Annexes to COM(2017)610 - Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks - Main contents

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dossier	COM(2017)610 - Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks.
document	COM(2017)610
date	October 18, 2017

Agreement withrisk-basedenhance detection capacities for customs inMember States (mid-customscooperation with other agencies to monitor2018) to establishcontrols tointernational supply chains in order to detect andcommon repositoryinterceptcontrol illicit entry of CBRN materials.of cargo information.dangerous CBRN materials at the borderCustoms DetectionRaise awareness of CBRN threat among customs and law enforcement, improve inter-agencyTechnology Project Group to explorecooperation and information-sharing between customs and other authorities, in line with thedetection capability for Biological and Chemical materialsEU Strategy and Action Plan for customs riskmanagement (COM (2014) 527)in international supply chains. Report by Mid 2018

Extend the Radiological/Nuclea r training for law enforcement, customs officers and other front line agents at

EUSECTRA¹⁶

training facility
1.3StrengthenPreventing external actors (state and non-state)Update the EU listsEU exportto access dual-use / CBRN items through tradeof CBRN high riskcontrolsmaterials in 2018 and assess the scope and nature of
13

14 15

16

Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) is the IAEA’s information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control. International Atomic Energy Agency.

Dual-use e-System (DUeS) is a secure electronic system hosted by the Commission for exchanging information among Member States. It has been fully operational since 2012 and it aims to improve the exchanges of denials of dual-use items between EU Member States. The main information processed covers the description of the goods under denial and the parties involved in the denials such as the Member States, the exporter, broker, consignee and end-user.

The European Nuclear Security Training Centre has been established to address concerns of theft of radioactive materials that could be associated with crime and acts of terrorism. It provides hands-on-training using real nuclear material to front line officers, trainers and other experts in the field. The

			technical interactions between "CBRN" and "dual-use" items
1.4	Address insider threats	Exchange best practices on vetting and background checks in facilities holding CBRN materials such as biological laboratories or nuclear facilities.	A mapping of existing vetting practices to be finalised by end 2017.

OBJECTIVE 2: ENSURING A MORE ROBUST PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE TO CBRN SECURITY INCIDENTS

FOR AND

Operational preparedness is crucial in order to effectively mitigate the impact of a CBRN attack or incident. Given the inherently cross-border and transnational nature of the CBRN threat, EU cooperation can add value by encouraging capacity building activities in the EU, such as cross-border cooperation in training, exercises and response, facilitating mutual assistance, providing guidance, promoting minimum standards across the Union, and where needed, funding for trans-national projects in this area.

The Commission has already organised numerous training sessions and exercises at the EU level focusing on cross-sectoral cooperation in case of CBRN attacks. For instance, the 2014 ARETE exercise focused on cooperation between law enforcement and civil protection in case of a complex chemical and terrorism situation including hostage-taking. Moreover the Commission funded a series of training courses organised in cooperation with the Member States' authorities on cross-sectoral response to a radiological dirty bomb attack. These initiatives were complemented by exercises organised in the civil protection area and trainings organised by Europol and CEPOL.

Further actions will build on these experiences and bring the various preparedness and response initiatives together in a coherent programme, maximising the training and exercise opportunities for Member States and enhancing consistency in Member States' approaches.

Additional actions facilitating multi-agency cooperation will be identified following the EU workshop on cooperation of first responders at the disaster scene following terrorist attacks, held in October 2017. In case of a major CBRN incident, the response will require the involvement of various stakeholders, including private actors, e.g. when it comes to ensuring that medical countermeasures are available.

The Commission therefore sets out the following priority actions that need to be taken in close cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders.

Commitment	Action	Deliverable and Timeframe
2.1	Strengthen EU CBRN preparedness	The Commission in cooperation with Member States will strengthen training and exercises for first responders from the law	A mapping of existing EU training activities by January

