Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2013)796 - Amendment of Regulation 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities and cooperation with the Commission on customs and agricultural matters - Main contents
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| dossier | COM(2013)796 - Amendment of Regulation 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities and cooperation with the ... |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2013)796  |
| date | 25-11-2013 |
Action against breach of customs legislation is integral to the protection of the Union’s financial interests and to the development of customs cooperation.
Customs legislation may be breached by various practices such as misdescription of imported goods so as to take advantage of lower duties, or by misdeclaration of the origin of the goods in order to circumvent anti-dumping levies and/or to avoid quantitative import limitation quotas, or by misuse of the transit system, when the goods effectively imported are declared as being in transit in order to evade the applicable customs duties.
To combat these breaches of customs legislation extensive exchange of information is required in the framework of cooperation both between Member States and between the Member States and the Commission. While such cooperation has already been successful, a number of areas have been identified where further action is necessary, mainly as regards the functioning of the antifraud system in the customs field and the improvement of customs risk management at national and Union levels i.
The main legal instruments applying to breaches of customs legislation in this context are Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, and Council Decision 2009/917/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the use of information technology for customs purposes.
Regulation (EC) No 515/97 governs issues relating to the customs union which is an area of the exclusive EU competence according to Article 3(1)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Council Decision 2009/917/JHA addresses matters relating to the area of freedom, security and justice which according to Article 4(2)(j) of TFEU is an area of shared competence between the Union and the Member States.
On this basis, the Commission created an IT structure, the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS), for the implementation of the relevant legislation, which includes databases for customs issues and for issues related to cooperation in the law enforcement field.
1.3.1. The need to address loopholes in the existing systems for the detection of customs-related fraud
There are various duties, taxes, rates and quantitative limits which have to be respected by traders operating legitimately in the EU. The financial gains to be had from avoidance of these charges constitute an incentive to commit fraud such as misdeclaration of origin, misdescription of goods and misuse of the transit system. This risk is even greater since the existing systems for the detection of customs fraud are still not sufficiently developed and the means of checking the true origin of imported goods are currently limited. In particular, it is not possible for customs officers to verify whether the declared origin of goods is consistent with the route followed by the container transporting the goods. The information on container movements (Container Status Messages - CSMs) is considered crucial for detecting cases of misdeclaration of origin. The current system for the detection of misdescription of goods is also unsatisfactory. In this context, the identification of suspicious cases by customs authorities is based on notifications that may be received from various sources (for example other customs authorities or economic operators) and risk analysis based on limited data. The main drawback of this procedure is that the controls are still not sufficiently targeted as they are based on analyses of limited data. Similarly, gaps exist in the system for the detection of misuse of the transit system. The procedure currently used for the verification of goods in transit consists of document checking and physical controls. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of these methods are limited by the available resources and by limitations in the scope and quality of data available for automated risk analysis and targeting of controls. To effectively target instances of misdeclaration of origin, misdescription of goods and misuse of the transit system, it is appropriate to use automated and scientific risk analysis methods for identification of suspect shipments. The Commission believes that these methods can be more effectively and efficiently implemented when supported by systematic availability of high-quality and timely data on CSMs, imports, exports and transit at national and EU levels.
1.3.2. The need to enhance customs risk management and supply chain security at national and EU levels
The need to establish an equivalent level of customs controls for goods brought into/ taken out of the customs territory of the Union is recognised, alongside the need to introduce a Union-wide risk management framework to support a common approach. In that context, Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 amending the Community Customs Code provides for the common risk management framework which has been implemented by the Commission and the Member States. In its Communication on Customs Risk Management and Security of the Supply Chain i, the Commission identified a number of strategic implementation challenges. Of particular importance are the difficulties caused by gaps in the availability and quality of data for pre-arrival screening for safety and security risks. The Communication emphasises that provision by traders of quality data and its availability to the authorities involved in risk management at the appropriate level is a major priority. In this context, the collection of CSMs and their integration in pre-arrival risk analysis can make a vital contribution to enhancing the supply chain security in general and to the work of the Commission and the Member States in managing the risks identified in Article 4 (25) of the Community Customs Code, including the threats posed to the Union’s security and safety, to public health, to the environment and to consumers.
