Annexes to COM(2020)733 - Implementation of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation

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agreement in place with the Commission for the transfer of data from the Internal Occurrence Reporting System (IORS) to the ECR, to ensure full compliance and coverage.

Access to information stored in the ECR – Articles 10, 11 and 12

Articles 10, 11 and 12 stipulate the arrangements for access to the information stored in the ECR. Those provisions are fully implemented by the Commission, which is responsible for the processing of data stored in the ECR, and by the Member States (so called “points of contact”) who assist the Commission in relation to the requests for information stored in the ECR.

Since the Regulation’s entry into force until 31 December 2019, there were total of 86 requests for information based on Article 11 of the Regulation out of which six were refused on various grounds.

Occurrence analysis and follow up – Articles 13 and 14

Similar to requirements for reporting, some requirements for the analysis were already in place prior to the entry into force of the Regulation as part of safety management requirements. The provisions of the Regulation, as also stated in the guidance material for the Regulation 12 , are not intended to create another analysis requirement alongside the safety management requirements, but serve the purpose of reinforcing the need for the analytical processes to be carried out. The overall situation has therefore not changed much, except for the introduction of strict timelines.

As regards the point on strict timelines, there is no evidence suggesting that the 30-days deadline for the preliminary analysis of occurrences by the organisations, laid down in Article 13(4) and 13(5) is generally not complied with. However, many industry stakeholders noted that the timeline of 30 days for providing the preliminary analysis of the occurrences to the competent authority is too short. Moreover, the Regulation also sets a deadline of three months from the initial report for the organisations to submit their final analysis. Regulation, however, allows for the possible extension of that deadline if duly justified 13 .

At Member State level the Regulation requires the monitoring of the analysis by organisations which they oversee, as well as the carrying out their own analysis of occurrences directly reported to them. On the basis of their analysis, they are expected to determine any appropriate corrective or preventive action required to improve aviation safety, and use information obtained from the analysis of occurrence reports to identify remedial action. Similar to organisations, the competent authorities in the Member States all have processes in place to analyse occurrences. However, there are differences in the degree to which analyses are carried out and the depth of these analyses. The main reasons for this are concerns about the clarity of the requirements for analysis at national level, as well as a lack of resources. Furthermore, some Member States noted a degree of ‘imbalance’ between the requirements for analysis laid down by the Regulation and the degree of details included in the requirements for reporting, collecting, processing and storing occurrences. This imbalance leads to a high workload associated with the collecting and processing of occurrence reports and leaves little time for the analysis and follow-up.

At the EU level, there are two streams of analysis: EASA’s analysis of occurrences reported directly to the Agency by organisations for which EASA acts as a competent authority (based on occurrences stored in EASA’s own database) and a collaborative analysis done together with Member States. Those analyses result in the publication of the EASA Annual Safety Reviews and in the development of Safety Risk Portfolios (SRPs), which are used in the publication of the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).

The EASA Annual Safety Review is produced by the Safety Intelligence and Performance Department of EASA and is based on the data contained both in EASA’s own Occurrence Database as well as data contained in the ECR. As part of its risk management process, the Agency also defines and implements appropriate actions, which are subject to a continuous monitoring.

EASA works with a range of collaborative partners through two main platforms: the Network of Analysts (NoA) 14 and the Collaborative Analysis Groups (CAGs) 15 . The NoA is set up by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 and pulls together data from different Member States to get a more general picture of safety hazards faced by the EU as a whole. The CAGs are expert groups set up by EASA that are responsible for analysing the safety of European aviation for specific aviation domains. They review available safety information, arrange in depth safety analyses and identify emerging issues. They also monitor the safety performance of their domain and provide feedback on the effectiveness of actions taken. Both systems are complementary because they provide analysis at different levels and they contribute to the Safety Risk Portfolios and to the safety actions which may be adopted in the EPAS.

It can therefore be determined that the implementation of the Regulation has played a significant part in enhancing the analytical capability of occurrences throughout the Union, and consequently also in determining appropriate mitigating measures where needed. Although considerable progress was noted, the analytical process is one likely to benefit from more effort at the Member State level and further technological developments.

Confidentiality and appropriate use of information and protection of the information source – Articles 15 and 16

The implementation of the Regulation’s provisions related to “just culture” and the protection and appropriate use of the source of information was closely analysed. While it was found that all Member States and majority of the organisations put in place processes to ensure anonymization of occurrence reports, the issue with traceability – i.e. the possibility to infer the persons concerned in an occurrence report based on the circumstances described in the report – remains, especially in the smaller organisations with less employees.

Article 16(11) lays down an obligation for the organisations to adopt internal “just culture” 16 rules. The available information is not conclusive on whether this requirement has been fully implemented by all organisations.

The most significant shortcoming in the implementation of the Regulation was found in relation to the obligation laid down in Article 16(12) for the Member States to designate a body responsible for the implementation of the “just culture” principles. Based on the reviews of the reports on the functioning of the “just culture bodies” submitted by the Member States in accordance with Article 16(13) and additional information received from citizens, the Commission identified 11 Member States that failed to designate a “just culture body” responsible for the implementation of paragraphs 6, 9 and 11 of Article 16. As a consequence, the Commission opened infringement cases and sent out 10 Letters of Formal Notice and one Reasoned Opinion to the non-compliant Member States 17 . The Commission also sent out a number of EU Pilots to the Member States that stated in their reports to have designated a “just culture body” but where there were still doubts as to whether such body has the competencies to discharge the function envisaged in the Regulation.

