSA, while combining it with other surveillance activities, such as Frontex joint operations and the use of Frontex owned technical equipment. Such a coordinated approach could in particular improve the capability to detect and track small vessels used for irregular migration and cross-border crime.
Member States have shown a clear preference for Option 4.2, which the result, that a Concept of Operations for the common application of surveillance tools has been elaborated in 2011,84 which shall be tested between Frontex, EMSA and the EUSC in 2012.
In Option 4.3 Frontex would not take advantage of existing capabilities set up by the EUSC and EMSA, but establish the service for the common application of surveillance tools on its own. Since it is likely to take considerable time for Frontex to accumulate the same knowledge and expertise as the EUSC and EMSA, it would be difficult to implement Option 4.3 and to achieve full operational effectiveness in the short to mid-term.
6.5.2. Consistency
The biggest advantage of Options 4.1 and 4.2 would be that it takes into account that substantial investments in space infrastructure and know-how already undertaken by GMES/ESA, EMSA and the EUSC. Option 4.2 would be more consistent with the objective of promoting interagency cooperation than Options 4.1 and 4.3, envisaging a European capability for the common application of surveillance tools which could not only be used for border surveillance, but also for other purposes, such as law enforcement and defence and thereby representing an important component in establishing the common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain85. Due to its multi-purpose and cross-sectoral approach, EU funding provided by the GMES programme for such a service can be justified.
6.5.3. Costs
Cost comparison between policy options 4.1 to 4.3 (2011-2020)
| Policy Option 4.1 Decentralised option | Policy Option 4.2 Partly centralised option | Policy Option 4.3 Centralised option | ||
| Total | M€ 80,5 | M€ 62,1 | M€ 62,3 |
The total costs in 2012-2020 for Option 4.1 are estimated at M€ 80, with almost similar amounts for Option 4.2 (M€ 62,1) and Option 4.3 (M€ 62,3). 86
The costs of Option 4.1 are not only higher, but this option is not cost-efficient, since the processing of data would be undertaken at national level, which implies a multiplication of staff, activities and associated fixed costs (i.e. buildings, offices and equipment), with the result that the different NCCs would replicate what could be done better at EU level. Option 4.2 would build not only on the existing experience, know-how and capabilities of EMSA, EUSC and GMES, but existing contracts with service providers and data distributors could be used, involving cost reductions. In the long-term, Option 4.3 provides potential in benefiting from significant economies of scale because of having a single centralised actor (Frontex), which also explains why the cost estimates are almost identical with Option 4.2, which largely builds on existing capabilities.
6.5.4. Fundamental rights
Option 4.1 would also have the disadvantage that legal frameworks may not be established to enable commercial operators to monitor activities in third countries and store information in line with data protection laws.
7.Comparison of options and identification of preferred policy option
In line with the assessment in section 6, the following options would be the preferred ones:
With regard to the establishment of NCCs, Option 1.1 is the preferred option, because it does not require Member States to restructure their national administrations and thus could be easily implemented. However, Option 1.1, giving the NCCs coordination functions for land and maritime border surveillance, should be regarded only as a minimum requirement, not preventing Member States from giving their NCCs additional competencies as discussed under Options 1.2 and 1.3.
Following the decentralised approach for setting up EUROSUR, the preferred policy option for the EUROSUR network is Option 2.2. Frontex is already setting up the EUROSUR network on a pilot basis with selected Member States, focusing currently on the exchange of unclassified information. The security accreditation for exchanging information at the level of EU Restricted is a long process, which might lead to delays. This choice also takes into account the relatively small difference in network costs and the need for exchanging sensitive information when setting up the Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture.
Taking into account the urgent need for enhancing the situational awareness and reaction capability for border control in the Mediterranean region, Option 3.2 provides the best answer on how to promote the cooperation with neighbouring third countries. However, the willingness of northern African countries to cooperate is a pre-condition for the implementation of Option 3.2.
For the common application of surveillance tools, Option 4.2 is the option providing most added value. The testing and validation of the cooperation between Frontex, EMSA and the EUSC is planned for 2012 as well as foreseen in a number of FP7 projects starting in 2013. It is envisaged for this service to be funded by the GMES programme as of 2014.
The options selected above have also been the ones preferred by Member States when developing the different steps and components of EUROSUR in 2008-2011. Taking into account that EUROSUR is supposed to be set up in a decentralised manner, EU legislation would guarantee that each of the steps and components would be implemented in the same way. Furthermore, it would ensure that the different steps would complement each other in a coherent manner, thereby increasing their overall efficiency.