	sectorial	customs authorities and military partners.	EU Advisory Group
	training and	Training and exercises will be carried out	to consider
	exercises	through existing financial instruments and	additional needs by
		operational tools, in particular the Union's	Q2 2018
		Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM),	Roll-out of new training and
		CEPOL and the ISF-Police.
		The development of a common EU CBRN	exercises starting in
		training curriculum will be promoted in	Q4 2018
		close cooperation with EU Member States'	Conduct further
		experts.	exercises at EU level (similar to the ARETE exercise in 2014) in 2019
2.2	Strengthen the	In order to provide better support to Member	Assess gaps in the
	EU's response	States in the event of a major CBRN	field of CBRN
	capacity for	incident, Member States and the	disasters response in
	CBRN	Commission will continue strengthening the	2018.
	incidents under	existing European Emergency Response	Adaptation grants for registration/ certification of modules
	the EU civil	Capacity (EERC) of the UCPM, including
	protection mechanism	the EU Medical Corps. Encourage Member States to continue committing new CBRN capacities to the EERC.
		Support Member States in the process of registering and certifying CBRN modules and other capacities into the EERC.	Cross-sectorial table top exercises on
		business continuity
		planning during a
		Review the initial capacity goals in the field	pandemic (2018)
		of CBRN disasters.	Workshops on preparedness and
		Test cross-sectorial preparedness and response to pandemics.	International Health Regulations implementation and on best practices regarding entry and exit screening. Planned for 2017-2018.
2.3	Conduct a gap	In close cooperation with the CBRN	Initial gap analysis
	analysis on the	Advisory Group, the Commission will	report with
	detection of	examine the extent to which existing	recommendations by
	CBRN	detection equipment can detect CBRN	Q3-2018
	materials	materials. Results will feed into detection pool activities and work on standardisation.
2.4	Improve early	Re-engineer the Early Warning and	New platform to be
	warning and	Response System (EWRS) with a view to	ready by mid-2018
	response as	improving situational awareness and
	well as	incident management for serious cross
	information	border threats to health as well as to link

	serious cross-
	border threats
	to health¹⁷
2.5	Strengthen	Ensure rapid identification and	2015-2018
	preparedness	characterization and rapid sample sharing	Implementation by
	of laboratories in the EU	mechanisms; provide support to less equipped Member States.	Member States with Commission support
	against serious		in the framework of
	cross-border		the EMERGE Joint
	threats to		Action¹⁸ on Efficient
	health		response to highly dangerous and emerging pathogens at EU level.
2.6	Increase	Increase preparedness of Member States for	Joint procurement of
	preparedness	cross-border threats to health via joint	vaccines together
	of Member	procurement of medical countermeasures	with the Member
	States for	(based on Article 5 of Decision	States concerned;
	cross-border	1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border	2018 (preparations
	threats to	threats to health).	ongoing)
	health	Strengthen preparedness as well as actions at	2017-2020 (Joint
		points of entry (air, maritime and ground	Action in
		crossing.	preparation) 2017-2020 (Joint
		Member States and the Commission to	Action in
		develop a shared vision at EU level on how	preparation)
		to improving vaccine coverage in the EU,
		and start actions to strengthen vaccine
		supply and stock management, enhance the
		interoperability and interaction of
		immunisation information systems, improve
		vaccine confidence and tackle hesitancy, and
		increase the effectiveness of vaccine
		research and development at EU level.
2.7	Improving	Strengthen EU's cross-sectoral awareness on	Next edition of the
	awareness,	bio-risks arising from accidental or	course in Q2-2018
	preparedness	voluntary releases through training, such as	(further sessions to
	and response	the joint European Centre for Disease	be arranged as
	to bio-risks,	Prevention and Control (ECDC)/Europol	needed)
	including	course on “Cross-sectoral biorisk awareness
	emerging	and mitigation training” for health

17 As defined in the Article 2 of the Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health: 1.

threats of biological origin (communicable diseases; antimicrobial resistance and healthcare-associated infections related to communicable diseases (hereinafter ‘related special health issues’); biotoxins or other harmful biological agents not related to communicable diseases; 2. threats of chemical origin; 3. threats of environmental origin; 4. threats of unknown origin; 5. events which may constitute public health emergencies of international concern under the IHR, provided that they fall under one of the categories of threats set out in points (a) to (d).

