Annexes to COM(2017)167 - 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard - Main contents

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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.

dossier	COM(2017)167 - 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard.
document	COM(2017)167
date	April 10, 2017

Annex-1.pdf">http://www.juradmin.eu/images/media_kit/aca_surveys/Transversal-Analysis---Annex-1.pdf 2016 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.

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two specific scenarios on a consumer dispute have been set out in the context of each Member State’s income and living conditions. The data in Figure 21 show availability of legal aid for these two scenarios. They are based on two different values of the claim: a high value claim (i.e. EUR 6 000) and a low value claim (i.e. each Member State’s respective Eurostat poverty threshold converted to monthly income ⁵¹).

Most Member States grant legal aid on the basis of the applicant’s income. ⁵² Figure 21 compares in % the income thresholds for granting legal aid in a specific consumer case with the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member State. For example, if eligibility for legal aid appears at 20 %, it means that an applicant with an income 20 % higher than the respective Eurostat poverty threshold can receive legal aid. On the contrary, if eligibility for legal aid appears at -20 %, it means that the income threshold for legal aid is 20 % lower than the Eurostat poverty threshold. Some Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for coverage of 100 % of the costs linked to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering parts of the costs (partial legal aid). Other Member States operate either only a full or only a partial legal aid system.

Figure 21: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case* (differences in % from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the CCBE⁵³)

Full legal aid Part legal aid

I €6000 ■ Low value claim* €6000 ■ Low value claim*

* The figure presents thresholds for legal aid ranging from 40 % to -30 %. DK, DE, IE, FR, HR, LT, NL, PT, FI, and SE grant legal aid at an income threshold which ranges between 40 % and 154 %. HU, RO, and UK(SC) grant legal aid at an income threshold which ranges between -30 % and -68 %. ‘Low value claim’ means a claim which corresponds to the Eurostat poverty threshold for a single person in each Member State, converted to monthly income (e.g. in 2014, this value ranged between €110 in RO and €1716 in LU). Most Member States use disposable income for calculating legal aid eligibility, except DK, LU, and NL which use gross income. In IE, SK, and UK (SC) no legal aid is available for a value of the claim at the respective AROP threshold as the amount would be too small.

The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable household income. European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, Eurostat table ilc_li01,

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/database

Member States use different methods to establish the eligibility threshold, e.g. different reference periods (monthly/annual income). About half of the Member States also have a threshold related to the personal capital of the applicant. This is not taken into account for this figure. In BG, ES, FR, HU, HR, LV, LU, NL, PT, UK (SC), certain categories of persons (e.g. individuals who receive certain benefits) are automatically entitled to receive legal aid in civil/commercial disputes. Individuals who receive some type of social benefits are automatically entitled to legal aid in civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use such as the merit of the case are not reflected in this figure.

2016 data collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different values of the claim have been indicated: €6000 and the Eurostat poverty threshold in each Member State). Given that conditions for legal aid depend on the

applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used:

a single 35-year-old employed applicant without any

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DE: the income threshold is based on the Prozesskostenhilfebekanntmachung 2016 and average annual housing costs (SILC). LV: a range of income between €128.06 and €320 depending on the place of residence of the applicant. The rate is based on the arithmetic mean.

Most Member States require parties to pay a court fee when starting a judicial proceeding. Figure 22 compares for the two scenarios the level of the court fee presented as a share of the value of the claim. If, for example, the court fee appears at 10 % of a EUR 6 000 claim in the figure below, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court fee to start a judicial proceeding. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat poverty threshold for each Member State.

Figure 22: Court fee to start a judicial proceeding in a specific consumer case (level of court fee as a share of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the CCBE⁵⁴)

i€6000

* ‘Low value claim’ see below Figure 21.

– Submitting and following a claim online –

Electronic submission of claims, the possibility to monitor and advance a proceeding online as well as electronic communication between courts and lawyers also ease access to justice and reduce delays and costs. ICT systems in courts also play an increasingly important role in crossborder cooperation between judicial authorities and also ease the implementation of EU legislation.

The data refer to income thresholds valid in 2016 and have been collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different

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Figure 23: Availability of electronic means* (0 100 % of courts⁵⁵) (source: CEPEJ study)

available in 0 % of courts, 4 = available in

CZ EE LV LT HU RO AT ES SK Fl PT IE SI DE SE IT BE MT DK NL HR BG EL FR CY LU PL UK I to submit a case to monitor the stages of a proceeding ■ to transmit summons

* DK: electronic forms are available on website, but can currently only be submitted by email. LT: certain documents may be submitted via the courts’ electronic services portal. PL: the possibility to bring a case to the court by electronic means only exists for writ of payment cases. RO: a case may be submitted to courts via email. SK: the e-submission is possible in certain civil procedures. Citizen has access to information about court proceedings via courts websites. SI: in specific types of cases the monitoring of procedural acts is possible.

– Exchanges between courts and lawyers –

The frequency of using various ICT techniques in exchanges between courts and lawyers as well as the underlying reasons for the use and non-use differ significantly between Member States.⁵⁶ In order to have a clearer picture of the actual use of ICT, Figure 24 presents the results from a survey of lawyers on how they communicate with courts and for which reasons they use ICT.

Figure 24: Use of ICT between courts and lawyers* (source: CCBE survey)

I III

ii in rnu

EE PT IT CZ ES DK HU LT SE FR SI BE NL PL MT IE DE LU EL CY BG HR LV AT RO SK Fl UK

■ for communication between court and lawyer «for electronic signature of documents for submissions to court

* Submissions to court covers the following answer options:’ electronic submission of a claim’, ‘electronic submission of summons to appear in court’, ‘electronic submission of evidence/supporting documents’.

Data concern 2015. Equipment rate from 100 % (device completely deployed) to 0 % (device non-existing) indicates the functional presence in courts of the device covered by the graph, according to the following scale: (100 % = 4 points if applicable to all matters / 1.33 points per specific matter; 50-99 % = 3 points if applicable to all matters / 1 point per specific matter; 10-49 % = 2 points if applicable to all matters / 0.66 point per specific matter; 1-9 % = 1 point if applicable to all matters / 0.33 points per specific matter. Matter relates to the type of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other).