With regard to Options 1.1 and 2.2, the EU legislation should focus in particular on the tasks and functions of national coordination centres, Frontex and the EUROSUR network as well as on common rules for the exchange of information between the NCCs and Frontex. When being consulted in 2008-2011, Member States clearly expressed the need for EU legislation on EUROSUR, because the Updated EU Schengen Catalogue on External borders control, Return and readmission includes only recommendations and best practices on border surveillance, but no binding rules.87
With regard to Options 3.2, the legal basis for the establishment of the SEAHORSE Mediterraneo network would be an agreement between the countries. Concerning Option 4.2, Frontex, EMSA and EUSC would regulate the cooperation with regard to the common application of surveillance tools in a service-level agreement.
Costs, responsibility and source of funding for the preferred option
Step | Component | PO x.1 | PO x.2 | PO x.3 | Preferred option | |
| Decentralised approach | Partly centralised approach | Centralised approach | To be set up by | Funding via | ||
| 1 | NCCs | M€ 99,6 | M€ 271,6 | M€ 610 | Member States | EBF |
| 1 | FSC | M€ 95,6 | M€ 129,8 | M€ 137 | Frontex | Frontex |
| 2, 7 | Network | M€ 42,4 | M€ 46,7 | M€ 49,3 | Frontex | Frontex |
| 6 | CPIP (RAU) | € 0,0 | M€ 29,3 | M€ 29,2 | Frontex | Frontex |
| 3 | 3rd countries | € 0,0 | M€ 5,4 | M€ 25,3 | Member States | DCI, EBF |
| 5 | Common application of surveillance tools | M€ 80,5 | M€ 62,1 | M€ 62,3 | Frontex EUSC EMSA | Frontex and FP7/ GMES |
| Total | M€ 318,1 | M€ 544,9 | M€ 913 | |||
| Preferred Option | M€ 338,7 |
Combining the preferred options, the costs of EUROSUR would amount to M€ 338,7.
EUROSUR will not require additional EU funding. Member States would continue using the EBF in this regard. Furthermore, considerable FP7 funding is being used for developing and testing selected EUROSUR components.
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, EUROSUR would be a decentralised system, leaving Member States fully in charge of controlling the external borders and cooperating with neighbouring third countires, while selected components, such as the EUROSUR network, would be provided centrally by Frontex, thereby generating added value for all EUROSUR stakeholders.
Most Member States already have the minimum infrastructure in place and therefore it is not envisaged that they would encounter difficulties in upgrading and connecting their national infrastructures. The difficulties which some Member States may meet are more of a organisational than technical nature, e.g. when determining which national authority should be responsible for the national coordination centre.
The role of Frontex in EUROSUR would grow steadily when administering the EUROSUR network as well as providing the common application of surveillance tools. Frontex would fulfil these tasks in line with its mandate as amended in 2011, which allows the Agency to purchase and own its own technical assets, to process under certain conditions personal data obtained during operations and to provide technical assistance to third countries.
8.Monitoring and evaluation
Frontex shall ensure that methods are in place to monitor the functioning of EUROSUR against the main policy objectives. Two years after EUROSUR is fully operational and every year thereafter, Frontex shall submit to the Comission a report on the technical and operational functioning of EUROSUR, taking into account the following indicators:
Impact indicators88
1. Reduced number of irregular migrants entering the Schengen undetected;
2. Reduced death toll of migrants at sea;
3. Reduced cross-border crime, in particular of drugs smuggled across the external borders.
Result and output indicators
1. Increased situational awareness at the external borders and in the pre-frontier area;
2. Improved interagency cooperation at national level;
3. Improved cooperation between Member States as well as with Frontex;
4. Increased cooperation with neighbouring third countries.
5. Increased technical and operational capability to detect and track small boats;
6. Increased exchange of unclassified and classified information in close-to-real time;
7. Increased capability to react to alerts, incidents and other events at the external borders.
Moreover three years after the EUROSUR system would have started all its operations and every four years thereafter, the Commission shall produce an overall evaluation of EUROSUR, including examining results against objectives and assessing the continuing validity of the underlying rationale. The fist evaluation is expected to take place in 2016 under the condition of EUROSUR becoming operational as of 2013. The Commission should submit the reports on the evaluation to the European Parliament and the Council, accompanied, where necessary, by appropriate proposals to amend the Regulation establishing EUROSUR.