	threats	emergency services, law enforcement and civil protection. Support Member States in their fight against bioterrorism, including elaboration of national preparedness strategies for bioterrorism issues via development – in collaboration with network of experts from Member States – of an EU focussed handbook on bioterrorism threats. ECDC will help Member States raise awareness and exchange best practices as regards "Do it yourself" (DIY) biology, including amateur experimentation, use of biological agents and genetic engineering techniques outside laboratory environments and by non-trained individuals and risks for biosafety and biosecurity¹⁹.	Development of the handbook by Q3 2018 Awareness raising material on risks related to emerging biotechnologies The activity will start in Q3 2017 and will continue in Q4 2017 – Q1 2018
2.8	CBRN detection pool of Member States' experts	Extend the explosives detection pool²⁰ to CBRN experts with a view to assist Member States with e.g. securing large scale events. Activities of the detection pool will be based – among others - on the guidance material developed for the protection of public spaces.	Training for detection pool experts – Q3-2018 with a view to be operational in 2019.
2.9	Reinforce nuclear security capacities and networks	Promote full use of European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) for joint trainings in radiological and nuclear detection.	Customs Training campaign phase-2 at EUSECTRA to be launched in Q4 -2017
2.10	Enhance cooperation in the area of nuclear forensics	The scope and comprehensiveness of nuclear forensic capabilities vary significantly with only a few Member States being able to perform in-depth examination of nuclear and radioactive material. Most Member States rely only on core capabilities, which are complemented by the more advanced ones offered i.a. by the Commission's Joint Research Centre.	Develop legal framework for using the Commission services capability in the nuclear forensics domain – by the end of 2018

19 Commercially available "do-it-yourself" bio-kits make it possible for a user to produce genetically modified microorganisms. Progress in this area may lead to intentional attack or accidental contamination with modified viruses or bacteria. See also: European Centre for Disease Control, Rapid Risk Assessment: Risk related to the use of ‘do-it-yourself’ CRISPR-associated gene engineering kit contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/rapid-risk-assessment-risk-related-use-do-it-yourself-crispr-associated-gene.

20 The pool was introduced in the 2015 EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives (COM(2015) 624 final) with an aim to provide Member States operational support in the

The Commission will further develop the legal framework (agreements with Member States) for using these Commission services and to provide - both general and advanced -training to Member States in this area.

OBJECTIVE 3: BUILDING STRONGER INTERNAL-EXTERNAL LINKS AND ENGAGEMENT IN CBRN SECURITY WITH KEY REGIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL EU PARTNERS

CBRN threats can arise from both inside and outside the Union. Working beyond the Union as well as building stronger partnerships and closer internal-external security links are an inherent part of the EU's strategy to counter-terrorism and CBRN risks. The call for a more “joined-up Union” between the internal and external dimensions of security policies is a key priority in the EU Global Strategy²¹and in the context of the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration .

CBRN security needs to be mainstreamed in the EU's external action, through the development of capacities in third countries (notably in neighbouring countries), enhancing cooperation with strategic partners as well as specialised international organisations, such as Interpol, IAEA, OPCW building on the renewed commitment of the UN Security Council to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. There is also a need to develop closer links between activities undertaken within the framework of EU CBRN Centres of Excellence. In this regard, priority should be given to the EU Neighbourhood countries.

The Commission therefore sets out the following priority actions that need to be taken in close cooperation with Member States and other stakeholders.

Commitment	Action	Deliverable and
			Timeframe
3.1	Develop	Deepen cooperation with strategic partners	In the context of the
	CBRN	experienced with CBRN:	existing CBRN
	security	(1) sharing of information on CBRN threat	dialogue, hold a
	cooperation	and risks;	workshop on
	with key		security of
	international	(2) exchange of best practices;	radioactive sources
	partners, including in the context of	(3) joint trainings or exercises. Discuss on a regular basis CBRN security in the CT/Security dialogues with relevant third	with the United States – Q2-2018 EU-US workshop on
	CT/Security dialogues	countries, with a view to identify possible cooperation and capacity-building actions.	joint criminal-epidemiological investigations – Q4-

22 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And

Security Policy. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

			2018 Invite strategic partners to dedicated sessions of the CBRN Security Advisory Group, where appropriate.
3.2	Develop cooperation with NATO on CBRN related issues	Work towards closer cooperation with NATO in relation to third countries, notably in the fields of: (1) information exchange; (2) capacity building; (3) training; (4) exercises. Develop synergies with NATO on how counter-terrorism may benefit from defence capability development inter alia in the areas of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), and Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In cooperation with the NATO-accredited CBRN Centre of Excellence design tailor made training modules for EU CBRN Centre of Excellence partners.	EU-NATO workshop – Q1/2-2018. Common trainings, e.g. in NATO-accredited CBRN CoE (Q4 2017) and envisaged for 2018/ 2019/2020 2018, based on lessons learned from first rounds of common trainings.
3.	Develop cooperation with specialised international organisations	The EEAS and Commission will engage with specialised multilateral organisations (Interpol, IAEA, OPCW²², BWC ISU²³, UNODA²⁴) to share best practices and look for synergies notably in the field of information sharing and capacity-building in third countries.	Regularly invite these organisations to the CBRN Security Advisory group as well as trainings and exercises