As a result of the recent introduction of e-Customs, the documents supporting import and export declarations (invoice, certificate of origin, etc.) are kept by the economic operators and no longer by the customs administrations. Importantly, these documents are often necessary for OLAF to conduct its investigations. The current procedure used by OLAF to obtain those documents is to send a request to the Member States. However, such a system is inefficient because, as previously mentioned, the Member States are no longer in possession of relevant information and thus they have to request it from the economic operators before forwarding it to the Commission. This causes a loss of time before the documents become available to OLAF. There is currently no provision in the legal framework which could be used to accelerate procedures relating to OLAF investigations.
The AFIS IT system is currently underused because Member States are not able to select the potential users of the information they insert in the system. Consequently, protection of the Union's financial interests and customs cooperation are sub-optimal and unnecessarily obstructed. There is thus a need for technical clarification that data inserted by the owners can be restricted to particular users. A provision in the Regulation clearly enabling data owners to restrict visibility to specific users would considerably increase the exchange of information and improve further the possibility to prevent, detect and investigate customs-related fraud. In addition, restricted visibility protects confidentiality and therefore improves the level of confidence in the system. The ability to shield sensitive data would lead to increased willingness to share information within the AFIS system. Moreover the restricted visibility feature would enable the Commission to improve data management, making it possible to store, update and search for information thus far only exchanged.
In line with the current legislation, two different bodies (i.e. European Data Protection Supervisor – EDPS and Customs Joint Supervisory Authority – CJSA) carry out audits. There are cases where a lack of coordination between these bodies leads to diverging recommendations causing inefficient use of resources in the Commission and Member States. The implementation process is prolonged because it is necessary to accommodate the recommendations of both the EDPS and CJSA. This causes inefficiency and generates additional costs in terms of time and resources. Carrying out the recommendations can continue even one year after the audit took place. Closer collaboration between the two supervisory bodies is therefore necessary.
Another issue in the area of data protection which needs to be further clarified is the responsibility for the technical systems established by the Commission on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 515/97. Currently, the Commission is providing Member States with technical assistance, training, communication activity and other operational support by means of technical systems. However, the responsibility for data protection supervision with regard to those technical systems has not been specifically assigned. For this reason, the proposal clarifies the EDPS' competence.
1.3.6. The need for clarification on the admissibility of evidence collected under mutual assistance
Currently, national prosecutors are reluctant to use documents obtained via mutual assistance channels as evidence in criminal proceedings because the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 515/97 are not sufficiently clear on such a possibility. This inevitably causes delays in national criminal proceedings or may even result in the dismissal of a case due to time barring. Importantly, it also undermines the principle of legal certainty, given that relevant provisions of Regulation (EC) No 515/97 are subject to differing interpretations. It appears necessary to clarify that the evidence obtained via mutual assistance may be used by prosecutors in the national criminal proceedings. The proposal does not oblige national courts to accept such evidence automatically as it still has to satisfy the national procedural rules.
1.3.7. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office
The Commission recently proposed the setting up of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Given the associated changes in the investigation and prosecution of crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests, the Commission should assess the need for revision of the current Regulation once the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is established. In that event, all national authorities of the Member States and all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union must immediately inform the European Public Prosecutor’s Office of any conduct which might constitute an offence within its competence. In accordance with the draft Regulation establishing the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the latter will have access to the databases operated by the Commission or the Member States under this Regulation.
In order to address the above shortcomings, it appears necessary to amend Regulation (EC) No 515/97.
Contents
- RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
- BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
- 1.1. General context
- 1.2. Legal context
- 1.3. Specific issues
- 1.3.1. The need to address loopholes in the existing systems for the detection of customs-related fraud
- 1.3.2. The need to enhance customs risk management and supply chain security at national and EU levels
- 1.3.3. The need to address delays in OLAF investigations
- 1.3.4. The need for clarification on the possibility to restrict visibility of data
- 1.3.5. The need for streamlined data protection supervision
- 1.3.6. The need for clarification on the admissibility of evidence collected under mutual assistance
- 1.4. Proposed solution
- 2.1. Consultations with stakeholders
- 2.1.2. Shipping companies - World Shipping Council
- 2.1.3. Data Protection Supervisors
- 2.2. Impact assessment
- 3.1. The legal basis
- 3.2. Subsidiarity, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights
- 3.2.1. Subsidiarity and proportionality
- 3.2.2. Relation with fundamental rights
- 3.2.3. Value added
- 3.3. Choice of instruments
- 3.4. Specific provisions
- 3.5. Entry into force
The Commission has consulted stakeholders on a number of occasions and has taken into account the comments received.