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Figure 25: Reasons for the (non-)use of ICT between courts and lawyers* (source: CCBE survey)

* Positive experience covers the following answer options: ‘very practical’, ‘user-friendly’ and ‘other advantages’. Negative experience covers the following answer options: ‘not sufficiently user friendly’, ‘technical problems’ and ‘other obstacles’. Respondents could give indicate a maximum of two reasons for the (non-)use of ICT.

– Communicating with the media –

For the general public, the media serves as a channel that contributes to the accessibility of justice systems and judicial work.

Figure 26: Relations between courts and the press/media* (source: European Commission⁵⁷)

Illlllllllll llllllllIII llllll I

llllllll III MIMI II

■■■■■■■Illlllllllll

II I 111IIIIIIII lllllll II11 llllllllIIIllllll llllll

BG DK DE EE ES IT LV LT HU NL RO Fl SE BE CZ IE HR LU SK SI AT PT FR MT EL CY PL UK Judiciary has established guidelines on communication with the press/media forjudges

■ An official is in charge of explaining judicial decisions to the press/media (Highest instance) An official is in charge of explaining judicial decisions to the press/media (2nd instance)

■ An official is in charge of explaining judicial decisions to the press/media (1st instance)

* For each of the three instances two points can be given if civil/commercial cases and administrative cases are covered. If only one of the two categories of cases is covered only one point is given. Maximum possible: 7 points. DE: each federal state has own guidelines for judges on communicating with the press and media. FI: in all courts there is a person who can be in contact with the press when necessary, but not as his/her main duties.

- Accessing judgments -

Providing judgments online advances transparency and understanding of the justice system. It helps citizens and businesses to take informed decisions when accessing justice. It could also contribute to increasing consistency of case law.

Figure 27: Access to published judgments online to the general public* (civil/commercial and administrative cases, all instances) (source: European Commission⁵⁸)

Illlllll

lllllllllll

lllllllllllllll

lllllllllllllllllll

■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■Illlllll

lllllllllllllllllllllll

LT HU MT RO SK ES

■ 1st instance

CZ DE IT NL BE HR AT 2nd instance

* For each instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for civil/commercial and administrative cases respectively (0.5 points when some judgments are available). For Member States with only two instances, points have been given for three instances by mirroring the respective higher instance of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not distinguish between the two areas of law, the same number of points has been given for both areas. Maximum possible: 6 points. DK: most administrative cases are adjudicated by independent collegial quasi-judicial administrative bodies outside courts. SE: courts do not publish judgments regularly online (only landmark cases). According to the principle of public access to information, citizens are entitled to read all judgments or decisions. DE: each federal state decides on online availability of 1^st instance judgments.

Figure 28: Arrangements for online publication of judgments in all instances*

(civil/commercial and administrative cases, all instances) (source: European Commission⁵⁹)

■ ■■lllllllllll__________________

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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIC _

■■■■■■lllllllllllllllllll

II.

ES RO SK MT DE AT SI IT LV LT HU NL Fl

■ Website accessible to a general public free of charge Judgments are assigned a European Case Law Identifier (ECLI) Rules in place on revealing personal data?

BE EE BG IE FR HR PT SE LU CZ CY DK

■ Website is updated at Least once a month

■ Judgments are tagged with keywords

* For each of the three instances, two points can be given if civil/commercial cases and administrative cases are covered. If only one of the two categories of cases is covered only one point per instance is given. Maximum possible: 30 points. DK: most administrative cases are adjudicated by independent collegial quasi-judicial administrative bodies outside Danish courts. NL: no keywords, but a table of contents is added to every published judgment.

– Complaining to companies –

Access to justice includes avenues outside courts. Figure 29 is based on a survey on retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection. Companies were asked to indicate if they received complaints from consumers located in their own country and through which channel.

2016 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.

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Figure 29: Consumer complaints channels outside companies* (source: Survey on retailers attitudes towards cross-border trade and consumer protection 2016 ⁶⁰)

* Share of businesses having received consumer complaints through the respective channels. Original question also contained answer options ‘In-house complaint channels’ and ‘Other channels’, which in most Member States are the two main channels used. Public authorities are in this context those which are dealing with consumer related issues.

– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods –

Figure 30 shows Member States’ efforts to promote and incentivise the voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution methods.⁶¹ Figure 31 shows the number of complaints submitted through the European online dispute resolution (ODR) platform. This web-based multilingual tool has been available to the public since 15 February 2016. Consumers and traders who have a contractual dispute over a product or service bought online and wish to find a solution out of court can submit their contractual disputes about online on the platform.

Figure 30: Promotion

Commission⁶²)

of and incentives for using ADR methods* (source: European

35 30 25

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11111111111111111

llllllllllllllllllll

111111

HU DE DK ES SI LT PT HR BE NL RO SE EE Fl IT AT LU SK LV EL CY BG IE FR CZ MT PL UK

■ Civil and commercial disputes Labour disputes Consumer disputes

* Aggregated data based on the following indicators: website providing information on ADR; publicity campaigns in media; brochures to the general public; court provides specific information sessions on ADR upon request; ADR/mediation coordinator at courts; publication of evaluations on the use of ADR; publication of statistics on the

⁶⁰ To be published in the framework of the Consumer Conditions Scoreboard 2017 (3^rd quarter of 2017).

⁶¹ The methods to promote and incentivise the use of ADR do not cover compulsory requirements to use ADR before going to court, as such requirements raise concerns about their compatibility with the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

use of ADR; legal aid covers costs (in part or in full) incurred with ADR; full or partial refund of court fees; including stamp duties; if ADR is successful; no lawyer for ADR procedure required; judge can act as mediator; others. For each of these 12 indicators, one point was given for each area of law. IE: promotion and incentives in civil and commercial disputes relate only to family proceedings. PT: for civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in case of justices for peace. LV: no court fees charged in labour disputes.