OBJECTIVE 4: ENHANCING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CBRN RISKS

CBRN is a technically complex and rapidly developing area which needs close monitoring. At present, CBRN expertise is distributed unevenly within the European Union and spread across many different governmental, academic and private actors. An EU-wide framework is needed to bring relevant actors together, to build partnerships across these sectors, collectively identify further needs and harness the benefits of

EU

Research.

4.1 Creation of an EU CBRN security network

22 23

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon. Biological Weapons Convention – Implementation Support Unit.

To improve coordination at EU level, an EU CBRN security network will pool together all CBRN actors at both strategic (policy-making) and operational levels to overcome the fragmentation of efforts. It will bring together Member States, EU institutions and relevant agencies, and where appropriate key international partners and the private sector. The network will rely on three pillars: 1) an advisory group bringing together all CBRN security coordinators of the MS, 2) a support network composed of existing CBRN centres across the EU and 3) a CBRN knowledge hub set up in the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in Europol.

Its objectives will be to (1) maintain a comprehensive and updated understanding of CBRN risks coming from inside and outside EU and to support the formulation of policies and initiatives to address identified gaps; (2) develop cooperation and coordination at operational level (e.g. information exchange, exchange of best practices); and (3) facilitate civil-military cooperation in areas which are mutually beneficial.

Commitment

4.1.1

Set up a

dedicated

Advisory

Group on EU

CBRN

Security

Action

Member States to appoint national CBRN Security Coordinators, as primary points of contact in Member States for the

implementation of the EU CBRN Security Action Plan.

Building upon the previous CBRN advisory group, which was created under the 2010-2015 Action Plan with the mandate of overseeing its implementation, the

Commission will set up a new dedicated Advisory Group on EU CBRN Security for the purposes of the present Action Plan, bringing together Member States CBRN Security Coordinators, the Commission and relevant EU agencies, the European External Action Service and other relevant public and private CBRN stakeholders, which will:

(1) regularly review and analyse the evolving CBRN threats and risks (in cooperation with INTCEN and Europol);

(2) identify gaps in CBRN prevention, detection, preparedness and response measures, and advise on new policy initiatives to address those gaps;

(3) map existing centres of expertise and identify collaborative arrangements to encourage synergies and complementarity.

Deliverable and Timeframe

A list of coordinators in all Member States by December 2017.

A first meeting of the Advisory Group by January 2018 and periodically (2-3 meetings /year) afterwards

A first gap analysis by April 2018 and to be reviewed periodically

A regular and systematic exchange of good practices on identified risks and gaps

A first mapping of existing centres of expertise by May 2018.

	Support Network	of expertise and networks will feed into the CBRN Security Advisory Group in: (1) developing a EU expert support structure (in close cooperation with Europol) which can provide guidance and advice also on technical and scientific issues to Member States and EU institutions on CBRN security, including during incidents; (2) facilitating the identification and dissemination of good practices and lessons learned; (3) sharing expertise and liaising with existing CBRN centres of excellence in Europe and outside. Interested Member States will be asked to identify by December 2017 structures which could feed into an EU CBRN Support Network.	CBRN project proposals under ISF-Police by October 2017²⁵ A fully operational Network by summer 2018
4.1.3	Europol (ECTC) to develop a knowledge hub on CBRN	Europol (ECTC) to develop its existing CBRN team into a knowledge hub to support law enforcement authorities on CBRN security, including weapons and threats: (1) supplying analytical products on CBRN threats and incidents; (2) facilitating cooperation and exchange of information (notably via EBDS, and networks such as EEODN²⁶) between law enforcement and other actors (including military), as well as with its network of international partners; (3) organising training (in cooperation with CEPOL); (4) providing operational support and deploying CBRN expertise to support investigation of CBRN incidents	Optimise the use of existing Europol capabilities to enhance collective knowledge on CBRN threats Systematic sharing of CBRN-relevant information via EBDS Deploy CBRN expertise to assist investigations

4.2 Harnessing the benefits of EU

security research

Exploiting better EU security research via dissemination activities for research results, as well as via ensuring that research activities respond to the operational needs in the area of CBRN.