2.1.1. Member States’ customs authorities
Member States were consulted by means of a questionnaire in February 2012. Member States expressed their needs for access to customs-related data (import, transit and export) regarding transactions in another Member State and the perceived usefulness of information on container movements. They also provided their views on the best way of collecting, storing and analysing such information.
In May 2012, the Commission organised a conference to gather feedback and suggestions from Member State experts on the overall functioning of the Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS), as well as on the implementation of and prospects for Regulation (EC) No 515/97. The conference consisted of a plenary session and four specific workshops on legal issues, Joint Customs Operations, applications, and technical and IT security aspects of the current status and future evolution of AFIS.
On a number of occasions, the Commission consulted the ‘Mutual Assistance Committee’, established on the basis of Article 43 of Regulation (EC) No 515/97, consisting of the representatives of the Member States responsible for mutual administrative assistance matters. Recent discussions took place during the meetings on 24 May 2012 and on 25 September 2012.
A major consultation of the shipping industry took place on 15 March 2012, with participation of private sector companies and the World Shipping Council (WSC). The aim was to inform carriers about the proposed initiative and to obtain their feedback on the envisaged provision of CSMs to the Commission. The Commission also proposed a pilot exercise in this area. Discussion focused on the type of data that container carriers must provide to the Commission and how this should be done, as well as the methods of transmission, etc. The Commission did its utmost to involve the industry in the preparations, so as to ensure easy implementation of its proposal.
In addition, several meetings were held between the Commission and representatives of the WSC.
Based on these consultations, the type of information to be submitted by the companies was established. The most cost-effective method of transmitting this information is through a ‘global dump’, i.e. a daily copy of all container movements. Alternatively, companies may opt for selective submission of data. Remaining modalities will need to be further specified.
The shipping industry has underlined the need to ensure that data provided by the companies should be transmitted only once. The Commission should then be responsible for communicating these data to international and/or European institutions, as well as Member States, for the purposes for which the database is established.
In the course of the preparations for this proposal, meetings with the EDPS and CJSA were organised in May and June 2012.
The Commission carried out an impact assessment of policy options, taking into account the consultations of the interested parties. The conclusion was that, amongst other things, the solutions sought by the main amendments of the Regulation would comprise the following:
· Create conditions for improved fighting of customs fraud related to misdeclaration of goods origin through the submission of Container Status Messages by the deep sea carriers to the Commission. The recommended submission method is global reporting (‘global dump’) involving near zero costs. An alternative submission method is also possible.
· Create conditions for improved fighting of customs fraud related to misdescription of goods through the creation of a central database for import and export data. A legal basis for the supply of such data would need to be created. This measure will not impose any additional costs on Member States because the information that is required already exists in electronic format, namely in respective databases operated by the Commission. Therefore, only consent of the Member States to copy these data is required.
· Create conditions for improved fighting of customs fraud related to misuse of the transit system through the creation of a centralised repository for transit-related data.
· Speed up OLAF investigations by enabling direct access to documents supporting import and export declarations. Expected costs for private sector operators are near zero, since the obligation already exists (businesses are required by national law and also the Customs Code to keep the relevant documentation). Importantly, the expected volume of requests addressed to economic operators that would be necessary for OLAF investigations is expected to be very small (a few cases per year).
The Impact Assessment concluded that the proposed options are in line with the fundamental rights. In this context it is important to note that the envisaged CSM database would contain no personal data. Databases on import, export and transit would contain personal data and protection of this data is to be monitored by the EDPS according to already applicable standards laid down in Regulation (EC) No 515/97.