Figure 31: Number of consumer complaints to the ODR platform (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: ODR platform — extracted 24 March 2017)

* The Figure shows the number of complaints submitted to the ODR platform, not the number of disputes received by ADR entities via the ODR platform. A number of cases submitted to the ODR platform are subsequently solved bilaterally between the parties outside the platform, without any further involvement of an ADR entity.

3.2.2 Resources

Adequate resources, the right conditions in courts and well-qualified staff are necessary for the good functioning of the justice system. Without a sufficient number of staff with the required qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality of proceedings and decisions are at stake.

– Financial resources –

The figures below show the budget actually spent on courts, first by inhabitant (Figure 32) and second as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 33).⁶³

General government total (actual) expenditure on administration, operation or support of administrative, civil and criminal law courts and the judicial system, including enforcement of fines and legal settlements imposed by the courts and operation of parole probation systems, and legal aid — legal representation and advice on behalf of government or on behalf of others provided by government in cash or in services; excluding prison

administrations (National Accounts Data, Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), group 03.3),

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Figure 32: General government total expenditure on law courts* (in EUR per inhabitant) (source: Eurostat)

LU UK DE IE SE AT NL I" SI BE Fl ES DK FR MT PL PT LV CZ EL SK HR HU BG LT EE RO CY

12010 2013 2014 «2015

* Data for NL, SK are provisional.

Figure 33: General government total expenditure on law courts* (as a percentage of GDP) (source: Eurostat)

BG PL SI HR LV DE UK HU RO ES IT SK CZ PT EL AT MT LT NL SE BE FR IE Fl LU EE DK CY

■ 2010 12013 2014 «2015

* Data for NL, SK are provisional.

Figure 34 shows which state power (judiciary, legislature or executive) sets the criteria for determining financial resources for the judiciary, and what criteria are used.

Figure 34: Criteria for determining financial resources for the judiciary*⁶⁴

EL EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HL MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK Fl (admin)

■ Judiciary sets criteria ■ Parliament sets criteria Executive sets criteria

I Other body sets criteria Amount based on historic/realised costs ■ No. of incoming cases taken into account

No. of resolved cases taken into account Anticipated costs of projects, investments ■ Courts' needs/requests

* DK: number of incoming and resolved cases at courts of 1^st instance are taken into account; DE: only for the Supreme Federal Court’s budget — as regards courts of 1^st and 2^nd instance; judicial systems vary between the federal states; EE: number of incoming and resolved cases for courts of 1^st and 2^nd instance; FR: number of incoming and resolved cases for courts of all instances; IT: the Ministry of Justice defines criteria for civil and criminal courts, while the Council for the Judiciary (CPGA) defines criteria for administrative courts; HU: law states that the salaries of judges must be determined in the act on the central budget in such a way that the amount shall not be lower than it had been in the previous year; NL: the number of resolved cases based on an evaluation of the costs for courts is taken into account.

– Human resources –

Adequate human resources are essential for the quality of a justice system. Diversity among judges, including gender balance, adds complementary knowledge, skills and experience and reflects the reality of society.

Figure 35: Number of judges* (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

* This category consists of judges working full-time, under the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. EL: the total number of professional judges includes different categories over the years shown above, which partly explains their variation. UK: weighted average of the three jurisdictions; data for 2010 contains 2012 data for UK (NI).

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States without Councils for the Judiciary were obtained through cooperation

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Figure 36: Proportion of female professional judges at 1^st and 2^nd instance and Supreme Courts (source: European Commission (Supreme Courts)⁶⁵ and CEPEJ study (1^st and 2^nd instance))

i 11 i it ii in l 11 r

■i i ii i in 11111 ii iii 111111111 ■i i ii i ii 111111 ii 11111111111

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL* PT RO SI SK Fl SE UK* ■ 1st instance (2015) ■ 2nd instance (2015) Supreme Courts (2016)

* PL and UK data for 2014 for 1^st and 2^nd instance.

Figure 37: Developments in the proportion of female professional judges at 1^st and 2^nd instance 2010-2015, at Supreme Courts 2010-2016* (difference in percentage points) (source: European Commission (Supreme Courts)⁶⁶ and CEPEJ study (1^st and 2^nd instance))

* LU: the proportion of female professional judges in the Supreme Court declined from 100 % in 2010 to 0 % in 2016. UK: for England & Wales the average of 1^st and 2^nd instance is used. PL and UK: data compare 2010 with 2014.

Database on women and men in decision-making: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/index_en.htm Database on women and men in decision-making: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-

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Figure 38: Number of lawyers* (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)

* Under CEPEJ methodology a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised according to national law to plead and act on behalf of his or her clients, to engage in the practice of law, to appear before the courts or advise and represent his or her clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer).

– Training –

Judicial training is important in contributing to the quality of judicial decisions and the justice service delivered to citizens. The data set out below cover judicial training in a broad range of areas, including communication with parties and the press and on judicial skills.

Figure 39: Compulsory training for judges* (source: CEPEJ study⁶⁷)

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NO

COMPULSORY ! TRAINING

NL IE EL FR HU DE EE LT PT BE ES LV PL* RO SI BG CZ DK HR IT LU AT SK CY MT Fl SE UK

In-service training for the use of computer f anilities in the court I n-service Traini ng for Specialised J ucïci al Functions l Initial training

i In-service training for management functions of the court l General in-service training

* Some Member States do not offer compulsory training in certain categories but may offer optional training.

Figure 40: Judges participating in continuous training activities in EU law or in the law of another Member State* (as a percentage of total number of judges) (source: European Commission, European judicial training report 2016⁶⁸)

EE MT SI LT DK IE RO LV BE SE BG ES NL DE HU AT Fl CZ FR HR IT PL SK EL LU UK CY PT

* In a few Member States the ratio of participants exceeds 100 %, meaning that some participants attended more than one training activity. AT data includes prosecutors, DK includes court staff.