1 COM(2008) 68 final of 13.2.2008 (‘EUROSUR roadmap’). This Communication was elaborated on the basis of the MEDSEA and BORTEC studies carried out by Frontex. For further details see Annex 1.1.
2SEC(2008) 151.
3The following shortcomings had been listed: lack of interagency cooperation and of exchange of relevant information, in particular when it comes to maritime border surveillance; current technical limitations in detecting and tracking small vessels; lack of preparedness to quickly respond to changing routes and methods used for irregular migration and cross-border crime etc.
41) Reduce number of irregular migrants entering the Schengen area undetected; 2) Reduce loss of lives of migrants at sea; 3) Increase the internal security of the EU by combating cross-border crime.
5 See also Commission Staff Working Paper determining the technical and operational framework of EUROSUR and actions to be taken for its establishment, SEC(2011) 145 final of 28.1.2011.
6 E.g. Council Working Group on Frontiers, Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), EU Military Staff etc.
7 E.g. European Parliament Seminar on Collaboration in Space for International Global Maritime Situational Awareness (C-SIGMA), Brussels, 16.11.2010.
8 European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Space Agency (ESA).
9 E.g. 2008 and 2010 EU Security Research Conferences.
10 E.g. in the context of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) and the European Organisation for Security (EOS).
11 Summaries of the most relevant documents can be found in Annex 1.
12 An overview these groups can be found in Annex 2.
13Technical study on developing concepts for border surveillance infrastructure, a secure communication network and a pre-frontier intelligence picture within the framework of a EUROSUR (EUROSUR technical study). Main contractor: ESG. Subcontractors: EADS, SELEX, Thales. Consultants: SECUNET, University of the German Army. Budget: M€ 1, 8, funded under External Borders Fund.
14 Technical study assessing the financial impact of establishing EUROSUR. Main contractor: GHK. Subcontractors: UNISYS and Euroconsult. Budget: € 144 150, funded by DG Home Affairs.
15 For this purpose, Frontex uses an external contractor (GMV; budget: M€ 1,5) and is supported by the Member States' expert group on the EUROSUR pilot project as a platform for technical discussions. In 2011, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Spain will be connected to the EUROSUR network.
16 See Annex 1.5.
17References to and excerpts of these legal acts can be found in Annex 1.1.
18 For further details see Annex 1.1.
19 For further details see the impact assessment accompanying the EUROSUR roadmap, SEC(2008) 151 final of 13.2.2008, 6-16.
20 Commission Communication on Migration, COM(2011) 248final of 4.5.2011, 8-9.
21A list of press reports can be found on http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiers-of-europe_16.html , estimating that around 12 943 migrants died in the Mediterranean Sea and around the Canary Islands between 1988 and the end of July 2011, with 1931 alone in 2011.
22 An overview can be found in Annex 4.2.
23Compare also Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 67 TFEU.
24 Compare also Article 79 TFEU on developing a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring the efficient management of migration flows and the prevention of illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings and Article 87 TFEU on police cooperation.
25 Liechtenstein is expected to join the Schengen area until the end of 2011.
26 Compare SEC(2011) 145 final of 28.1.2011.
27 An overview table on the scope of EUROSUR can be found in Annex 3.
28 Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.
29 Thus also including Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium.
30 Thus Austria, Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland would not actively take part in EUROSUR.
31United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982; Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974; International Convention on Maritime Research and Rescue (SAR), 1979.
32Articles 4 and 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture; Article 33 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto.
33 Compare also Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex, OJ L 111 of 4 May 2010, 20. See Annex 1.1.
34 Commission Decision 2007/599/EC of 27 August 2007 (EBF strategic guidelines, priority 2).
35 A more detailed overview can be found in Annexes 4.1 to 4.5.
36 This assessment also included a comparison with the plans presented by the Member States in the context of the External Borders Fund, showing that they generally match with the assessment.
37 Greece plans to make its NCC operational in 2013. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage.
38 See overview in Annex 4.1.
39 Of the 4 remaining Member States, 2 (Hungary and Slovakia) do not have any maritime borders. One country (Norway) could not provide a reply at this stage.
40 Of the remaining 8 Member States, 6 do not have any land border, while one (Romania) replied that its NCC is not planned to become responsible for land border surveillance and another country (Norway) could not provide a reply at this stage.