The proposal to amend Regulation (EC) No 515/97 should be based on Articles 33 and 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Article 33 TFEU provides the basis to cover most of the scope of exchanges of information between customs authorities and between the customs authorities and the Commission for the purpose of customs cooperation. Article 325 TFEU sets out the EU’s competence to enact the necessary measures in the fields of prevention of and fight against fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the Union’s financial interests which ‘act as a deterrent’. Article 325 and Article 33 of the TFEU provide for the legislative procedure to adopt the necessary measures with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection.
The need for EU-level legislation on mutual administrative assistance and customs cooperation stems from the following facts:
· The need for EU legislation on mutual administrative assistance and customs cooperation has already been recognised by the European legislator with the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 515/97 and Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
· It is acknowledged that many customs risks manifest themselves on a transnational basis. Illicit supply chains can quickly adapt to improvements in the risk management environment at a given point of entry and focus on other points with lower levels of protection. Action at EU level is necessary to ensure an equivalent level of protection against customs risks at all points of the external borders, as envisaged in Regulation (EC) No 648/2005.
· Given that trade is global, Member States alone cannot efficiently observe, detect and mitigate risks entailing breach of customs legislation and other customs-related risks; complementary action at EU level would substantially facilitate the work of Member States in pursuing investigations, especially in cases where cross-border transfer of goods is involved. Organising activities in the area of customs cooperation at EU level would create significant added value, with a coherent approach and coordination of the activities.
· The EU has exclusive competence in the areas of fraud prevention and the Customs Union.
· It is clear from consultation with trade stakeholders that a single central submission of CSMs will have lower costs than submission only to the Member State through which the container enters or leaves the customs territory of the Union.
· The EU is best placed to drive such collective action because it already possesses the necessary experience, systems and expertise to guarantee the rapid and cost-efficient gathering, communication and sharing of data.
· National customs authorities alone cannot effectively share information and conduct a large-scale fight against breach of customs legislation and other customs risks at reasonable cost. Systematic collection of the data required to analyse customs risks which pose a threat to the EU and its Member States would constitute a disproportionate effort for 28 individual Member States and can be achieved more effectively and efficiently by action at EU level.
It can thus be concluded that EU action to collect, store, process, use and make available to the Member States the data identified in this Regulation in pursuit of the fight against fraud and other customs risks is necessary and proportionate to the nature and scale of the risks concerned, and satisfies the principle of subsidiarity.
This initiative concerns in particular the fundamental right to protection of personal data. This right is enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 16 TFEU, based on Directive 95/46/EC, as well as in Article 8 of the ECHR.
The respect of personal data protection rights has already been duly considered in Regulation (EC) No 515/97 and Council Decision 2009/917/JHA through rigorous rules as regards the content coverage of data, data preservation and data protection supervision. In this context, it is important to note that the envisaged CSM database would contain no personal data. Databases on import, export and transit would contain personal data and protection of those data is to be ensured by the EDPS according to already applicable standards laid down in Regulation (EC) No 515/97.
The proposed action at EU level would significantly improve the detection, investigation and prevention of customs-related fraud, by increasing the exchange of information and the available evidence, and improving the functioning of the established system, thus rendering the action more efficient and effective. It would also significantly enhance the capacity of the EU to identify and mitigate the risks identified in Article 4 (25) of the Community Customs Code, including the threats posed to the Union’s security and safety, to public health, to the environment and to consumers. Consequently, the envisaged action will strengthen the protection of the Union’s financial interests, improve risk management, and further promote customs cooperation.
To guarantee that full value can be delivered, the Commission will ensure that the governance and administration of the future databases and information concerning CSMs, transit, import and export is formally shared between its services for the purposes indicated in the Regulation. It will ensure that the databases are available for seamless incorporation in risk management activities of the Commission and the Member States, including systematic real-time pre-arrival and pre-departure risk analysis. An appropriate inter-service governance structure will be provided to streamline operational management and the allocation of responsibilities for data protection and security.
The instrument proposed is a Regulation, corresponding to the instrument being amended.
3.4.1. Definitions – Article 2
The definition of the concept of customs legislation is updated, in order to have the terminology aligned with the customs field, namely adding references to entry and exit of goods. A definition of service providers active in the international supply chain in order to clarify to whom the obligation laid down in Article 18c i shall apply.