On the other hand, at the industry level, the European social partners, members of the sectoral social dialogue committee for civil aviation (CANSO, ETF, ATCEUC), have jointly agreed on the “ATM Just culture tool box” 18 . It targets staff and managers within organisations providing air traffic management / air navigation services and sets guiding principles for implementing just culture and fostering a healthy and open reporting culture.

3.CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND RELATED FATALITIES

The general objective of the Regulation is to contribute to the reduction in the number of aircraft accidents and fatalities through a proactive approach resulting from the specific objectives detailed in the preceding sections.

The degree to which the Regulation has directly contributed to an actual decrease in the number of accidents and fatalities in civil aviation has proven difficult to measure, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The data recorded by EASA show that between 2010 and 2018 19 the number of accidents involving the European operators has decreased in average terms. The decrease is even more evident when put into perspective with the continuous increase in air traffic in the same period. The rate of accidents has continuously decreased since 2014, while the rate of serious incidents stabilised after a peak in 2016.

The analysis of a counterfactual scenario, i.e. the scenario where the Regulation would not have been adopted, suggests that in the absence of the Regulation, the rate of civil aviation accidents in Europe would have followed a constant trend after the third quarter of 2015 (after the Regulation entered into force). After the entry into force of the Regulation, there has been a decrease in the accident rate, from 3.5 accidents per 1 million flights to 1.3 accidents per 1 million flights post-intervention.

It has, however, not proven possible to do a retroactive prediction, with certainty, of the safety situation and the number of accidents and other safety related occurrences that would have occurred in the absence of the Regulation. It also needs to be noted that the various elements of the aviation safety system - aiming at the prevention of accidents and serious incidents - are closely interlinked and therefore it would be extremely difficult to single out the effect of just one of its features – i.e. the occurrence reporting, analysis and follow-up.

Nevertheless, given that the Regulation contributed to the increase of the number of occurrence reports stored in the ECR, which in turn might have had contributed to the improvement of safety awareness and identification of safety risks, it may be ascertained that the Regulation has likely made a certain contribution to the reduction of the total number of accidents.

4.CONCLUSION

Overall, all its subjects – i.e. the Commission, EASA, the EU Member States and the organisations - have implemented Regulation (EU) No 376/2014. Nonetheless, some shortcomings in the implementation of some of the Regulation’s provisions were identified. Most notably, a significant portion of the Member States failed to designate a “just culture body” in accordance with the Regulation, which resulted in infringement cases being launched by the Commission.

On the other hand, the successful implementation of the Regulation’s requirements on the establishment of mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting systems resulted in a notable increase in the number of occurrences collected since the Regulation’s entry into force. In addition, the implementation of the provisions on the establishment and management of the European Central Repository resulted in a comprehensive database containing occurrence reports from all EU Member States. More occurrence reports to be analysed then in turn allowed identification of potential safety hazards, particularly at the Member State and EASA levels. Consequently, it can be concluded that the Regulation, since its entry into force, has to some extent contributed to the reduction of accidents and related fatalities in the EU.


(1) Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007, OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 18, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/oj .
(2) “Ex-post evaluation of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation – Final Report”, not yet published.
(3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 of 29 June 2015 laying down a list classifying occurrences in civil aviation to be mandatorily reported according to Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 163, 30.6.2015, p. 1, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/1018/oj .
(4) Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2003 on occurrence reporting in civil aviation, OJ L 167, 4.7.2003, p. 23, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/42/oj .
(5) COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER: Impact Assessment Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on occurrence reporting in civil aviation, SWD/2012/0441 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0441.
(6) https://www.aviationreporting.eu/AviationReporting/.
(7) ‘organisation’ means any organisation providing aviation products and/or which employs, contracts or uses the services of persons required to report occurrences in accordance with Article 4(6). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Art 2(8).
(8) European Co-ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems.
(9) Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Arts 8 and 10.
(10) EU Member States (including the United Kingdom, until 1 February 2020), Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland.
(11) Bearing Point, “Impact Assessment of ECCAIRS transition from JRC to EASA”, 12 June 2017.
(12) European Commission, “Guidance Material - Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 and its implementing rules” (2015) https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/safety/doc/guidancematerial376.pdf .
(13) Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Art 13(4).
(14) The NoA comprises EASA, the European Commission, EASA Members States and an observer. It was initially formed as a voluntary network to support the analysis of safety data for the European Aviation Safety Plan, which is the predecessor to the EPAS, in 2011. The implementation of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 has formalised the role of the NoA and underscored the importance of safety analysis in supporting the EPAS and improvement of aviation safety in Europe. The NoA currently meets twice a year and on ad-hoc basis whenever is needed. Source: https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/safety-management/safety-risk-management  
(15) The CAGs consist of groups of industry stakeholders of EASA’s regulatory partners. Each CAG meets up to three times per year. There are currently six different CAGs: (1) aerodrome and ground handling; (2) air traffic management; (3) balloons; (4) commercial air transport aeroplanes; (5) general aviation; (6) human factors. Source: https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/safety-management/safety-risk-management
(16) ‘just culture’ means a culture in which front-line operators or other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated. Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Art 2(12).
(17) The Reasoned Opinion was closed as the State provided the evidenced that the Just Culture Body was designated with the necessary competences to execute its function under Article 16(12) of the Regulation. The rest of the cases are still pending.
(18) https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?mode=dsw&docId=11897&langId=en.
(19) EASA, ‘Annual Safety Review 2020’ (2020) https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/easa_asr_2020.pdf ;
EASA, ‘ Annual Safety Review 2019’ (2019) https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/Annual%20Safety%20Review%202019.pdf ;
EASA, ‘Annual Safety Review 2018’ (2018) https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/218639_EASA_ASR_MAIN_REPORT_2018.pdf .