Figure 41: Share of continuous training of judges on various types of skills* (as a percentage of total number of judges receiving training) (source: European Commission⁶⁹)

Judgecraft ■ IT skills Court management ■ Judicial ethics

* The table shows the distribution of judges participating in continuous training activities (i.e. those taking place after the initial training period to become a judge) in each of the four identified areas as a percentage of the total number of judges trained. Legal training activities are not taken into account. Judicial training authorities in UK(NI) did not provide specific training activities on the selected skills.

⁶⁸ 2015 data. In 2011 the Commission set the target that, by 2020, half of all legal practitioners in the EU should have attended training in European law or in the law of another Member State. The 2016 European judicial training report: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/final_report_2015_en.pdf

⁶⁹ 2015 data collected in cooperation with the EJTN. ‘Judgecraft’ includes activities such as conducting hearings,

Figure 42: Availability of training for judges on communication with parties and the press

(source: European Commission⁷⁰)

MM MM

CZ DK DE ES IT LU LT HU NL AT PT RO SI Fl

Communication with the media and general public (continuous) Communication with the parties (continuous)

SE BE EE FR HR BG EL LV SK IE CY MT PL UK

Communication with the media and general public (initial) ■ Communication with the parties (initial)

3.2.3 Assessment tools

Monitoring and evaluation of court activities are conducive to detecting deficiencies and needs, and thereby help the justice system to be more responsive to current and future challenges. Adequate ICT tools can provide real-time case management systems and can help to provide nationwide standardised court statistics. In addition, they could be used for the management of backlogs and automated early-warning systems. Surveys are essential to assess how justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals and court users. An adequate follow-up of surveys is a pre-requisite to improve quality of justice systems.

Figure 43: Availability of monitoring and evaluation of court activities* (source: CEPEJ study⁷¹)

Pit

I I I

I I I I I I I I_____

I I I llllllllllll

I I I llllllllllll

SI DK EE HR LT HU NL AT PL* PT RO SK

Fl BG CZ EL MT SE BE DE

ES LU LV UK

■ Annual activity report Regular evaluation system

i Number of postponed cases Specialised court staff for quality

Performance and quality indicators I Other elements

* The evaluation system refers to the performance of court systems, using indicators and targets. In 2015, all Member States, except LV, reported having a system that allows them to monitor the number of incoming cases, the length of proceedings and the number of decisions handed down, making these categories irrelevant. Similarly, the more in-depth work on quality standards has superseded its use as an evaluation category. Data on ‘other elements’ include e.g. appealed cases (EE, ES, and LV), hearings (SE), or the number of cases solved within certain timeframes (DK).

2016 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.

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Figure 44: Availability of ICT for case management and court activity statistics*

(0 = available in 0 % of courts, 4 = available in 100 % of courts⁷²) (source: CEPEJ study)

I J

Mil II

BG CZ EE ES LV LT HU MT NL AT RO SI Fl SE DK IE PT EL DE HR PL* FR SK IT BE LU CY UK ■ Case management systems ■ Tools of producing courts activity statistics

Figure 45: Topics of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals* (source: European Commission⁷³)

II II

I II III

II Mill

NO SURVEYS IN 2015

BE BG CZ EE IE EL CY LU MT AT PT RO SK PL

■ Customer service of the court

■ The judgment/decision of the court General level of trust in the justice system

DE NL SI IT HR LT HU Fl LV ES FR DK SE ■ Accessibility of the court service

The conduct of the hearing

The service provided by the lawyer _ Other topics

* Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of the level they were performed at.

2015 data (2014 for PL). Equipment rate from 100 % (device completely deployed) to 0 % (device non-existing) indicates the functional presence in courts of the device covered by the graph, according to the following scale: 100 % = 4 points if applicable to all matters / 1.33 points per specific matter; 50-99 % = 3 points if applicable to all matters / 1 point per specific matter; 10-49 % = 2 points if applicable to all matters / 0.66 point per specific matter; 1-9 % = 1 point if applicable to all matters / 0.33 points per specific matter. Matter relates to the type of litigation handled (civil/commercial, criminal, administrative or other).

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Figure 46: Follow-up of surveys conducted among court users or legal professionals (source: European Commission⁷⁴)

3.2.4 Standards

Standards can drive up the quality of justice systems. Following the mapping of quality standards in the 2016 Scoreboard, this edition examines certain standards on timing and information to parties in more detail.⁷⁵ Figures 47-49 present the use of standards on time limits, timeframes and backlogs, and an overview of which Member States use these standards. Time limits are quantitative deadlines, e.g. for the time from the registration of a case until the first hearing. Timeframes are measurable targets/practices e.g. specifying a pre-defined share of cases to be completed within a certain time. Backlogs are cases that are pending after a certain pre-defined amount of time, e.g. three months or even ten years. Figure 48 presents in how many areas of law standards on timing exist.

Figure 47: Standards on timing* (source: European Commission⁷⁶)

* Member States were given 1 point per area of law (civil/commercial, administrative, or other) that has standards defined.

⁷⁴ 2015 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.

⁷⁵ In the EU Justice Scoreboard, the standards on time limits and timeframes go beyond the requirements stemming from the right to a hearing within a reasonable time as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Figure 48 shows the competences of the different powers of state to set and monitor the standards on timing.

Figure 48: Setting and monitoring standards* (source: European Commission⁷⁷)

* Member States are ordered according to the order in Figure 47. Note that the definition ‘by the parliament (standards set in law)’ here indicates that a certain standard is set only in law. Even when more than one power is shown for setting/monitoring timing related standards, each power could be fully responsible for one type of standard. The ‘executive’ encompasses institutions under direct or indirect control by the government. The ‘judiciary’ includes bodies such as court presidents, councils for the judiciary, judges’ bodies, etc. CY and PT: No information on monitoring.

Figure 49 shows which measures are used when standards on timing (Figure 48) are not complied with. For example, in certain Member States non-compliance triggers a special meeting between the judge in question and the court president to discuss the situation. If it is an entire court which is not complying, the meeting could be between the president of the court in question and the president of the higher court.