3.4.2. Admissibility of evidence – Article 12
The proposed amendment of Article 12 aims at removing legal uncertainty that currently exists in relation to the possible use of information collected through mutual assistance as evidence in national criminal proceedings.
3.4.3. Information related to movements of containers – Article 18a and new Articles 18c, 18d, 18e and 18f
Article 18a of Regulation (EC) No 515/97 provides for the establishment of a directory to collect data on container movements and to analyse these data. However, the wording of this article does not oblige the relevant economic operators (i.e. carriers) to supply the Commission with the information to be inserted in the directory (i.e. Container Status Messages — CSMs). Consequently, while the Commission has tested the effectiveness of such a directory and the analysis system is of proven quality, it is limited in quantity due to insufficient access to necessary data.
The proposed amendments aim to ensure that the necessary data are provided, by creating an obligation in a new Article 18c for the relevant service providers to supply the information in question. This information can substantially contribute to the fight against various types of customs fraud including misdeclaration of origin, and to the management of other customs risks identified in Article 4(25) of the Community Customs Code.
Article 18d specifies that for containers destined to be brought into the customs territory of the Union, the time period of reporting is delimited by the empty status of the container. In practice, this means that carriers will have to report the CSMs for containers imported into the EU from the most recent moment when the container was empty before being brought into the customs territory of the Union until the moment the container is again reported empty after leaving the customs territory of the Union. For containers leaving the customs territory of the Union the time period of reporting is limited to the moment the container is reported empty outside the customs territory of the Union. If it is not possible to determine specific empty container events, carriers may report CSMs according to the following time periods:
(a) for containers destined to arrive in the customs territory of the Union: 3 months prior to arrival in the customs territory of the Union and 1 month after the arrival in the customs territory of the Union or when a non-EU location is reached (whichever comes first).
(b) for containers leaving the customs territory of the Union: during 3 months after the container has left the customs territory of the Union.
Without prejudice to the outcome of the ongoing analysis, it may be envisaged that the main elements of the future delegated acts would be as follows:
The delegated act envisaged in Article 18f i will set out, inter alia, the exact events for which CSMs will have to be reported to the Commission. These may include the following: confirmation of booking, arrival at a loading or unloading facility, departure from a loading or unloading facility, loading on or unloading from a conveyance, instruction of stuffing or stripping, confirmation of stuffing or stripping, intra-terminal movements, terminal gate inspection and sending for heavy repair.
As far as the frequency of reporting is concerned, each carrier may choose either:
(a) to submit, on a daily basis, all new CSMs generated or collected in the carrier’s electronic equipment tracking system within the previous 24 hours, regardless of whether the CSMs concern containers which are destined to be brought in/taken out of the customs territory of the Union or not (‘data dump’); or
(b) to submit, on a daily basis, CSMs specifically related to containers (whether laden or not) destined to be brought into/taken out of the customs territory of the Union, generated or collected in the carrier’s electronic equipment tracking system within the previous 24 hours.
The minimum data elements of the CSM messaging will also be determined by means of delegated acts. The message formats and methods of transmission of the CSMs will be determined by means of implementing acts.
3.4.4. Data related to import, export and transit – new Article 18g
With a view to achieving more targeted controls and increasing the effectiveness of the fight against customs fraud, it is proposed to introduce a legal basis for the processing of import and export data.
With regard to data related to transit, an administrative arrangement on the Anti-Fraud Transit Information System was put in place in 2011 between the Commission and the Member States. Under this arrangement OLAF automatically receives the information on the movement of goods placed in transit. OLAF analyses these data and provides reports that are regularly shared with the Member States and the interested Commission services. However, while acknowledging the Commission’s efforts, several Member States feel that the Commission should define a clear legal basis for this activity replacing the present arrangement. The proposal introduces the appropriate legal basis. This does not put any additional reporting burden on the Member States, as the electronic data are already circulated and exchanged among Member States in an electronic system operated by the Commission. The proposal involves replicating the data from the systems operated by the Commission and analysing these data in order to trace fraudulent cases and build patterns useful for identifying potential instances of customs fraud and protecting the financial interests of the European Union. The proposed database will be available for use by the Commission and the customs administrations of the Member States. The Commission is the responsible data controller for this directory.