41 Cyprus, France, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage.
42 Norway could not provide a reply at this stage.
43 France, Italy and Poland. Norway could not provide a reply at this stage.
44 The costs ranged from € 22 514 in Romania to M€ 18,8 in Slovakia. An overview of the 2007-2010 NCC costs can be found in Annex 4.4.
45 Spain, France, Italy, Slovakia, Poland and Finland.
46 Commission Decision C(2011)2304 of 7.4.2011 adopting the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013 for the Thematic Programme 'Cooperation with Third Countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum".
47 For further details see Annex 6.1.
48 GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) is the European Initiative for the establishment of a European capacity for Earth Observation. More information can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/gmes/index_en.htm and http://www.gmes.info.
49 See Annex 1.6.
50 E.g. Spain, Italy, Malta.
51 See Annex 1.5.
52 Article 3(2) TEU and Article 67(2)TFEU. Compare also Article 77(1)(b) and (c) and 77(2)(c) TFEU.
53Full situational awareness is only needed at tactical and operational level (e.g. in the local and regional coordination centre) in order to take real-time operational decisions. At strategic level (e.g. in the NCC and in Frontex) only a subset of the data is needed to take decisions.
54 E.g. by combining data and information derived from different civilian and military ship reporting systems, patrol assets, satellites and other surveillance tools.
55Step 4 on research for border surveillance is focusing on the development, testing and validation of the other steps before them being implemented. Step 8 is being carried out in the framework of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy and does not form part of this impact assessment.
56 Policy Options 1.1 and 1.2 shall be understood as minimum requirements.
57 Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points.
58 Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture.
59 Common Information Sharing Environment. The CISE for the EU maritime domain (Step 8) is developed in the framework of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy.
60 Based on replies received from 20 Member States in August 2011.
61 Surveillance of land, maritime and air borders and border checks at border crossing points.
62 But password protected and using https.
63 EU Satellite Centre, European Maritime Safety Agency, European Fisheries Control Agency, EUROPOL.
64 Centre de Coordination pour la lutte antidrogue en Méditerranée (CeCLAD-M) and the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N).
65 The National Situational Pictures are supposed to be managed by the NCCs and the European Situational Picture by the Frontex Situation Centre (FSC). Therefore they are not assessed separately. Their costs have been included in the cost estimates for the NCCs and the FSC.
66 See Annex 1.6.
67 Land, maritime and air border surveillance as well as checks at border crossing points.
68 A fourth option – giving the NCC a coordination function for border control, including border checks – has not been assessed, because in all Member States border guards/police, which always have a centralised command structure, are responsible for border checks.
69 For the NCC cost estimates provided by Member States in August 2011 in the framework of the technical study assessing the financial impact of establishing EUROSUR, see Annex 4.6. The 2017-2020 figures have been based upon the 2016 figures as provided by Member States.
70For the calculation of the NCC cost estimates see Annex 4.7. For the FSC cost estimates see Annex 4.8.
71 For all 24 Schengen countries with land and maritime external borders.
72Cf. Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31); Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1); Council of Europe Convention of 28.1.1981 (ETS 108).
73 For Frontex the given legal limitations apply. See Articles 11a ff of Regulation (EU) No …/2011 of … amending Council Regulation No 2007/2004 establishing Frontex, OJ …
74 Instead of a centralised repository the central part could be limited to a central repository of indexes. Such a system would require a lower volume of data transfer and lower central database capability and it could still be regarded as a decentralised system.
75 For detailed cost estimates see Annexes 5.1 to 5.3.
76 Risk Analysis Unit.
77 EU Satellite Centre, European Maritime Safety Agency, European Fisheries Control Agency, EUROPOL.
78 Centre de Coordination pour la lutte antidrogue en Méditerranée (CeCLAD-M) and the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N).
79 For CPIP concepts see Annex 1.7.
80 For detailed cost estimates on the CPIP see Annex 5.4.
81 Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, Morocco, Mauretania, Senegal, Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea Bissau. For details see Annex 6.1.
82 The concerned countries are not named, because negotiations are still going on.
83 This assumption is in line with the standard assumption for calculation decommissioning costs in the IT industry,
84 See Annex 1.6.
85 Step 8 of the 2008 EUROSUR roadmap. Compare Commission Communications COM(2009) 538 final of 15.10.2009 and COM(2010) 584 final of 20.10.2010.
86 For detailed cost estimates see Annexes 7.1 to 7.3.
87References to and excerpts of these legal acts can be found in Annex 1.1.
88 These indicators will also dependent on factors outside of EUROSUR, such as changes in the political and economic situation in neighbouring third countries.