25 The call for proposals will support implementation of this Action Plan as well as the EU Action Plan on the protection of public spaces as well as the Commission Recommendation on the implementation of Regulation 98/2013. The call can support – among others - developing an EU expert support structure or regional networks, which will later be part of the Support Network.

26 European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN) is a network of bomb technicians and CBRN experts managed by Europol. The network allows its members sharing of best practices and lessons learned as well as common trainings. EEODN organises yearly conferences combined with

The Commission will extend the testing of equipment, encourage harmonisation of standards and support the development of shared capacities via its extended detection pool of experts.

Commitment	Action	Deliverable and
			Timeframe
4.2.1	Support the	Further develop the Platform of the Community	2018 CoU planning
	dissem inati	of Users on Secure, Safe and Resilient Societies	to be presented in
	on and take-	(CoU), which gathers researchers, policy	November 2017,
	up of	makers, industry/SME representatives and	covering 18 thematic
	research	practitioners including first responders, to	workshops,
	results	translate research outcomes into practical	including 6 CBRN-
		action.	related topics like
		Increase the dissemination of research results	chemical hazards or
		and promote information exchanges to enhance	water safety and security. The
		the dialogue among different actors, in the
		CBRN area, and provide regular update about	workshops will
		research outputs also in the context of the EU	provide an annual
		CBRN Security Advisory group and its support	update on ongoing
		network	research and capacity building activities and identify future priorities Mapping report of H2020 projects covering the 2014-2016 calls to be finalised by December 2017 Regularly publish results from CBRN research projects via the EU CBRN security network
4.2.2	Identify	Ensure that research projects focus on the needs	Continuous dialogue
	further	of end-users in the CBRN area	in the various EU
	research		fora, such as the
	needs and		CBRN advisory
	address	Prioritise research efforts to:	group, New actions
	emerging CBRN	(1) provide solutions on how to mitigate emerging CBRN threats, such as UAS or bio-	under the Horizon 2020 2017 call
	threats	hacking;	New CBRN projects
		(2) enhance Member States' disaster risk reduction capacities, from	selected from the call 2017 starting in
		preparation/preparedness, monitoring to	Q1-2018
		response and recovery.	A CBRN security call for proposals in Q2-2018

harmonisati on through standardisat ion and certification for CBRN security products and systems

equipment with a view to propose areas for standardisation. This work will also help inform practitioners on equipment performance and provide training to the detection pool experts.

Continue pre-normative research activities within the framework of the Commission's European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection²⁷ with an aim to develop CEN²⁸ Workshop Agreements; identify CBRN areas in which mandates to CEN can be launched and launch new calls in support of CBRN standardisation under Horizon 2020.

of performance testing of CBRN detection equipment in MS and identify standardisation needs prone to mandates to CEN by the end of 2018.

Calls for standardisation-related research in Q2-2018 and Q2-2019

CONCLUSIONS

In light of the evolving threats, Europe needs to pool resources and expertise to develop innovative, sustainable and effective solutions. Cooperation efforts across the EU along the lines set out in this Action Plan can result in significant security gains and lead to tangible results.

The proposals set out in this Communication will pave the way for a more effective and focused EU cooperation in the protection, preparedness and response against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. The Commission encourages Member States to take advantage of the various opportunities set out in this Communication, and invites the European Parliament and the Council to endorse this action plan and to actively engage in its implementation, in close cooperation with all relevant stakeholders. The Commission will review progress at the latest after two years.

27 The European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP) is the Commission

co-financed project coordinated by Joint Research Centre aiming at providing a framework within which experimental facilities and laboratories will share knowledge and expertise in order to harmonise test protocols throughout Europe, leading to better protection of critical infrastructures against all types of threats and hazards and to the creation of a single market for security solutions. Three of the working groups deal with CBRN threats: chemical and biological risks to drinking water; detection of indoor airborne chemical-biological agents and radiological and nuclear threats to critical infrastructure.