Recommendation 2017/1584 - Coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises - Main contents
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Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017 on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crisesLegal instrument | Recommendation |
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Number legal act | Recommendation 2017/1584 |
CELEX number i | 32017H1584 |
Document | 13-09-2017; Date of adoption |
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Publication in Official Journal | 19-09-2017; OJ L 239 p. 36-58 |
19.9.2017 |
EN |
Official Journal of the European Union |
L 239/36 |
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (EU) 2017/1584
of 13 September 2017
on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 292 thereof,
Whereas:
(1) |
The use of and dependence on information and communication technologies have become fundamental aspects in all sectors of economic activity as our companies and citizens are more interconnected and interdependent across sectors and borders than ever before. A cybersecurity incident affecting organisations in more than one Member State or even the entire Union with potential serious disruptions to the internal market and more broadly to the network and information systems on which the Union economy, democracy and society rely is a scenario that Member States and EU institutions have to be well-prepared for. |
(2) |
A cybersecurity incident may be considered a crisis at Union level when the disruption caused by the incident is too extensive for a concerned Member State to handle on its own or when it affects two or more Member States with such a wide-ranging impact of technical or political significance that it requires timely coordination and response at Union political level. |
(3) |
Cybersecurity incidents can trigger a broader crisis, impacting sectors of activity beyond network and information systems and communication networks; any appropriate response must rely upon both cyber and non-cyber mitigation activities. |
(4) |
Cybersecurity incidents are unpredictable, often occur and evolve within very short periods of time and therefore affected entities and those with responsibilities as regards responding to and mitigating the effects of the incident must coordinate their response quickly. Furthermore, cybersecurity incidents are often not contained with any specific geographical area and may occur simultaneously or spread instantly across many countries. |
(5) |
An effective response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at the EU level requires swift and effective cooperation amongst all relevant stakeholders and relies on the preparedness and capabilities of individual Member States as well as coordinated joint action supported by Union capabilities. Timely and effective response to incidents relies therefore on the existence of previously established and, to the extent possible, well-rehearsed cooperation procedures and mechanisms having clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of the key actors at national and Union level. |
(6) |
In its conclusions (1) on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection of 27 May 2011, the Council invited the EU Member States to ‘strengthen collaboration among Member States and contribute, on the basis of national crisis management experiences and results and in cooperation with ENISA to the development of European cyber incident cooperation mechanisms to be tested in the framework of the next Cyber Europe exercise in 2012’. |
(7) |
The 2016 Communication ‘Strengthening Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry’ (2) encouraged Member States to make the most out of the NIS Directive (3) cooperation mechanisms and to enhance cross-border cooperation related to preparedness for a large-scale cyber incident. It added that a coordinated approach to crisis cooperation across the various elements of the cyber ecosystem to be set out in a ‘blueprint’ would increase preparedness and that such a blueprint should also ensure synergies and coherence with existing crisis management mechanisms. |
(8) |
In the Council Conclusions (4) on the aforementioned Communication, Member... |
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