Article 13 i of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code requires that customs controls (other than spot checks) be based on risk analysis using automated data processing techniques, and provides for the establishment of a common risk management framework in that context. Article 4(25) defines the risks concerned, and Article 4(26) provides for risk management activities to include ‘collecting data and information, analysing and assessing risk, prescribing and taking action and regular monitoring and review of the process and its outcomes, based on international, Community and national sources and strategies.’ It is appropriate therefore to ensure that the data collected can be used in risk management for all customs risks and to provide for their availability to the relevant authorities at EU and Member State level for this purpose in appropriate circumstances.
3.4.5. Supporting documents – new Article 18h
In cases where OLAF requires customs-related supporting documents for the purposes of its investigations, it cannot request them directly from the economic operators but needs the intermediation of national authorities. This leads to delays in investigations and, frequently, to failure of investigations due to time barring. This is particularly problematic in customs-related cases where the limitation period of three years applies. The situation has worsened since 1 January 2011 with the introduction of e-Customs, as the documents supporting import and export declarations (invoice, certificate of origin, etc.) are no longer kept by the customs administrations but by the economic operators.
With a view to accelerating investigation procedures, a new provision is proposed to empower the Commission to obtain directly from private sector companies, the documents supporting import and export declarations, for purposes of the investigations based on Regulation (EC) No 515/97.
3.4.6. Restricted visibility and publication of the authorities – Articles 29 and 30
It is expected that introduction of the possibility to select the potential users of data (restricted visibility) would significantly increase the use of databases by Member States and consequently contribute to efficiency. Therefore, it is proposed to amend Article 29 accordingly. The proposed amendment also includes a more flexible way of publishing the updates of the lists of the relevant authorities mentioned in Articles 29 and 30.
3.4.7. Data protection – Articles 18b, 33, 37 and 38
The complex structure of the supervision of data protection rules results from the dual legal structure of the customs information system: Regulation (EC) No 515/97, Article 37(3)(a); and Council Decision 2009/917/JHA, Article 25 i which reflect the pre-Lisbon structure. Hence, two separate bodies have been established: CJSA and EDPS ensure that data protection rules are implemented according to the legislation. However, as recommendations are applicable to both parts of the IT system, it is clearly difficult to implement different opinions and recommendations. This creates redundancies in the use of resources.
To address this problem, the proposal introduces a provision which aims at simplifying and harmonising the rules for the supervision of data protection rules applicable to each of the systems. The objective is to ensure coherence during the supervision process and encourage the use of common audits, leading to joint reports.
In addition, the proposal clarifies that the EDPS is responsible for data protection supervision of the technical systems established by the Commission on the basis of this Regulation.
The proposal also introduces a maximum retention period of ten years for data stored in the CIS, stipulating additionally that in cases where personal data are stored for a period exceeding five years, the EDPS should be informed accordingly.
Finally, in order to safeguard the rules governing data protection, a specific provision is introduced in Article 38 on the security of processing.
3.4.8. Consistency with the Lisbon Treaty – Article 23, Article 25 i, Article 33, Article 38, Article 43 and Article 43a
In order to ensure increased consistency of Regulation (EC) No 515/97 with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the proposed amendment takes account of the necessary adjustments as regards granting the Commission delegated powers (Article 290 TFEU) or implementing powers (Article 291 TFEU).
The proposed Article 18c i introduces an obligation for public or private sector operators active in the international chain to send to the Commission data on container movements. Given that this provision may conflict with contractual obligations between companies and their clients relating to non-disclosure and confidentiality, the Article concerning entry into force provides for an appropriate transitional period, during which carriers should renegotiate their private law contracts in order to comply with the amended Regulation.
The budgetary effort concerns mainly the IT costs to maintain and further develop the existing AFIS system. The costs related to the implementation of this proposal will be handled within the framework of the existing forecast in the context of Multiannual Financial Framework and therefore no additional request for budgetary allocation is required. The overall costs of the proposal are comparable to those of the previous period and are considered as a mere continuation of recurrent costs. The budgetary development related to this proposal is in line with the Multiannual Financial Framework.