Figure 49: Follow-up to non-compliance with standards (source: European Commission⁷⁸)

2016 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.

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– Information to parties –

Figure 50 presents standards on the way parties are informed and the type of information they receive about the progress of their case. Certain Member States have a system with automatic notification by e-mail or SMS providing information about delays, timetables or general case progress. Others simply give online access to the information during the case, while some also leave it at the discretion of the courts.

Figure 50: Standards on information about case progress

(source: European Commission⁷⁹)

* Member States were given points depending on the method used to provide each type of information. 1.5 points for automatic notification by e-mail or SMS, 1 point for online access throughout the case, 0.5 points each for information upon request by parties, court discretion or any other method used.

3.2.5 Summary on the quality of justice systems

The 2017 Justice Scoreboard examines the factors that contribute to the quality of justice systems: easy access, adequate resources, effective assessment tools and appropriate standards.

Accessibility

This edition looks in more detail at how justice systems are accessible from the perspective of the court users, i.e. citizens, consumers or businesses.

• Most Member States provide online information about their justice system (Figure 20). However, room for improvement exists regarding the user-friendliness of this information, for example web pages which are accessible for the visually impaired or which provide interactive tools enabling citizens to find out whether they are eligible for legal aid. Also, online availability of court judgments for civil/commercial and administrative cases could be improved across all instances (Figure 27). Only 17 Member States publish all civil/commercial and administrative judgments of the highest courts.

• The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a key impact on access to justice, in particular for citizens in poverty. This edition examines how far legal aid systems support consumers in a dispute with a company of a high value (i.e. EUR 6 000) or a low value (i.e. claim corresponding to the Eurostat poverty threshold). Figure 21 shows that in some Member States, consumers whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold would not receive legal aid. The difficulty to benefit from legal aid could be particularly dissuasive when the

court fees represent a significant share of the value of the claim (Figure 22).

. Proper use of ICT in courts contributes to speed up proceedings and to reduce cost. For example, a reform enabling courts in a Member State to deliver documents electronically to parties, and to deliver the remaining paper mail through a centralised postal system, saved more than EUR 4.5 million in 2016 (more than 2 % of the courts’ budget). The Scoreboard shows that electronic submission of claims is not in place in all Member States (Figure 23) nor are ways to follow online the progress in a court proceeding. A survey on the actual use of ICT between courts and lawyers shows that ICT tools are widely used in 10 out of the 20 Member States covered by the survey (Figure 24). They are most frequently used for general communication with courts, while signatures of documents and submissions of claims, summons and evidence are slightly less frequently done by electronic means. In 8 out of 10 Member States where lawyers report significantly less ICT use, the most frequent reason indicated is that the tools are not available and to a lesser degree bad experience with using ICT.

• Looking more closely at the channels used by consumers for complaining against a company (i.e. whether the complaint arrives through courts, public authorities, out of court mechanisms or consumer NGOs), it appears that the most frequent channel is the public authorities followed by the courts and the out of court mechanisms (Figure 29).

• In comparison to previous years, the voluntary use of alternative dispute resolution methods is increasingly promoted and incentivised in all Member States (Figure 30). The significant number of complaints submitted through the newly established online dispute resolution (ODR) platform shows the willingness of consumers to use alternative dispute resolution methods. In most Member States cross-border disputes represent a significant share of all disputes submitted to the ODR platform (Figure 31).

Resources

High-quality justice requires an adequate level of financial and human resources, appropriate training and diversity among judges, including gender balance. The Scoreboard shows the following:

• In terms of financial resources, data show that, in general, over half of the Member States increased expenditure on the judicial system per inhabitant in 2015 (Figure 32). However, few Member States facing particular challenges have decreased their budget. Member States mostly use historical or actual cost for determining financial resources for the judiciary instead of relying on the actual workload or court requests (Figure 34).

• The level of gender balance among judges in first and/or second instance courts continues overall to be good or appears to be moving towards a balance (Figure 36). In Supreme Courts however, even if most Member States are moving towards a gender balance, some Member States are moving in the opposite direction. (Figure 37).

• On the training of judges, while most Member States appear to recognise the importance of continuous training (Figures 39 and 40), efforts are needed to diversify the scope of the training offered. Continuous training on judicial skills (judgecraft), IT skills, court management and judicial ethics does not exist in all Member States (Figure 41). Furthermore, certain Member States do not provide any training on communicating with parties and with the press (Figure 42). In 2016, the European Judicial Training Network set up a short-term exchange programme for court presidents and heads of prosecution services focusing for example on change management and ICT.

Assessment tools

•

however, not all Member States have the full range of such tools. The full potential of ICT case management systems still need to be improved in many Member States (Figure 44) to ensure that they can serve various purposes, including generating statistics, and that they are implemented consistently across the whole justice system. For example, in some Member States, ICT tools do not provide for the management of backlogs, including the identification of particularly old cases. By contrast, certain Member States have early-warning systems to detect malfunctions or non-compliance with case processing standards, which facilitates the finding of timely solutions. In some Member States, it is still not possible to ensure nationwide data collection across all justice areas.

The regular use of surveys remains a central source for understanding the views that users and professionals have on the justice system. Around half of Member States undertook surveys in 2015 (Figure 45). Although all Member States undertaking surveys have also ensured follow-up, the extent of it differs greatly between them. The most common practice is to feed survey results into an annual report at local or national level (Figure 46). In several Member States, client-satisfaction surveys are published by the courts.

Standards

Standards can drive up the quality of justice systems. This edition examines in more detail certain standards aiming to improve the timing of proceedings and the information to the parties.

• Most Member States use standards on timing. However, certain Member States facing particular challenges on efficiency are currently not using such standards. Standards fixing time limits (e.g. for the time from the registration of a case until the first hearing) are most widespread, while those on timeframes (e.g. specifying a pre-defined share of cases to be completed within a certain time) and backlogs are used less (Figure 47). The monitoring of the respect of the standards is mainly under the responsibility of the judiciary (Figure 48). The non-compliance with the standards can trigger various type of follow-up. Most commonly, the judge concerned is asked to report and/or to discuss the issue, but other consequences can be the increase of human or financial resources of a certain court, the provision of temporary assistance by special judges or the reorganisation of the court management process (Figure 49).

• Most Member States have standards on how to inform the parties about the progress of their case, the court timetable or potential delays (Figure 50). The differences between Member States relate mainly to the methods used. Certain Member States have a system with automatic notification by e-mail or SMS providing information about delays, timetables or general case progress. Others simply give online access to the information during the case, while some also leave it at the discretion of the courts. From the perspective of citizen-friendliness, automated information by the court is preferable to one which requires action from the parties.

3.3 Independence

Judicial independence is a requirement stemming from the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the Charter (Article 47).⁸⁰ It guarantees the fairness, predictability and certainty of the legal system, which are important elements for an attractive investment environment. In addition to information about perceived judicial independence from various sources, the Scoreboard shows how justice systems are organised to protect judicial independence in certain types of situations where independence could be at risk. Having continued its cooperation with European judicial networks, particularly the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the 2017 Scoreboard shows up-to-date figures on structural independence and presents new figures on the appointment and evaluation of judges.⁸¹

3.3.1 Perceived judicial independence

Figure 51: Perceived independence of courts and judges among the general public (source: Eurobarometer⁸²– light colours: 2016, dark colours: 2017)

Figure 52 shows the main reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges. The respondents among the general public, who rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose among three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States are in the same order as in Figure 51.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN

The figures are based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members (CZ, DE, EE, CY, LU, AT and FI) were obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union. Eurobarometer survey FL447, conducted between 25 and 26 January 2017; replies to the question: ‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of courts and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad?’: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-

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Figure 52: Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of independence (share of all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer⁸³)

50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

mimiirai mrnnmiiiiiiiiini

at

m

DK Fl AT DE NL IE LU SE UK CY BE FR LT EL MT RO PL CZ LV HU EE PT SI IT HR ES BG SK

The status and position of judges do not ■ Interference or pressure from Interference or pressure from

sufficiently guarantee their independence economic or other specific interests government and politicians

Figure 53: Perceived independence of courts and judges among companies (source: Eurobarometer⁸⁴- light colours: 2016, dark colours: 2017)

Figure 54 shows the main reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges. The respondents among companies, who rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’, could choose among three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States are in the same order as in Figure 53.

Eurobarometer survey FL447, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’.

Eurobarometer survey FL448, conducted between 25 January and 3 February 2017; replies to the question: ‘From what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of courts

and judges? Would you say it is very good, fairly good, fairly bad

or

very bad?’:

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Figure 54: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all respondents — higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer⁸⁵)

Figure 55: WEF: businesses’ perception of judicial independence (perception means better perception) (source: World Economic Forum⁸⁶)

higher value

3.3.2 Structural independence

The Scoreboard presents an overview of how justice systems are organised to safeguard judicial independence in certain types of situations where independence may be at risk. This edition focuses on some of the main aspects of the judges’ status: the appointment of judges (Figures 56 and 57), the evaluation of judges (Figure 58), the transfer of judges without their consent (Figure 59), and the dismissal of judges (Figure 60).

Eurobarometer survey FL448; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not really, not at all?’.

The WEF indicator is based on survey answers to the question: ‘In your country, how independent is the judicial system from influences of the government, individuals, or companies? [1 = not independent at all; 7 = entirely independent]’. Responses to the survey came from a representative sample of businesses representing the main sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing industry, non-manufacturing industry, and services) in all the countries concerned. The survey is administered in a variety of formats, including face-to-face or telephone

interviews

with

business executives,

mailed

paper

forms,

and

online

surveys:

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The 2010 Council of Europe Recommendation on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (‘the Recommendation’) sets out standards designed to preserve the independence of the judiciary in such situations.⁸⁷ The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details of the safeguards. Having more safeguards does not, in itself, ensure the effectiveness of a justice system. It should also be noted that implementing policies and practices to promote integrity and prevent corruption within the judiciary is also essential to guarantee judicial independence.

– Safeguards relating to judges –

The guarantees of structural independence require rules, including those on the appointment of judges.⁸⁸ Figure 56 presents the bodies and authorities which propose judges for their first appointment at first instance courts and the authorities that appoint them. It also shows whether the recruitment of judges is done through a specific exam or a competition for judges, or through a vacancy notice without a specific exam.

Figure 56: Appointment of judges: proposing and appointing authorities*⁸⁹

* In several countries other authorities or bodies (e.g. court presidents, judges) may or should deliberate or be consulted on the candidate judges (e.g. in BE, CZ, DE, EE, LT, HU, NL, AT, UK (EN+WL), and UK (SC)); In some countries (e.g. LT and PL) certain candidates are exempt from taking the special exam for judges because of their previous qualifications or experience; CZ: the president formally appoints judges, the Minister of Justice decides on the assignment of a judge to the particular court. In practice, the candidate judges for appointment are nominated by presidents of regional courts. Afterwards, the list of candidates is forwarded to the Ministry of Justice that forwards the list of candidates (after considering all circumstances) to the Head of State; DE: proceedings at the level of the federal states differ greatly. In half of the 16 federal states, judicial electoral committees participate in the recruitment. In some of the federal states, this matter is dealt with completely by their state Ministry of Justice, whereas in other federal states the authority to decide on recruitment and on the (first) appointment has been transferred to the presidents of the higher regional courts. Some federal states provide for mandatory participation of a council of judges. Others require a joint appointment by the competent minister and a conciliation committee if the council of judges objects. In some federal states, judges are elected by the state parliaments and have to be appointed by the state executive; IE: the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board recommends at least seven candidates to the government for appointment. Following the government’s decision, the president formally appoints the judge and cannot refuse to appoint the proposed candidate; FR: candidate judges are selected through a specific exam for becoming a judge and are ranked according to their results. Following

Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities.

Paragraph 46 and 47 of the Recommendation provides that the authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members were

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a discussion between the candidate and the Ministry of Justice on assignment to a particular court, the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature must issue an opinion on the first appointment of these candidates and the Minister of justice then forwards the list of candidates to the President of the Republic, who must formally appoint the candidate judges through a decree without having discretion on the matter; LV: after three years, the Judicial Qualification Board, composed of and elected by judges, provides an opinion in the evaluation of the professional work of a judge; NL: the decision to propose a judge for appointment is formally made by a court president, relying on the recommendation by the Independent Selection Committee; RO: The figure relates to the appointment of senior judges; UK (EN+WL): Different procedures apply for the first appointment of the senior judiciary (High Court Judges and above), which are presented above, and for the appointment of the junior judiciary (Circuit Judges and below).

Figure 57 presents the possible discretion that the executive power (e.g. president of the republic, government) or the parliament have when they are appointing judges for their first appointment at first instance courts upon submission from the proposing authorities (e.g. Council for the Judiciary, court).⁹⁰ The height of the column depends on whether the executive can reject a candidate judge at all, whether it can choose only among the proposed candidates, or whether it can choose and appoint any other candidate, even if she or he is not proposed by the competent authority. An important safeguard in case of non-appointment is the obligation to provide reasons and the possibility of a judicial review. The figure is a factual presentation of the legal system and does not make a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the safeguards. For example, it should be noted that in several countries where the executive or the parliament has the power to reject a candidate judge, such an event has never happened (e.g. in NL, AT, SK, SE, UK (EN+WL) and UK (SC)), or has happened only in very few cases (e.g. in LV, SI and FI).

Figure 57: Appointment of judges: competence of the executive and the parliament*⁹¹

(higher value means more possible discretion)

* For each Member State, one point was given if the executive/parliament can reject a proposed candidate and choose another candidate among those proposed; one point was given if there is no obligation by the executive/parliament to state reasons for not appointing a candidate judge; two points were given if the executive can reject a candidate and choose any other candidate; and two points were given if there is no judicial review in case of non-appointment. DE: no data; IE: the government may appoint a person who is not on the list sent by the Judicial Appointments Advisory Board but in practice does not do so. The final appointment is made by the president, who cannot refuse; EL (admin): the final appointment is made by the president, who cannot refuse; LT: without advice from the Judicial Council, the President cannot appoint a judge; if the Judicial Council gives positive advice to the president, the president is free to adopt the final decision; If the Judicial Council gives negative advice to the president, then the president must follow this advice when adopting the final decision; LU: there is no binding text on this issue, but until now, the appointing authority has never rejected a candidate judge proposed for appointment by the Commission du recrutement et de la formation des attaches de justice; PL: whether the President has to give reasons and whether there is judicial review in case of non-appointment of judges is currently being examined by the Supreme Administrative Court; RO: the president can refuse the appointment of a senior judge or prosecutor only once. The reasoned refusal is sent to the Superior Council of Magistracy; SK: The president could possibly refuse to appoint a candidate judge but it has never happened; FI: if the president does not appoint the proposed candidate, he/she cannot choose another candidate but remit only once the appointment for further preparation; SE: if the government wants to appoint a candidate that the Judges Proposals Board did not submit, it is legally

Paragraph 44 of the Recommendation provides that decisions concerning the selection and career of judges should be based on objective criteria pre-established by law or by the competent authorities. Such decisions should be based on merit, having regard to the qualifications, skills and capacity required to adjudicate cases by applying the law while respecting human dignity. Paragraph 48 provides that an unsuccessful candidate should have the right to challenge the decision, or at least the procedure under which the decision was made.

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members were

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obliged seek a new opinion by the Board on that other candidate; UK(EN+WL) and UK(NI): the appointing authority referred is the Lord Chancellor (UK Minister of Justice), who recommends a candidate judge for formal appointment by the Queen; UK(SC): the appointing authority referred is the First Minister of Scotland, who recommends a candidate judge for formal appointment by the Queen. If the First Minister of Scotland were to reject a candidate judge, the proposing authority (Judicial Appointments Board for Scotland) may propose this candidate judge again to the First Minister.

Figure 58 presents who decides on the evaluation of judges and what criteria are used (e.g. quantitative, qualitative). The Recommendation provides that where judicial authorities establish systems for the assessment of judges, such systems should be based on objective criteria.⁹²

Figure 58: Individual evaluation of judges*⁹³

* For each Member State, two points were given if the evaluation was done by one authority or body and one point was given if this is a competence shared by two authorities/bodies. One point was given if a country uses quantitative and qualitative criteria, and two points were given if only quantitative criteria are used. UK (EN+WL): no data; EL: evaluation of criminal and civil judges is conducted by the Council for the Judiciary, and the evaluation of administrative judges is conducted by the judicial inspection body; IT: criminal and civil judges-qualitative and quantitative criteria are evaluated; administrative judges-quantitative criteria are evaluated.

Figure 59 shows whether the transfer of judges without their consent is allowed, if so, which authorities take the decision, the reasons for such transfers and whether it is possible to appeal against such a decision. The numbers indicate how many judges were transferred without consent in 2015 for organisational, disciplinary or other reasons, and how many appealed (if no number is given, there are no data available).⁹⁴

Paragraph 58 of the Recommendation provides that where judicial authorities establish systems for the assessment of judges, such systems should be based on objective criteria. These should be published by the competent judicial authority. The procedure should enable judges to express their view on their own activities and on the assessment of these activities, as well as to challenge assessments before an independent authority or a court.

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members were obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. Paragraph 52 of the Recommendation contains guarantees on the irremovability of judges. Judges should not be moved to another judicial office without consent, except in cases of disciplinary sanctions or reform of the

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Figure 59: Transfer of judges without their consent*⁹⁵ (irremovability of judges)

* BE: transfer for organisational reasons only within a court; CZ: a judge can be transferred only to the court of the same instance, the court one instance higher or lower (all within the same judicial district); DE: transfer for a maximum of three months and only in cases of representation; FR: Minister of Justice can transfer a judge for organisational reasons in the rare event such as the closure of a court or for legal reasons such as fixed-term appointments (for a court’s president or for specialised functions); HR: judges were transferred due to implementation of the judicial map reform; IT: three judges and two magistrates were transferred for disciplinary reasons by the CSM (civil and criminal courts’ council), who all appealed against the transfer; the CPGA (administrative courts' council) can transfer for disciplinary reasons only and did not transfer any judges; LT: temporary transfer in the event of an urgent need to ensure the proper functioning of the court; RO: only temporary transfers of up to a year, for disciplinary sanctions; FI: transfer in case of reorganisation of functions of public administration.

Figure 60 shows the authorities with the power to propose and take decision on the dismissal of judges at courts of first and second instance.⁹⁶ The upper part of each column indicates which authority takes the final decision⁹⁷ and the lower part shows – where relevant – which authority proposes dismissal or who must be consulted before a decision is taken. The numbers show how many judges (from all court instances) were dismissed in 2015 by a given body and how many appealed against dismissal (if no number is given, there are no data available).

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members were obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language. The height of the columns does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of the safeguards.

Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Recommendation require that national systems provide for safeguards regarding the dismissal of judges.

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Figure 60: Dismissal of judges at courts of 1^st and 2^nd instance*⁹⁸

Review of the dismissal before a Court / Constitutional Court / Other independent body

■ Decision by the Council for the Judiciary / by a Court

■ Decision by the Parliament

Decision by the Ministry of Justice / Prime Minister / Head of State

Proposal by either the Judiciary (Council for the Judiciary / Court) or by another independent body Proposal by Ministry of Justice / Prime Minister / Head of State / Chancellor of justice Proposal by the Parliament

■ Proposal by the Parliament / independent body / Ministry of Justice / Court possible

* The numbers indicate how many judges were dismissed in 2015 by particular body and how many appealed dismissal (no number indicates no data available). UK (EN+WL): no full-time salaried judges were dismissed. Only one part-time (fee-paid) tribunal judge was dismissed and fifteen non-salaried lay magistrates; In some countries, the executive has an obligation, either by law or practice, to follow the proposal of the Council for the Judiciary to dismiss a judge (e.g. ES and LT).

- Work of judicial networks -

European judicial networks⁹⁹ have continued with their examination on the legal safeguards for protecting judicial independence. In September 2016, a joint brainstorming on the quality and independence of justice systems with members of the ENCJ, NPSC and ACA-Europe took place during which the Commission encouraged these networks to develop the examination of the effectiveness of the safeguards for judicial independence. The ENCJ has advanced in this examination (e.g. on non-transferability of judges, on funding of the judiciary) and has carried out a new survey of judges (e.g. on judges’ perception of judicial independence, judges’ perception on whether appointments and promotions were based on the ability and experience of the judges). The results of this work will be presented later in 2017 and could feed future editions of the Scoreboard.

3.3.4 Summary on judicial independence

Judicial independence is a fundamental element of an effective justice system. It is vital for upholding the rule of law, the fairness of judicial proceedings and the trust of citizens and businesses in the legal system. For this reason, any justice reform should uphold the rule of law and comply with European standards on judicial independence. The Scoreboard shows trends in perceived judicial independence and information on legal safeguards to protect judges in certain situations where their independence may be at risk.

• The 2017 Scoreboard presents the developments in perceived independence from surveys of

Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. Responses from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary or are not ENCJ members were obtained through cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. The Member States appear in the alphabetical order of their geographical names in the original language. The height of the columns does not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of the safeguards. In particular, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSC), Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative

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citizens (Eurobarometer) and companies (Eurobarometer and World Economic Forum):

All surveys generally show similar results, particularly among the Member States with the lowest and the highest perceived judicial independence.

The WEF survey, presented for the fifth time, shows that the businesses’ perception of independence has improved or remained stable in more than two-thirds of Member States, both when compared with the previous year or since 2010. Compared to 2010, there were improvements in several Member States with a low level of perceived independence (Figure 55).

- Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, the interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most stated reason, followed by the pressure from economic or other specific interests. Both reasons are still notable for several Member States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 54 and 56).

- Among the reasons for good perception of independence of courts and judges, more than three-quarter of companies and of citizens (equivalent to 38 % or 44 % of all respondents, respectively) named the guarantees provided by the status and position of judges.

• The Scoreboard focuses on certain safeguards relating to the status of judges, from their appointment, their evaluation and possible transfer without consent, to their potential dismissal:

On the first appointment of judges at first instance courts, it appears that in a majority of Member States, the Council for the Judiciary or another independent body proposes the candidate judges for the appointment (Figure 56). In a majority of Member States, the executive power (e.g. the President of the Republic or other Head of State, Government, Minister of Justice) appoints judges and its discretion varies (Figure 57).

On the individual evaluation of judges (Figure 59), in all Member States, the evaluation is carried out either by the Council for the Judiciary, or by the court presidents (or other judges). While several Member States do not evaluate judges individually, the countries that do usually use both quantitative and qualitative criteria.

On the transfer of judges without their consent and the dismissal of judges at first and second instance courts, in nearly all Member States, judges transferred or dismissed can appeal or request a judicial review of the decision. The figures show that in nearly all Member States a low number of judges were dismissed or transferred without their consent and that most transfers were for organisational reasons (Figures 59 and 60).

4. CONCLUSIONS

After five editions, the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard shows progress: the effectiveness of justice systems has generally improved, a number of Member States have shown determination in engaging in justice reforms, the Council every year addressed recommendations to certain Member States, the judiciary has actively cooperated with the Commission and the European Parliament has supported EU actions in this area since the very beginning. Challenges remain and further efforts must be made to reap sustainable rewards for citizens. The rule of law and the future of Europe deserve these efforts.